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Introduction
The Articles of Agreement of the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) distinguish between payments for
current international transactions and capital move-
ments; the Articles generally prohibit members of the
IMF from restricting or delaying the former, while
permitting members to restrict or control the latter.
This distinction seems to have been a product of the
members' concern that, under fixed exchange rates, they
must retain the capacity to control capital movements
in order to preserve the autonomy of their domestic
monetary policies, to insure that the exchange rates
established by the IMF would not be undermined by
speculative movements of capital, and to preserve a
tool by which payment imbalances in the capital account
might be remedied, should the established exchange rates
appear to be (temporarily) inappropriate.
The recent change from "fixed" to flexible
exchange rates eliminates, in theory at least, some of
these historic bases for the distinction between pay-
ments for current and capital transactions. For example,
capital movements enhance the effectiveness of domestic
monetary policy under flexible rates (although the
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effectiveness of fiscal policy may be impaired) and
exchange speculation may work to stabilize rather than
to destabilize the international monetary system.
Further, the need to remedy payment imbalances would
not exist under a system of freely floating exchange
rates, for the exchange rate would adjust to maintain
external transactions in equilibrium. However, the un-
stated political motives for controlling the movement
of capital may still exist. And its usefulness to
remedy payment imbalances may continue where, as is
currently the case, the exchange rates do not float
freely, but are subject to occasional and heavy govern-
ment intervention.
In addition to the present weakness of the his-
torical bases for capital control, there is to be con-
sidered a ,welfare" theory which holds that the factors
of production must move unrestrictedly if their most
efficient distribution is to be realized. The case for
incz eased capital mobility is strong: greater mobility
of capital renders monetary policy more effective and
contributes to world economic growth as well.
It is therefore somewhat surprising that the
Second Amendment to the Articles, while legitimating
post hoc the flexible exchange-rate system, continues
to preserve the distinction between payments for cur-
rent and capital transactions. Flexible exchange rates
eliminate the economic need for such a distinction.
Yet, this continued distinction suggests that individual
countries are unwilling to surrender power to control
capital movements. Any proposal to amend further the
Articles to withhold from members the power to control
capital movements and, thereby, to increase the mobi-
lity of capital, must be analyzed carefully. The
potentially deleterious effects, as well as the bene-
fits, that are likely to attend such increased mobility
of capital require consideration.
This paper will examine the distinction between
payments for current and capital transactions from the
several perspectives. Part I provides an institutional
background to the textual definition of the distinction.
Part I is a discussion of the various interpretations
of the relevant provisions of the Articles. In part
III, an analysis of judicial interpretations is under-
taken in an effort to determine whether, in fact, the
courts look to the character of the underlying transac-
tion in passing upon the legality of restrictions on
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related payments. In part IV, the historical back-
ground of the Bretton Woods Conference is examined to
elucidate the concerns of the drafters of the Second
Amendment, which formed the basis of their decision to
reserve to member governments the power to control
capital movements. Finally, in part V, the role of
capital mobility is scrutinized from an economic per-
spective; analysis of flexible exchange rates reveals
that the drafters' concerns for potentially adverse
effects from capital movements no longer apply and the
corresponding provisions of the Articles are inappro-
priate to the IMF's purpose of economic growth and
development.
The potential which increased capital mobility has
to enhance the effectiveness of monetary policy and to
contribute to greater world welfare also involves
costs. Thus, a conclusion as to whether the distinc-
tion between payments for current and capital transac-
tions ought to be maintained depends upon the relative
weight assigned to the various costs and benefits that
are likely to accrue to either alternative. This
weighing is performed in part VI.
I. Institutional Background
The Articles of Agreement of the International
Monetary Fund were drafted at the United Nations
Monetary and Financial Conference, which met at Bretton
Woods, New Hampshire, in July of 1944.1 From their entry
into force on December 27, 1945, the Articles have been
the legal foundation of the IMF and the world monetary
system. The First Amendment became effective in 1969, 2
and the recently proposed Second Amendment was accepted
by the United States on October 19, 1976, and became
1. For a text of the Final Act and related documents of the
Conference, see UNITED NATIONS MONETARY AND FINANCIAL CONFERENCE,
BRETTON WOODS, NEW HAMPSHIRE, JULY 1, TO JULY 22, 19-44 (Department of
State Publication 2187, Conference Series 55, 1944). The Interna-
tional Monetary Fund [hereinafter referred to as the "IMF"] has
also published the original and amended Articles in pamphlet form.
2. See IMF, PROPOSED AMENDMENT OF THE ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT
(1968).
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effective on April 1, 1978.3 The Second Amendment
formally acknowledges the change from the familiar ,par
value" or "adjustable peg system of exchange rates,
which had been established by the original Articles and
maintained until March of 1973, to the generalized
"floating" rates which exist today.5
Among the purposes of the IMF, the Articles set
forth what must be a primary objective of every modern
country:
to facilitate the expansion and balanced
growth of international trade, and to
contribute thereby to the promotion and
maintenance of high levels of employment
and real income and to the development of
the productive resources of all members.... 6
The operative provisions of the Articles establish the
IMF's essential functions and the rules of conduct for
its members.
The original Articles called for each member to
declare a par value for its currency and to maintain
its market value within 10 percent of par. 7 Under the
3. See Bretton Woods Agreements Act Pub. L. No. 94-564, §1,
90 Stat. 2660 (1976) (codified at 22 U.S.C. §286e-5 (1976)). See
also IMF, PROPOSED SECOND AMENDMENT TO THE ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT
OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARYFUND (1976). The Proposed Second
Amendment became effective on April 1, 1978, upon acceptance by
three-fifths of the members having four-fifths of the voting power,
as required by Article XVII (b) (Article XXVIII (a) of the Second
Amendment), 7 Mf SURVEY 97 (1978) (Fund Press Release No. 78/19).
All further references to "the Articles" shall be to the
Second Amendment to the Articles of Agreement, unless the
reference is otherwise identified. Parallel citations will be
made where appropriate.
4. See Article 11, Second Amendment, supra note 3. See
also R. SOLOMON, THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM 1945-1976, at
12-13 (1977) for a brief description of the par value system. It
is this system that, due to international reluctance to adjust par
values, came to be known as the system of "fixed" exchange rates.
5. See R. SOLOMON, supra note 4, at 267; see generally id.
at 267-89.
6. Article T(ii), Second Amendment, supra note 3.
7. Article IV, §(5)(c),(f), original Articles, supra note
YALE STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER
Second Amendment, members are merely required to choose
appropriate exchange arrangements and to conduct ex-
change transaction s consistently with specified "good
faith" standards.0 The IMF's monetary resources,
derived both from members' subscriptions9 and from
special drawing rights,1 0 are available to members
according to each member's quota.ll Although members
may use these esources to finance temporary or cycli-
cal imbalances or to obtain needed currencies, 1 2 they
may not use the IMF's resources to meet "a large or
sustained outflow of capital"13 or in any other manner
"contrary to the purposes of the Fund".1 With some
exceptions for those countries availing themselves of
the "transitional arrangements" provided by the
Articles,15 members are subject to several obliga-
tions,16 notably: to maintain the convertibility of
their respective currencies,I7 to avoid discriminatory
currency practices,1 8 and to provide the IMF with speci-
fied national data.19
8. 5ee Article IV, Second Amendment, supra note 3,
9. See Article III, Second Amendment, supra note 3,
10. Special drawing rights are a form of international
liquidity generated by the International Monetary Fund according
to rules specified in Articles XV through XXV, Second Amendment,
supra note 3. They are sometimes described as "paper gold" and
are similar in concept to Federal Reserve Notes. For a more
complete description of special drawing rights, see R. SOLOMON,
supra note 4, at Chapter VIII; IMF, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY REFORM:
DOCUMENTS OF THE COMMITTEE OF TWENTY 15-17 (1974).
11. See Article V, §3(b)(Iii), Second Amendment, supra
note 3.
12. Article V, §3(a), Second Amendment, supra note 3.
13. Article VI, §l(a), Second Amendment, supra note 3.
14. Article V, §5, Second Amendment, supra note 3.
15. See Article XIV, §2, Second Amendment, supra note 3.
The transitional arrangements, for countries not prepared to under-
take the full responsibilities of the Articles, excuse such coun-
tries from the obligation to refrain from restricting payments for
current transactions. Article VIII, §2(a), Second Amendment,
supra note 3.
16. See qenerallZy Article VIII, Second Amendment, supra
note 3.
17. Article VIII, §4, Second Amendment, supmx note 3.
18, Article VIII, §3, Second Amendment, supra note 3.
19. Article VIII, §5, Second Amendment, supra note 3.
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TT. T4. D sqtincti-pn between P!ayent4 for Current
lnternat- onal Transacti on& and International
Cap,4ta4 Movements
A. The Articles-
In addition to the obligations of members listed
above, the I'M requires that members distinguish between
their treatment of payments for current international
transactions and their treatment of international
capital movements. Article 'VTTT, Section 2Caj, pro-
hibits members20 from imposing restrictions "on the
making of payments and transfers for current interna,
tional transactions" unless such restrictions are
approved by the IMF. It should be emphasized that the
terms of this provision apply only to restrictions on
the making of payments and transfers. This section
does not prevent a member from regulating or prohibit-
ing either the recei'pt of such payments by its resi-
dents or their entry into the underlying transactions
that give rise to such payments. 2 1
Yet Article VI, Section 3, expressly permits mem-
bers to "exercise such controls as are necessary, to
regulate international capital movements," except where
the controls are exercised in a manner "which will
restrict payments for current transactions or which
will unduly delay transfers of funds in settlements of
commitments .. 2 Indeed, the IMF may render this
provision more permissive by excusing a member from the
20. However, members availing themselves of the transitional
arrangements of Article XIV, §2, may impose restrictions on pay-
ments for current international transactions, See note 15 supra.
21, J.G, Evans, Current and Capital Transactions: How the
Fund Defines Them, 5 FINANCE AND DEVELOPMENT 30, 31 (1968).
22. Joseph Gold, General Counsel of the IMF, notes that
this clause is ambiguous. See J. GOLD, INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL
MOVEMENTS UNDER THE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 55 n. 22
(I14F Pamphlet No, 2, 1977) [hereinafter cited as J, GOLD, INTER-
NATIONAL CAPITAL'MOVEMENTSI, It is not clear whether "commitments"
relates to current or capital transactions, or to both. However,
in view of the terms of Article VIII, Section 2(a), supra note 3,
prohibiting members from restricting "payments and transfers for
current international transactions" (emphasis supplied), to limit
the reference to this clause to current transactions would seem
to render it superfluous. A reasonable interpretation
19791
YALE STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER
inhibitions of the above-quoted exception when that
member's currency has been declared "scarce."123 And
the IMF may even require a member to impose such con-
trols when these are deemed necessary to remedy a
large or sustained outflow of capital.2 4
The characterization of a particular control is
therefore of considerable importance to members. Gen-
erally speaking, if a control is on capital movements,
it will be consistent with the Articles, But, if it
restricts the making of payments for current transac-
tions, it will be inconsistent with the Articles and
its imposition may subject the member to the sanctions
of ineligibility or compulsory withdrawal from the
IMF. 25
Whether a particular control is consistent with
the Articles is -a fundamental question in the resolu-
tion of disputes regarding certain commercial relation-
ships between private parties. Article 'VIII, Section
2(b) provides that: "Exchange contracts which involve
the currency of any member and which are contrary to
the exchange control regulations of that member main-
tained or imposed consistently with this Agreement
shall be unenforceable in the territories of any
member.... " On the basis of this provision, numerous
cases have arisen which deal with the propriety of cer-
tain controls on current payments and capital movements.
In order to determine the character of a particu-
lar control, it is necessary to inquire into the nature
of the underlying transaction. The informal rules that
22. CContinued)
would he that the clause exempts from regulation any transfer made
in respect of a current or capital transaction which was entered
into prior to any capital control which purports to restrict such
transfer. So interpreted, the clause is vaguely similar to the
prohibition in the United States Constitution of laws impairing
the obligation of contracts. U.S. CONST. art. I, §10, Cf. Evans,
supra note 21, at 32.
23, 68e Article VII, especially §3(b), Second Amendment,
supra note 3.
24. Article VI, §l(a), Second Amendment, supra note 3.
25. Article XXVI, §2, Second Amendment, supra note 3.
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are commonly applied to distinguish current from
capital transactions are quite straightforward. A
transaction that involves the exchange of goods or ser-
vices for prompt payment between residents of different
countries commonly is identified as a current interna-
tional transaction.2 6 A capital transaction, however,
is one which does not entail a quid pro quo in goods
and services, but which gives rise to an obligation or
expectation that the recipient will reimburse the len-
der or payor in the future, 27 or which establishes a
claim on the part of the payor to the currency or
foreign exchange reserves of the recipient country.2 8
Generally, then, a payment for a current transaction
has as its counterpart the receipt of goods or services-,
whereas a capital movement or transfer has as its
counterpart a claim to a future return.29
Although the Articles do not define capital move-
ments, Article XXXCd) defines "payments for current
transactions" as "payments which are not for the pur-
pose of transferring capital," including without limi-
tation:
(1) all payments due in connection with
foreign trade, other current business,
including services, and normal short-
term banking and credit facilities;
C2) payments due as interest on loans and
as net income from other investments;
26. J. COLD, INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MOVEMENTS, supra note 22,
at 19. For an illustration of a current transaction, see H.R.,
HELLER, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY ECONOMICS 54-44 (1974). Often, a
transaction will be regarded as "current" even though the goods
that are traded are "real capital" rather than consumer goods,
See id. at 11.
27. See HELLER, supra note 26, at 145.
28. J. GOLD, INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MOVEMENTS, supra note 22,
at 19. Cf. Evans, supra note 21, at 32.
29. Evans, supra note 21, at 30. Note, however, that
balance-of-payments accounting may further distinguish between
capital movements, as payments of financial capital which give
rise to obligations or expectations of repayment or claim of
ownership, and capital transfers, as a movement of capital
without a quid pro quo or future claim (e.g., charitable contribu-
tions or government grants-in-aid). If the payment is repayable,
it is a capital movement; if it is not repayable, it is a transfer.
See HELLER, supra note 26; P. H0ST-MADSER, BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
6-15 (IMF Pamphlet No. 9, 1967).
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(3) payments of moderate amount for
amortization of loans or for
depreciation of direct investments;
and
(4) moderate remittances for family
living expenses.
The broad scope of this definition is indicated by the
phrase "without limitation" and by the final sentence
of the s-ub.section. Clearly, the definition does not
purport to exhaust the list of possible payments for
current transactions. 3 0 Indeed, several of thr enumer-
ated examples- extend the definition beyond the common
rule to include payments in respect of transactions
that otherw-ise might be considered to be of a capital
nature.31
With the informal rules thus modified, the nature
of many frequent and important international transac-
tions can be readily identified, The first of the
enumerated examples confirms the informal rule by
guaranteeing current status to all payments for trade,
-current business, and services. Obviously, then, pur-
chases of goods and services are current transactions,
the payment for which may not be restricted by members.
It should be noted that goods or services so purchased
need not be imported into or performed within the mem-
ber country where the purchaser resides, 3 2 Where a
resident of member country A purchases goods in country
B, processes them in C, and sells them in D, he has
engaged in a series of current transactions; the fact
that the goods were ne:ver imported into A does not af-
fect the current status of the transactions. 3 3 Similar-
ly, tourist expenditures and other personal expenditures
abroad (-e.g., medical, educational, and other living ex-
penses-) a:re regarded as current, though there is not
necessarily a flow of goods or services into the home
30, J, GOLD, INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MOVEMENTS, supra note 22,
at 19.
31. See J, GOLD, THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND AND PRIVATE
BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 12 13 CINF Pamphlet No. 3, 1965) [hereinafter
cited as THE IMF AND PRIVATE BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS]; Evans, supra
note 21, at 33, 35,
32, Evans, supra note 21, at 34.
33. dt
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country.34 Also? disbursements for foreign and inter-,
national transportation are treated as current pay-
ments.35
The character of a transaction for domestic
accounting or tax purposes is not determinative of its
characterization under the Articles, Hence, the pur-
chase abroad of large productive machinery which is in-
stalled in the home country, though it may be viewed as
a capital expenditure by a tax accountant, will be a
current transaction for the purposes of the Articles.3 6
Although providing "normal short-term banking and
credit facilities" would qualify as capital transactions
under the informal rule, these are expressly afforded
"current" status in the Articles. The question arises
whether the terms include all commercial bank and inter-
corporate loans maturing in one year or less. 37 However,
the limiting adjectives, "normal" and "facilities,"
suggest that only such short-term banking and credit as
is necessary to sustain current trade and business is
comprehended i4 the definition of payments for current
transactions.36
Payments of interest on loans and net income from
investments, though not within the informal rule, are
defined as payments for current transactions. The
definition is not confined to the interest and income of
short-term loans and investments, but rather it applies
to all such interest, regardless of the term of the in-
vestment. Therefore, the payment of stock dividends,
operating income, and interest may not be restricted by
members. 39 The question might arise whether the redemp-
tion of stock or the proceeds of liquidation and redemp-
tion are productive activities from which current income
may be derived, In fact, they terminate the investment
and free the inv estorts capital therefrom. Thus, the
payment or redemption or liquidation proceeds would not
meet the requirement that a current payment be one "which
is not for the purpose of transferring capital." There-
fore, under Article VIII, Section 2(a) such payments may
be restricted.
34. Id
35. See P, SAMUELSON, ECONQ CS 655-57 C9tr ed. i 7.3)1.
36. Evans, supra note 21, at 30.
37. Cf. P. H0ST-MADSEN, supra note 29, at 13.
38. See Evans, supra note 21, at 35.
39. See P. HOST-MADSEN, supra note 29, at 10.
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Additionally, the amortization of loans, deprecia-
tion of direct investments, and remittances for family
living expenses, if "moderate" in amount, are regarded
as payments for current transactions. The concepts are
familiar and require little explanation. For deter-
mining the propriety of the amount of depreciation or
amortization payments, the qualification that they be
moderate seems to draw on generally accepted principles
and local circumstances regarding such variables as the
method of computation and the useful life of an
asset. 4 0 Any appropriate method of computing deprecia,
tion or amortization would probably qualify under this
definition.4 1 However, it is doubtful that highly-
accelerated methods would be regarded as "moderate,"
especially if such acceleration were not for an accept-
able business purpose, but rather for the sole purpose
of transferring capital.
Capital transaptions include long-term loans and
direct investments, 4 2 though the amortization and
depreciation thereof, as noted above, are current pay-
ments. Direct investment is perhaps best described as
a special sort of long-term loan, in which "the Tbor-
rower' and 'lender' are parts of the same corporate
family."43 For example, a parent corporation may
finance the construction abroad, by its subsidiary, of
an industrial plant. Thus, the parent would utilize
its own internal efficiencies as well as obtain the
advantages of an equity interest in a plant that is
desirably located.44
Also, portfolio investments in stocks and debt
obligations of foreign issuers constitute capital
transactions.45 Most such investments will be made for
the long term and for purposes that are not directly
related to current transactions. As discussed above,
40. Cf. Evans, supra note 21, at 34.
41. 1d,
42. "Lqng-term"' indicates a loan for a term exceeding one
year. See P. H0ST-MADSEN, supra note 29, at 13-15.
43. Aliber, A Theory of Direct Foreign Investment, in THE
INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION 17 (C, Kindleberger ed. 1970).
44. Cf. id, at 18.
45. Cf. J. GOLD, INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MOVEMENTS, supra
note 22, at 57 n. 45; P. HOST-MADSEN, supra note 29, at 14.
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where qhortterm jnvetments are undertaken not in
support of current trade and business, but rather for
the purpose of transferring capital, then such short-
term banking arguably may be capital transactions,
Therefore, it is most likely that short-term loans en-
gaged in for purposes of exchange speculation would
qualify as movements of capital rather than current pay-
ments,
I'Transfer" payments comprise a group of transac-
tions that are difficult to classify as "capital" or
"current."146 Such payments are unilateral--they have
no quid pro quo, nor do they give rise tp a claim for
future repayment.or to equity interests.47 Private
transfers take such forms as charitable contributions,
remittances to relatives, and other gifts and inheri-
tances. Government transfers can take many forms,48
such as the provision of commodities, machinery, or
funds, but the largest component of government trans-
fers is economic aid in the form of grants.49 In some
contexts, the nature of a transfer is determined by
inquiring into whether it would constitute income or
capital to the recipient. 5 0 However, such a test is
not appropriate with respect to the Articles. A pay-
ment for whichthere is no return in goods or services
represents a net loss to the capital reserves of the
transferor country. Such payments are therefore for the
purpose of transferring capital51 and may be subject to
restriction under Article VI, Section 3,
It is important to note that the concept of "con-
trols" is broader than that of "restrictions" and, in-
deed, may comprehend the latter term. A control need
not restrict payments for current transactions or capi'
tal movements; it may merely influence or regulate them 5 2
46. Evans, supra note 21, at 32, 33.
47, Cf. P, H0ST-MADSEN, supra note 29, at 11-12; Evans,
supra note 21, at 32.
48. P. H0ST-MADSEN, supra note 29, at 11.
49. Id.
50. Evans, suppa note 21, at*34.
51. Id.
52, J. GOLD, INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MOVEMENTS, supra note 22,
at 5,
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For the remainder of this paper, controls in their
broader, non-restrictive sense are not at issue, for
they do not directly affect the mobility of capital.
Henceforth, "Icontrols" and Prestrictions" are considered
to be equivalent. Unless specified otherwise, "con-
trolsl' refers to regulations that are restrictive or
prohibitive of capital movements, transfers, or current
payments. The discussion of several interpretations and
decisions of the IF will help to distinguish controls
which the Articles permit from those which they prohibit.
B, Interppetation by the International Monetary Fund
The final sentence of the definition of current
transactions CArticle XXX (d) of the Second Amendment)
provides that the W, after consultation with the mem-
bers concerned. -may "determine whether certain specific
transactions are to be considered current transactions
or capital transactions," Article XXIX of the Second
Amendment further expands that power: "(a) Any question
of interpretation of the provision of this Agreement
arising between any member and the Fund shall be sub-
mitted to the Executive Board for its decision.... " The
power of interpretation created by this Article is both
final and wholly internal, for there is no recourse to
agencies external to the IMF. 5 3 An appeals procedure is
established utilizing an IMF committee at the first
level; if the issues are not resolved, the members may
seek to be heard by a tribunal of three arbitrators and
an umpire Cchosen by the IMF, each of the two objecting
members, nd the International Court of Justice, respec-
tively). 5 The Fund has only rarely exercised its
power of final interpretation. More often, interpreta-
tions have been adopted through "decisions" of the Exe-
cutive Directors.55 As the Executive Directors are also
the body empowered to render final interpretations,
their decisions have great weight, without the formality
and inflexibility of final interpretations.
53. See Article XXIX, Second Amendment, supra note 3; J. GOLD,
INTERPRETATION BY THE FUND 1-3 (IMF Pamphlet No. 11, 1968),
54. Article XXIX (b), (c), Second Amendment, supra note 3.
55. See J. GOLD, INTERPRETATION BY THE FUND, supra note 53,
at 3-4, 14-16,
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An early interpretation, in response to an inquiry
from the United States, construed the Articles to mean
that memberst use of IMF resources should be limited
according to the IMFT s purpose of giving "temporary
assistance in financing balance of payments deficits on
current account for -monetary stabilization operations.",56
This left in doubt what has been understood to be the mem-
bers' right to use IMF resources to finance capital out-
flows that were neither large nor sustained CArticle VI,
Section 11. A later decision of the Executive Directors
clarified the. earlier interpretation by explaining that
it had not been intended to "preclude the use of the
Fund's resources for. capital transfers in accordance with
the provisions of the Articles, including Article vj."57
Thus, outflows that were neither large nor sustained
could be financed through use of those resources. This
decision is of practical value for, in permitting memberst
use of the IMF's resources for such purposes, the general
propensity to impose controls on small or temporary out-
flows of capital was probably reduced. However, this
decision is not of great value in distinguishing capital
from current transactions.
A decision of the Executive Directors, in Oune of
1960, dealt with the provisions of Article VY11, Section
2. The Directors determined that "[the guiding
principle in ascertaining whether a measure is a restric-
tion on payments and transfers for current transactions
...is whether it involves a direct governmental limita-
tion on the availability or use of exchange as such.t"58
This criterion is quite important, for it requires that
a direct quantitiative limit upon or a prohibition of
the use of exchange in current international transac,
tions must be a "restriction" within the terms of Article
viIi.59 Such a restriction, under most circumstances, is
prohibited and inconsistent with the Articles, Converse-
ly, however, an indirect limitation is not regarded as a
"restriction" and would be permitted. Import licenses
56, Decision No. 71,2, Sept. 26, 1946, reprinted n In W,
SELECTED DECISIONS OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS 54 Od Issue, i9651
[hereinafter cited as SELECTED DECISIONS].
57, Decision No. 1238 - C61/43), July 28, 1961, reprinted in
SELECTED DECISIONS, supra note 56, at 54. See aZso J. GOLD,- INTER-
PRETATION BY THE FUND, supra note 53, at 28-31.
58, Decision No, 1034 - C60/27), June 1, 1960, repr nted -n
SELECTED DECISIONS, supra note 56, at 81, 81,-82. See aZso J. GOLD,
THE IMF AND PRIVATE BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, supra note 31, at 10,
59. Decision No. 1034 - (60/27), supra note 58.
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and qugtas, whether for health or protectionist pur
poses, would not violate the Articles so long as ex-
change were freely ayailable for the transactions that
come within the quota or for those that are properly
licensed,' l despite the inevitable. impact of such ineasures
upon the demand for and use of foreign eachange. Simi-
larly, a member could declare a category of international
transactions to be illegal in its domestic law without
contravening the Articles. Article VII, Section 2Cb).,
however, would not compel other -members to recognize such
a declaration, That section provides for the unenforc-
ability of exchange contracts that are contrary to mem-
bers' exchange control regulations imposed consistently
with the Articles. Thus, a law within a country which
prohibits certain transactions does not constitute an
impermissible exchange control regulation; rather, it is
a domestic regulation of commerce or trade.
Though the guiding principle articulated in this
decision is formalistic, the distinction between direct
and indirect limitations reflects the memberst practical
and political objectives in establishing the ITMF. The
members did not intend the Articles to apply to trade
policy and they left themse ves free to regulate under-
lying current transactions,6
2
The motive or purpose of a member in imposing ex-
change regulations is immaterial to determinations of
the consistency of the regulations with the Articles.
The Executive Directors in July, 1956, decided that:
Subject to the provisions of Article V,
Section 3 concerning payments for current
transactions and undue delay in transfers
of funds in settlement of commitments:
Ca) Members are free to adopt a policy
of regulating capital movements
for any reason, due regard being
60, Import quotas and other restrictions on trade may come
within the purview of other international agreements, but such quotas
are not themselves subject to the provisions of the IMF Articles.
Perhaps the most extensive international treatment of trade policy is
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), in which United
States participation was effected by an executive agreement under
the authority of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934, as
amended. See 19 U.S.C. §1351(a)(1) (1976),
61, See J. GOLD, THE IMF AND PRIVATE BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS,
supra note 31, at 9-12,
62. Cf, id. at 10,
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paid to the general purposes of the
Fund and without prejudice to the
provisions of Article VI, Section 1.
(b) They may, for that purpose, exercise
such controls as are necessary, in-
cluding making such arrangements
as may be reasonably needed with
other countries, without approval
of the Fund.6 3
Although the decision of June 1960, discussed
above, recommended that exchange regulations for non-
balance-of-payments reasons "be avoided to the greatest
possible extent,"61 4 it did not rescind this 1956 deci-
sion making motive immaterial.
Therefore, so long as an exchange control neither
restricts payments and transfers for current transac-
tions CArticle VIII, Section 2Ca)), nor causes undue
delay in transfers for the settlement of commitments
CArticle VI, Section 3), nor causes a scarcity of the
member's currency (Article VII), it will generally be
permitted, even if motivated by noneconomic reasons.
Countries, then, may impose politically motivated con-
trols that are restrictive of capital movements. The
system of controls that members imposed upon Rhodesia
was therefore permissible.65 Additionally, members are
entitled to impose exchange controls for security
reasons, if they do not violate the specific articles
mentioned.66
Exchange surrender requirements are a form of
regulation that is not direct, yet neither are they so
essential as to bear on national security. Thus, a
country may require its residents to surrender the
foreign exchange proceeds of current transactions, but
a member may not forbid its residents access to the
foreign exchange needed for payments on current tran-
sactions, for limitations on such access would consti-
63. Decision No. 541 - (56/39), July 25, 1956, reprinted in
SELECTED DECISIONS, supra note 56, at 55 Cmpha added).
64. Decision No. 1034 - (60/27), supra note 58, at 82.
65. J. GOLD, THE FUND AGREEMENT IN THE COURTS, PARTS VIII-
XI 81 (1976) [hereinafter cited as 2 J. GOLD, THE FUND AGREEMENT].
66. Decision No. 144 - (52/51), August 14, 1952, reprinted in
SELECTED DECISIONS, supra note 56, at 75.
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tute direct restrictions and, therefore, would contra-
vene the decision of the Directors, 67
Article VIII, Section 2(b), set forth on page 8,
supra, renders unenforceable any exchange contract
which is contrary to exchange control regulations that
have been imposed consistently with the Articles. A
decision of the Executive Directors in June, 1949, in-
terpreted this Section to mean that parties entering
such contracts "will not receive the assistance of the
Judicial or administrative authorities of other members
in obtaining the performance of such contracts .... "6 8
The decision further states that when a party to such
a contract seeks enforcement thereof, the courts of the
member country where the action is brought "will not,
on the ground that they are contrary to the public
policy Cordre public) of the forum, refuse recognition"
of another member's exchange control regulations that
are consistent with the Articles. 69
This provision was not drafted to encourage or
perpetuate those exchange controls which prove to be
vexatious in private business transactions,Y0 nor
should it have that effect. Instead it promotes the
integrity and consistent application of such controls
as the Articles permit or require and curbs the pre-
Bretton Woods tendency of most courts to refuse to
recognize exchange regulations foreign to their Juris-
diction.71 Article VIII, Section 2(b), as interpreted
by the Directors, does not go so far as to make foreign
exchange controls part of the domestic la of each
member. It does, however, render unenforceable those
contracts which contravene the valid controls of another
member whose currency is involved even if the contract
would not offend the domestic laws of the forum.7 2
67. See J. GOLD, THE IMF AND PRIVATE BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS,
supra note 31, at 8.
68. Decision No. 446 - 4, June 10, 1944, pepxrited 'n
SELECTED DECISIONS, supra note 56, at 73, 73.
69. id. at 74.
70. J. GOLD, THE IMF AND PRIVATE BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS,
supra note 31, at 22.
71. Id. at 22-24.
72. 2 J. GOLD, THE FUND AGREEMENT, supra note 65, at 80.
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C. Summary
The Articles establish an international monetary
system which prohibits member countries from restrict-
ing payments and transfers for current international
transactions, except where authorized by the IMF (Arti-
cle VIII, Section 2Ca)). However, members may control
capital movements for any purpose, unless their con-
trols restrict current payments or the settlement of
commitments (Article VI, Section 3). Exchange contracts
that involve a member's currency and that violate that
member's valid exchange control regulations are unen-
forceable in the courts of other members (Article VIII,
Section 2(b)). If a member abides by the Articles, the
motive of the member in imposing its own exchange con-
trol regulations is immaterial.
The Articles define current transactions as those
transactions not for the purpose of transferring capi-
tal and list several transactions that are expressly
declared to be current, though they may appear to have
attributes of capital transactions. This list serves
to extend the definition somewhat beyond the common
understanding of current transactions and includes some
transfers of funds for which there is no corresponding
flow of goods and services. The guiding principle in
ascertaining whether a measure is a restriction on pay-
ments for current transactions is whether it is a direct
limitation on the use of foreign exchange. Indirect
limitations, such as import quotas, are unaffected by
the Articles.
The following section discusses cases in several
jurisdictions where controls in current payments and
capital movements have been challenged, either direct-
ly or implicitly. The judicial interpretations of the
relevant provisions of the Articles, and the conclu-
sions regarding the character of underlying transactions,
expand the definitions already discussed.
III, Judicial Interpretation
Much of the international movement of capital
results from direct investment, portfolio investments,
and long-term loans,73 the character of which is seldom
73, See P. H0ST-MADSEN, supra note 29, at 14.
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obscure. Controls on such movements, expressly permit-
ted under the Articles, are unlikely to be contested in
the courts. Conversely, controls that clearly restrict
payments for transactions in goods and services are un-
likely to be imposed, especially if it is assumed that
governments tend to abide by agreements to which they
have adhered. For these reasons, controls affecting
many economically significant transactions will never
come before the courts, And, although the IMF may de-
clare a member ineligible to use IMF resources and re-
quire a member to withdraw in the event that a member
fails to fulfill its obligations under the Articles, it
has used this power only rarely.74 Moreover, the IMF
has never expelled a member where its sole infraction
was an inappropriate exchange restriction.7 5 Where con,-
trols are economically significant and inconsistent with
the Articles, informal persuasion may be the preferred
means by which other members effect their removal,
Some controls, though held to be consistent with
the Articles, nevertheless may affect current payments,
while others may be imposed on payments that are not
easily classified as either current or capital. Over-
broad and ambiguous exchange regulations are more likely
to inhibit commercial activity and, thus, to be chal-
lenged by private parties. Such challenges might occur
where a transaction possesses both current and capital
characteristics or where the settlement of a commitment
necessitates a movement of capital.
Though the controls that come before the courts are
generally of less economic significance than those that
are not challenged or that are dealt with informally,
the judicial reasoning in the cases helps to identify
current and capital attributes of transactions that are
ambiguous in character. Further, a judicial exposition
of the criteria that determine the consistency of ex-
change regulations with the Articles would be a valuable
74. See Article XXVI, supra note 3; J. GOLD, MEMBERSHIP AND
NONMEMBERSHIP, at Ch. 16, especially 337-41.
75. See J. GOLD, MEMBERSHIP AND NONMEMBERSHIP, Ch. 16,
especially at 357 (recommendation of the Executive Directors that
Czechoslovakia be required to withdraw is based on several grounds,
one of which is that member's failure to consult with the Fund
regarding the retention of restrictions that were inconsistent with
Article VIII).
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tool for the analysis of close cases. Unfortunately,
the constellation of cases is far from ideal and the
rationales are not well~articulated.
Most of the cases arise between. private parties
under Article VII'I, Section 2(bl, relating to the un-
enforceability of exchange contracts that are contrary
to appropriate exchange controls. Often, therefore,
analysis of the underlying transactions and the consis-
tency, of regulations thereon with the Articles, though
important, is treated as ancillary, to the determination
of enforceability and its consequences. Other issues,
treated somewhat more extensively in the cases are (11
whether the contract being litigated is an "exchange
contract" within the meaning of the Section, and C2)
which country's currency is "involved'" in the contract.
These latter issues are of minor importance to this
paper Cthough they may be determinative of the outcome
in a case) for they are threshold questions which must
be reached before the validity of an exchange control
regulation can be determined. They are only briefly
dealt with below, Other cases are grouped according to
subject matter rather than by the few tests or criteria
that have been articulated.
A. On the Meaning- of "Exchange Contract" and
"Involve the Currency of an, Member," in
Arti'cle VIII, Secti'on 2Cbl
The concept of "exchange contracts" has been defin-
ed by Dr. F.A. Mann as "contracts which affect the cur-
rency resources of any member."17 6 From the broad read-
ing of the term "currency," which seems fairly compelled
by the purposes and structure of the IMF Agreement, Dr.
Mann considers that gold, securities, moveables, and ever
land may become "the subject-matter of exchange control
and their transfer may involve the currency of a
76, F.A. MANN, THE LEGAL ASPECT OF MONEY 382 (2d ed, 1953);
id. at 439-48 (3d ed, 1971) (elaboration and slight modification of
earlier view). See also J. GOLD, THE FUND AGREEMENT IN THE COURTS,
PARTS I - VII at 146 (1962) [hereinafter cited as 1 GOLD, THE FUND
AGREEMENT]:
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member."7 7 This view of an "exchange contract," which
turns upon whether a contract affects a member's cur-
rency, necessarily deterzines the Meaning of the terM
"involve the currency."78
A much narrower view,,-,that "exchange contracts"
are limited to those contrats which have an exchange
or transfer of currencies as their Pmmediate objective,
and which "involve" a currency only if that currency
is the medium of payment or is referred to within the
contract .-has been proffered by Professor A. Nussbaum
and supported by the seventh and eighth editions of
Diceyts treatise on the conflict of laws. 7 9  Although
such contracts are clearly within the meaning of "ex-
change contracts," there is no reason to construe the
terms of such a document as the IMF Articles in a
strictly leggl sense rather than in their broader eco-
nomic sense. 0 Indeed, an expansive notion of interna"
tional economic policy pervades the document and its
declarations of purpose.
77. Mann, The Private International Law of Exchdnge Controt
under the 1IW Agreement, 2 Int'l. & Comp. L.Q. 97, 102 (1953).
See also 1 J. GOLD, THE FUND AGREEMENT, supra note 76, at 92-93
(quoting Mann, Der Internationale Wdrungsfonda und das Internation-
ale Privatrecht, 8 JURISTENZEITUNG (Ttibingen) 442-46 (1953)).
78. See Gold and Lachman, The Articles of Agreement of the
International Monetary Fund and the Exchange Control Regulations
of Member States, 89 JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 666, 674, 684
(1962) (suggesting that a contract which affects the exchange
resources of a member ipso facto "involves" the currency of that
member).
79. See DICEY & MORRIS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 898-99 (8th
ed. 1967); DICEY'S CONFLICT OF LAWS 923;;24 (7th ed. 1958); A.
NUSSBAUM, MONEY IN THE LAW, NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL 542-44 (rev.
ed. 1950); Nussbaum, Exchange Control and the International Mone-
tary Fund, 59 YALE L.J, 421, 426 (1950), See also 1 J. GOLD, THE
FUND AGREEMENT, supra note 76, at 92,
80, See Mann, The Private International Law of Exchange
Control under the IMP Agreement, supra note 77, at 102.
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An English case, Sharif v. Azad,8 1 adopted the
broader view of Dr. Mann. Lord Denning there declared
that: "The words 'exchange contracts' are not defined,
but I think that they mean any contract which in ann
way affect fIqc] the country's exchange resources.1 2
The ninth edition of Dicey & Morris, The Conflict of
Laws (1973) abandoned its earlier, narrow position in
favor of the one expressed by Lord Denning, above.83
Joseph Gold, General Counsel of the International Mone-
tary Fund, has concluded that these broader formulations
recognize "quite properly that the concept [of "exchange
contract"] must be given an economic meaning."'8 4 There-
fore, he considers that transactions in any of the five
categories r cognized by the IMF in its Balance of Pay-
ments Manual may affect the exchange resources of a
member and thus qu~aify as the subject matter for an
exchange contract.0 0  These categories are: purchases
and sales of goods and services, barter, exchange of
means of payment (currency and gold), provision or
acquisition of goods or services without requittal
(grants-in-kind), and provision of' eans of payment
without requittal (gifts of money), 7 This approach is
81. L1967J 1 Q.B. 605, [1966] 3 All E.R. 785 (C.A.) involved
an arrangement made in England between two Pakistanis. One Latif
obtained 1300 cash and gave Sharif his check for 6000 rupees drawn
on a Pakistani bank; the payee's name was left blank. Sharif gave
the check to Azad, in exchange for a check for 12300 in favor of
Sharif; Azad was unable to collect when payment was blocked by
foreign exchange authorities in Pakistan. The court found the
arrangement to be an "exchange contract" within the meaning of
Article VIII, §2(b). The check for 6000 rupees contravened the
exchange regulations of Pakistan, but the check for L300, running
from Azad to Sharif, offended neither English nor Pakistani law,
Therefore, the court enforced the latter check, anticipating that
it might teach a "sharp" lesson to the defendant.
82. [1967] 1 Q.B. at 613-14, [19661 3 All E.R. at 787
(emphasis added).
83. See DICEY AND MORRIS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 920 (9th
ed. 1973).
84. 2 J. GOLD, THE FUND AGREEMENT, supra note 65, at 79.
85. IMF, BALANCE OF PAYMENTS MANUAL (3d ed. 1961).
86. 2 J. GOLD, THE FUND AGREEMENT, supra note 65, at 79.
87. Id. See also IMF, BALANCE OF PAYMENTS MANUAL (3d ed.
1961). It is perhaps surprising to find barter included in this
broad concept of exchange contracts. But barter and grants-in-
kind may well affect members" exchange resources where, but for the
barter or grant, currency would necessarily change hands.
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supported in many of the cases. 8 8 However, the narrow-
88. The broad reading of exchange contracts as including
those transactions which affect a member's exchange resources is
supported either expressly or implicitly in several cases.
An unreported case, decided by Chamber 12 for Commercial
Affairs of the Hamburg Landesgericht, involved a contract by
which Belgian defendants had agreed to purchase an amount of
ammonia sulphate from a West-German firm; payment was to be made
in dollars. Defendants had failed to obtain an import license,
and plaintiffs brought suit on the contract for defendants' failure
to take the goods. The court viewed the purchase agreement as an
exchange contract (the purchase of goods may affect members' ex-
change resources); it held that the action must fail, for the
import regulation was valid. See 1 J. GOLD, THE FUND AGREEMENT,
supra note 76, at 82-84.
In Lessinger v. Mirau, decided by the Schleswig-Holstein
Oberlandesgericht (April 1, 1954), the court regarded the view
of F.A. Mann - that an exchange contract is any contract that
affects a members exchange resource -- as "the only [interpreta-
tion] compatible with the purpose of the regimentation of foreign
exchange resources." See 1 J. GOLD, THE FUND AGREEMENT, supra
note 76, at 90-94.
In Southwestern Shipping Corp. v. National City Bank of New
York, 6 N.Y. 2d 454, 160 N.E.2d 836, 190 N.Y.S.2d 352 (1959),
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 895 (1959), an agreement of an Italian
importer to purchase from the plaintiff a certain volume of
"fatty acid" for $37,222 was assumed by the court to be an exchange
contract within the meaning of Article VIII, § 2(b), supra note 1.
The transaction contemplated the purchase of dollars in Italy and
the transmission of these funds to the United States. The court
viewed the import contract to be violative of Italian exchange
control regulations, for the importer had not obtained the neces-
sary import license. But it regarded the credit drawn against
defendant as enforceable, for it was independent of the antecedent
exchange contract. The bank was not entitled to plead the illegal-
ity of the underlying contract in this action, which was based on
the bank's negligent breach of its obligations under the credit
arrangement.
White V. Roberts, 33 Hong Kong L. Rep. 231 (1949), involved
an agreement between plaintiff and defendant, both exchange brokers
in Shanghai, by which plaintiff paid Chinese currency to defendant
in return for defendant's promise to make payments in foreign
currencies to third persons in other countries. Defendant's
promise to pay contravened Chinese exchange control regulations,
which rendered such contracts illegal and criminal. The agreement
was held to be an "exchange contract" within the meaning of the
original Articles, supra note 1, and was unenforceable. Reviewed in
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er, literal interpretation of Professor Nussbaum is al-
so not without its adherents; indeed, recent caseg in
the US. and England have taken the literal view. 9
Nevertheless, the weight of authority and the pur-
poses of the IMF support the definition of "exchange
contracts" as those which in any way affect the exchange
resources of a member. Only this broad definition will
achieve the consistent recognition of other members'
exchange control regulations under Article VIII, Section
2(b) and thus impose the requirement of consistency with
the Articles upon the many exchange control regulations
which impinge on the business relationships between
private parties.
B. Regulations Affecting Exchanges of Currencies
Angarly Netherlands decision, Frantzmann v.
Po'njen (1959), determined that a sale or exchange
88 (Continued)
1 J. GOLD, THE FUND AGREEMENT, supra note 76, at 87.
The broad definition of exchange contracts is also supported
in the cases of In Re Anna de Boer, 89 JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL
721 (Ct. App. Paris (Cour d'appel) 1961), and Societe Filature et
Tissage X. Jourdain v. Epoux ffeynen-Bintner, 22 Int l L. Rep. 727
(Tribunal d'Arrondissement de Luxembourg (Civil) Feb. 1, 1956),
reviewed in 1 J. GOLD, THE FUND AGREEMENT, supra note 76, at 94.
89. A narrower definition of exchange contracts, see note
76 supra, is adopted in Wilson, Smithett & Cope, Ltd. v. Terruzzi,
1 Q.B. 703 (C.A. 1976); J. Zeevi & Sons, Ltd. v. Grindlays Bank
(Uganda) Ltd., 37 N.Y.2d 220, 333 N.E.2d 168, 371 N.Y.S.2d 892 (1975),
cert. denied 423 U.S. 866; and by the Hamberg Court of Appeals,
Entscheidungen zum Interzonalem Privatrecht (OLGE Hamburg July 7,
1959), where a contract for the purchase of goods was held not to
be within the meaning of "exchange contract", even though the
purchaser was required to pay in the seller's currency. See 2
J. GOLD, THE FUND AGREEMENT, supra note 65, at 1-9,
90. (1959) N. J. No. 290 (D. Ct. Maastricht, June 25, 1959),
reviewed in 1 J. GOLD, THE FUND AGREEMENT, supra note 76, at 113.
Cf. Statni Banka and Banque d'Etat Tchecoslovaque v. Englander, 47
Int'l L. Rep. 157 (Cour d'appel Aix-en-Provence 1966), reviewed in
J. Gold, The Fund Agreement in the Courts, XII, 24 IMF STAFF PAPERS
193, 225 (1977). Statni Banka also involved an exchange of
currencies which was treated by the court as an exchange contract,
contrary to Czechoslovakian prohibitions against the import of
capital. On appeal, the agreement was held to be unenforceable
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of currencies, as must be expected, is a capital tran-
saction subject to members' control under Article VI,
Section 3. The case involved a 1955 agreement made in
Indonesia between Dutch parties by which the plaintiff
paid defendant a sum of rupiah in return for defen-
dant's promise to pay to plaintiff a sum of guilders
in the Netherlands. According to the court's opinion,
such agreements were subject to licensing in Indonesia,
pursuant to the Indonesian Foreign Exchange Ordinance
of 1940 and a Decree thereunder. The necessary li-
cense was not granted to the defendant. Upon defen-
dant's partial payment, plaintiff sued in the Nether-
lands for the balance.
Although the District Court of Maastricht refrain,
ed from evaluating in detail the Indonesian foreign
exchange provisions, it found that the "Foreign Ex-
change Decree must be considered as exchange legisla-
tion of that country--maintained in accordance with
the Fund Agreement,"9 1 and proceeded to discuss the
capacity of members to regulate capital movements.9 2
Having determined the Indonesian exchange controls to
merit recognition under Article VIII, Section 2(b),
the court held the agreement contrary thereto to be un-
enforceable and denied plaintiff the relief sought.
This case is important, not only in its holding
that the exchange of currencies is the proper subject
of legitimate capital controls, but also in its method.
In deciding that the Indonesian control regulated capi-
tal movements consistently with Article VI, Section 3,
and that therefore it must be recognized under Article
VIII, Section 2(b), the court in effect defined "ex-
change control regulations" of the latter Section to
include both the restrictions on payments for current
transactions (Article VIII, Section 2(a)) and controls
90. (Continued) under Article VIII, § 2(b), supra note 3, and
the Statni Banka funds, as the property of the Czechoslovakian
State, were immune from attachment. The appellate court reversed
the judgment of the lower court which had found in favor of
Englander.
91. 1 J. GOLD, THE FUND AGREEMENT, supra note 76, at 114.
92. Id. However, Gold points out that the court was somewhat
misguided in reasoning that, because the controls of Indonesia
were consistent with the Articles, supra note 3, when the controls
were imposed, they must necessarily remain so. In fact, they may
not affect all transactions in a consistent fashion. Nevertheless,
insofar as the regulations affect capital movements, as here, they
would be consistent with the Articles.
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on capital movements (Article VI, Section 3). That
Article VIII, Section 2(b), applies to regulations
governing capital as well as current transactions is
"undoubtedly correct."93 The Court's interpretation is
a significant contribution since the Articles did not
define the application of Article VIII, Section 2(b).94
C, Regulations on the Payment and Transfer of
Proceeds from Insurance Contracts
The character of an insurance contract and pay-
ments made thereunder is not easily identifiable as
capital or current. Although courts tend to view such
transactions and payments as capital transactions and
subject to members' regulations, the opinions are not
unanimous.
93. Id.
94. It is noteworthy that a statement by Joseph Gold, Gener-
al Counsel to the IMF, reconfirms the propriety of broad applica-
tion of Article VIII, § 2(b), supra note 3, to regulations govern-
ing capital as well as current transactions. The statement was
distributed to several U.S. courts which were then hearing the
"Cuban insurance cases" (see pp. 29-35 infra). It reads in rele-
vant part as follows:
A member of the Fund, like Cuba, which has accepted the
obligations of Article VIII is required to obtain Fund
approval of exchange restrictions on current transactions
... pursuant to Article VIII, §§ 2 and 3.... The Fund has
approved the maintenance by Cuba of a two percent exchange
tax on remittances abroad. Any other existing restrictions
on current transactions ... do not have the Fund's approval.
In accordance with the Articles of Agreement, Fund
approval for controls of capital transfers is not required.
Thus, to the extent any controls are confined to capital
transfers, they are maintained or imposed consistently with
the Fund's Articles of Agreement, [Emphasis added]
The last quoted sentence seems clearly to apply the requirement of
Article VIII, § 2(b)--that exchange control regulations be main-
tained consistently with the Articles, supra note 3--to controls on
capital transfers.
The statement by Mr. Gold is reprinted in Blanco v. Pan Ameri-
can Life Ins. Co., 221 F.Supp. 219, 224-25 (S.D. Fla. 1963).
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In Catz and Lips v. S.A. Union Versicherung 95
(1949), defendant, a Czechoslovakian insurance company,
had authorized a Dutch firm in 1934 to enter into cer-
tain insurance contracts in its behalf. The Dutch firm
entered into such contracts with plaintiffs, who were
agents for the insured parties. Claims arising during
the Second World War were not paid. The Dutch firm had
no funds of the defendant which could be attached, so
the insured parties accepted notes from plaintiffs in
the amount of their claims and assigned to plaintiffs
their claims against defendant, whereupon plaintiffs
sought to attach funds of defendant's agent in Belgium.
However, "in execution" of their power to control
capital movements under Article VI, Section 3, Czecho-
slovakia and the Netherlands had entered an agreement
in 1946 which prohibited the transfer between these
countries of funds in respect of debts incurred before
1945. Noting that plaintiffs could not have obtained
direct payment from defendant in Czechoslovakia, the
court declined to allow the same result to be achieved
indirectly. The court also regarded the assignment of
rights as contrary to the exchange laws of all three
countries.9 6 Plaintiffs therefore failed to recover on
their claim, since it had accrued prior to 1945, In so
holding, the court assumed that claims on insurance con-
tracts constitute capital movements, subject to members'
regulation.
There is some doubt as to whether insurance con-
tracts, and payments and claims thereunder, are indeed
predominantly capital transactions.97 The view that
payments on insurance claims are within the definition
of current payments is not unreasonable, since they are
payments "due in connection with foreign trade, [and]
other current business, including services."9 8 The IMF
95. Judgment of Jan. 21, 1949, Tribunal Civil d'Anvers, 5me
Chambre, Belg., [1949] Jurisprudence du Port d'Anvers 321, review-
ed in 1 J. GOLD, THE FUND AGREEMENT, supra note 76, at 30-32.
96. See 1 J. GOLD, THE FUND AGREEMENT, supra note 76, at 31.
97. See Meyer, Recognition of Exchange ControZs After the
International Monetary Fund Agreement, 62 YALE L,J. 867, 903 (1953).
98. Article XXX (d), supra note 1; see Meyer, supra note 97,
at 903.
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has regarded insurance premiums and the payment of
claims as "invisible" transactions,99 which may corres-
pond to the definition of payments for current transac-
tions. 1 0 0 The insurance feature of an insurance con-
tract is a service and, just as the premium represents
the payment for a current service, so the payment of a
claim constitutes the settlement of a commitment and,
thus, should be free from members' restrictions. Whe-
ther the cash surrender value of a policy represents
another form of the service of protection, or a repay-
ment of an investment and, therefore, a capital pay-
ment, is not so clear. 1 0 1 If a policy is viewed as a
"contingent asset" of the holder and as a "contingent
liability" of the issuer which will be made "current"
upon the occurrence of certain specified conditions,
then a recovery on the cash value should be treated as
a current transaction.10 2 The weight of authority
indicates that the insurance-service feature of an in-
surance policy is the predominant element of an entire,
indivisible contract,1 0 3 These arguments militate in
favor of the characterization of all payments relating
to insurance contracts as "payments for current tran-
sactions" within the meaning of the Articles.
Perhaps unfortunately, courts have not character-
ized premium and recovery payments on insurance con-
tracts as current payments beyond the power of members
to restrict or prohibit. Although the courts appear
reluctant to declare members' exchange control regula-
tions to be inconsistent with the Articles, they seem
eager to provide relief to plaintiffs bringing actions
on insurance contracts, the recovery on which is pro-
hibited by such regulations. To reconcile these
99. See IMF, THIRD ANNUAL REPORT ON EXCHANGE RESTRICTIONS
186 (1952) (Annex to Appendix III); Paradise, Cuban Refugee In-
sureds and the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary
Fund, 18 U. FLA. L. REV. 29, 68-69 (1965).
100. See W. SCA1MELL, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY POLICY 18-19
(1957); Paradise, supra note 99, at 68-69.
101. Compare Comment, 18 U. MIAMI L. REV. 455, 470-472 (1963)
with Paradise, supra note 99, at 70-72.
102. Comment, supra note 101, at 472,
103. See Paradise, supra note 99, at 72, But see J. GOLD,
THE CUBAN INSURANCE CASES AND THE ARTICLES OF THE 'FUND 42 n. 62
(IMF Pamphlet Series No. 8, 1966) [hereinafter cited as THE CUBAN
INSURANCE CASES].
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apparently inconsistent perspectives, the courts have
resorted to other, somewhat less direct means. One
might ask, whatever happened to the path of least resis-
tance?
A line of cases, known as the "Cuban Insurance
Cases," arose in the early 1960's as a result of Cuban
refugee insureds seeking to recover on insurance poli-
cies issued in Cuba by non-Cuban insurance companies.
The cases deal with certain exchange control laws and
regulations promulgated by Cuba while it was a member
of the IMF.lu The first of the relevant controls was
Law No. 13 of December 1948, establishing the National
Bank and displacing the U.S. dollar with the peso as
the legal tender of Cuba.105 Law No. 568 was enacted
in October, 1959, after Fidel Castro had taken office.
That law declared it a felony to export, import, trans-
fer or in most other fashions to move currency, securi-
ties, funds and claims thereon, into or out of Cuba,
except when and through the medium authorized by the
Currency Stabilization Fund.106 Law No. 851 of July
1960 and Resolution No. 3 of October 1960 nationalized
all properties and firms owned by U,S. persons, includ-
ing the Cuban assets of the U.S. insurance companies
that were defendants in the cases. The nationalized
properties were to be paid for by bonds Cthe performance
of which was dependent upon U.S. sugar purchases). Law
No. 930 of February 1961 established a state monopoly
of all transactions involving foreign currencies, to be
administered by the National Bank.107
In Pan American Life Insurance Co. v. Blancol08
(1966), plaintiff Blanco had purchased from defendant
104. See generally J. GOLD, THE CUBAN INSURANCE CASES,
supra note 103, at 1-6. Cuba became a member of the Fund in 1946
and availed itself of the transitional arrangements of Article XIV,
§ 2, supra note 1, until 1953, when it notified the Fund of its
acceptance of the obligations of Article VIII, §§2-4, supra note 1.
105. Id.. at 3. See R. Paradise, supra note 99, at 34-35,
106. J. GOLD, THE CUBAN INSURANCE CASES, supra note 103,
at 4.
107. Id. at 4-5.
108. 311 F.2d 424 (5th Cir. 1962), on remand 221 F.Supp. 219
(S.D. Fla. 1963), rev'd in part 362 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1966).
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insurance company three singlepayment annuity con-
tracts for the benefit of plaintiffts daughters, to be-
come payable as each daughter attained the age of 21
years. Each contract was signed and notarized in Havana,
and plaintiff paid the single premium there. The con-
tract provided that liquidations thereunder were pay-
able at defendant's headquarters in New Orleans and that
the contracts were exempt from restrictions as to resi-
dence and travel. Plaintiff, having fled Cuba, sought
to obtain the cash surrender value of the policies; de-
fendant refused to pay, and plaintiff brought suit on
the contracts.
In this case, defendant argued that the Cuban ex-
propriations relieved it of liability and substituted
the Cuban Government as the obligor on the contracts,
It argued further that the exchange control regulations
of Cuba were valid and should render the contract unen-
forceable. The U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Florida granted plaintiff's motion to strike
portions of Pan American's answer and dismissed its
counterclaim. On interlocutory appeal, the Court of
Appeals for the 'ifth Circuit acknowledged the relevance
of the issue, raised by appellant Pan American, of whe,
ther the Cuban exchange control laws were "maintained
or imposed consistently with"' the Articles.109 But the
court found no proof of such consistencyllO and it de-
clined to take judicial notice of the Cuban laws,lll
Nevertheless, it held that the District Court had erred
in striking the counterclaim and remanded the case for
a decision on the merits.11 2
Had the Cuban laws been judicially noticed, analyz-
ed, and found overbroad and inconsistent as applied to
the arguably current insurance transactions of Blanco,
the regulations might have been denied recognition. On
that basis, the court could have enforced the contracts
and provided Blanco with the relief sought.
However, the District Court, on remand, reached
similar results by a quite different route. It con-
sidered that it was not compelled to recognize the
109. 311 7.2d at 427.
110, Id.
111. Id. at 428.
112. Id.
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decrees of the Castro Government that were confisca-
tory and (thus) violative of international law.ll3 Al-
though it did not discuss further the decrees or the
current or capital attributes of the transactions af-
fected, the court did hold the exchange control regula-
tions to have no extra-territorial effect.114 As both
the plaintiff and the defendant were now resident in
the U.S., and as the contract did not require settle-
ment in Cuba, neither the persons nor the funds were
subject to the Cuban laws. The court considered, then
discarded, the possibilities that the cases might re-
quire the application of the Act of State Doctrine or
of the IMF Agreement.ll5 Plaintiff was entitled to
recover.
The Blanco case was consolidated by the District
Court with several other cases that had come up on
similar facts, except that they involved life insurance
rather than annuity contracts. The territorial limi-
tations imposed by the District Court on Cuba's ex-
change control regulations were grounds for relief to
the plaintiffs in these cases as well.11 6 As Joseph
Gold, General Counsel of the IMF has pointed out:
"The court seemed to be reaching for a thesis that
Article VIII, Section 2(b), did not require the recog-
nition of exchange control regulations if they purport-
ed to control nonresidents in transactions involving
assets outside the Jurisdiction."11 7 Implicit in this
113. 221 F.Supp. at 226, 227,
114. Id. at 227.
115. Id. at 229. The Court defined as an issue the applica-
bility of the Bretton Woods Agreement, id. at 226, but considered
the Agreement not to apply. Id. at 229.
116. See Aguirregaviria Zabaleta v. Pan American Life
Insurance Co., Conill v. Pan American Life Insurance Co., and
Lorido y Diego v. American National Insurance Co., jointly report-
ed in Pan American Life Insurance Co. v. BZanco, 221 F.Supp. 219
(S.D. Fla. 1963). It should be noted that on appeal, only the
Blanco and Conill cases were affirmed. 362 F.2d 167 (5th Cir.
1966). Diego and Zabaeta were reversed and remanded upon a
construction of the facts different from that of the District
Court. Because Cuba had withdrawn from the Fund before the appeal
was decided, the court was of the view that a judgment on the
policies would not be precluded by the Articles. Id. at 171.
117. J, GOLD, THE CUBAN INSURANCE CASES, supra note 103, at
29-30.
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statement and in the rationale of the cases is that the
Articles would require recognition of the regulations
to the extent that they do not purport to control non-
residents or assets outside the jurisdiction. This
suggests that the court, in addition to noting Cuba's
withdrawal from the Fund, was of the opinion that the
Cuban currency was not "involved," and that therefore
the regulations did not merit recognition. But this,
if not the wrong criterion, is certainly incomplete;
the Articles require recognition of the regulation Cby
holding a contrary contract unenforceable) where the
member's currency is involved and where the regulation
is consistent with the 
Articles.ll 
In most of the Cuban insurance cases, the courts
followed an approach similar to that of the District
Court in Blanco, relying on territorial limitations of
the regulations and suggestions that the policies were
not exchange contracts (and therefore not required to
be held unenforceable). This approach was adequate to
uphold the insurance contracts and provide relief to
the plaintiffs 1ll 9 However, in Confederation Life
Association v. Ugalde, 1 2 0 the policy was payable in
118. Article VIII, § 2(b), supra note 1, reads in relevant
part as follows: "Exchange contracts which involve the currency
of any member and which are contrary to the exchange control regu-
lations of that member maintained or imposed consistently with
this Agreement shall be unenforceable in the territories of any
member .... "
119, The plaintiff was successful in Theye y Ajuria v. Pan
American Life Insurance Co., 154 So,2d 450 (La. Ct. App. 1963),
rev'd, 245 La. 755, 161 So.2d 70 (1964) (reinstating judgment for
plaintiff), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 997 (1964); and Pan American
Life Insurance Co. v. Raij, 156 So.2d 785 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1963), cert, dismissed, 164 So.2d 204 (1964), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 920 (1964), See also Varas v. Crown Life Insurance Co., 204
Pa. Super. Ct. 176, 203 A.2d 505 (1964), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
827 (1965). The trial court found that defendant had offered to
make payment to plaintiff in Havana, but that it was impossible,
and thus plaintiff was not required, to collect in Havana. The
theory of quasi-contract was suggested by the trial court as a
ground for granting relief to the plaintiff. On appeal, however,
the Superior Court held that the contract was enforceable in
Pennsylvania,
120. 151 So.2d 315 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963), revtd in
part, 164 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 915 (1964),
34 YALE STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER
dollars in Havana and, upon plaintiff's request for the
cash value, defendant offered to make payment there in
Cuban pesos according to the terms of the policy as
modified by Cuban law. The defendant suggested, on
appeal to the Florida District Court of Appeals, that
the character of the transaction be analyzed as to its
current and capital attributes and that the cash sur-
render of a policy is akin to "the most obvious kind of
capital transaction."'1 2 1 The court did not engage in
the suggested analysis, but it appears to have assumed
that the transaction was of a capital nature, as argued
by defendant, and that the Cuban regulations were con-
sistent with the Articles. Nevertheless, the District
Court of Appeals did not view the Cuban laws as barv,
ring the plaintiff's claim; rather it considered the
issue to be one of proper exchange rates--i.e., should
the recovery be computed at the current exchange rate
or at the exchange rate which pertained when the con-
tract was entered?1 2 2
The Supreme Court of Florida, also apparently ig-
noring the invitation below to analyze the underlying
transaction and the regulations thereon, and assuming
the consistency of these regulations, said:
The Cuban laws relating to the establish-
ment of currency control are similar to
those which have been enacted in this
country ...and are not violative of United
States policy. The Florida courts are
obligated by the International Monetary
Fund Agreement to apply the cited Cuban
laws to the contract here involved.123
The Supreme Court reversed the lower court, and dis-
missed plaintiff Ugaldets action, finding that the
defendant had offered to make payment in Havana and was
therefore not in breach of the contract.
It may seem idle to speculate on the outcome of
this case had the court applied different criteria.
But such speculation will serve to highlight the inade-
quate criterion applied by the courts in the Cuban in-
surance cases. So long as the plaintiff and defendant
121. J. GOLD, THE CUBAN INSURANCE CASES, supra note 103, at
42 n.62.
122. 151 So.2d at 323.
123. 164 So.2d at 2.
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were not residing in Cuba and so long as the contracts
were payable outside of Cuba in non-Cuban currencies,
the courts could uphold the Cuban regulations and still
award relief, as in Blanco, on the basis of the terri-
torial limitations of Cuba's regulatory jurisdiction
and of the fact that its currency was not involved,
However, where the contract was payable in Cuba, in
pesos, plaintiffs failed because the courts assumed the
consistency of Cuba's regulations with the Articles.
Therefore the contract was unenforceable as contrary to
valid regulations. Had the court, in Ugalde, examined
the nature of the contract and had it found the pay-
ments and recoveries on the contract to be partially or
wholly of a current nature, or in the settlement of
commitments, then it could have held the Cuban restric-
tions thereon to be inconsistent with the Articles; the
plaintiff should then have succeeded in his claim. The
defendant's offer to make payment in Havana, though a
powerful defense against a suit for breach of contract,
would not have resolved the case, for plaintiff could
have proceeded on a theory of quasi contract. 1 2 4
D. Regulation of the Transfer of Investment Proceeds
Another case involved the Cuban exchange control
regulations is French v. Banco Nacional de Cuba.1 2 5
Ritter, an American who had invested some $350,000 in
a Cuban farm in 1957, had obtained official permission
to exchange the proceeds from his investment for U.S.
dollars or other foreign currency and expatriate the
same, free of the Cuban tax on the exportation of money.
In June 1959, Ritter possessed certificates from the
Cuban Government's Currency Stabilization Fund commit-
ting the Banco Nacional de Cuba to exchange a total of
$150,000 worth of pesos. In July of 1959 the Stabili-
zation Fund suspended payment on these and similar cer-
tificates and the Bank denied plaintiff French CRitter's
assignee) the funds represented by the certificates,
He brought an action against the Bank in the courts of
New York and obtained a favorable judgment from the
Supreme Court. The Appellate Division affirmed,
The Court of Appeals of New York, however, revers-
ed the judgment and dismissed the complaint. It viewed
124. Cf. Varas v. Crown Life Insurance Co., 204 Pa. Super.
Ct. 176, 203 A.2d 505 (1964), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 827 (1965).
125, 23 N.Y.2d 46, 242 N.E.2d 704, 295 N.Y.S.2d 433 (19681.
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the suspension decree as "nothing more than... an ex-
change control regulation similar to regulations
enacted or promulgated by many other countries, includ-
ing our own."12 6 The court considered a currency regu-
lation such as the one in issue, which alters the value
or character of money to be paid in satisfaction of
contracts, not to be a "confiscation."1 2? Plaintiff
French, his exchange certificates having been suspended,
then had to accept pesos. Although the court did not
specifically discuss the character of the transaction,
it is again apparent that it must have regarded the ex-
change of pesos--which Ritter had received as proceeds
from the liquidation of his investment--for dollars as
a capital transaction. The exchange, therefore, was
seen as rightfully subject to members' controls under
Article VI, Section 3.128
Judge Keating, in a strong dissent, saw the sus-
pension decree as "nothing other than an act of confis-
cation."1 2 9 Even if the decision originally served to
protect Cuba's foreign exchange resources,
it does not follow that it remains valid
under international law permanently ....
Though this might be justified when the
currency regulations of the country are
in accord with the principles of the
International Monetary Fund, even though
the enacting country is not a member or
has subsequently withdrawn, this view is
not justified when these monetary policies
are inconsistent with the purposes of the
Fund. 130
The facts of the case reveal the inconsistency found by
Judge Keating. Although no real confiscation had oc-
curred, for Ritter had received his pesos, his right
ever to receive any income from his investment in any
medium but Cuban pesos had been indefinitely suspended.
126. Id. at 55, 242 N.E.2d at 710, 295 N.Y.S.2d at 442.
127. Id.
128. See 2 J. GOLD, THE FUND AGREEMENT, supra note 65, at
69-70.
129. 23 N.Y.2d at 77, 242 N.E.2d at 724, 295 N.Y.S.2d at
461.
130. Id. at 88, 242 N.E.2d at 730-31, 295 N.Y.S,2d at 470
(emphasis added).
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This "suspension," an effective prohibition, abrogated
the exchange license granted him by the Cuban govern-
ment. The mere exchange of currencies, unrelated to
international transactions, is a capital movement,13 1
subject to members' regulations.1 3 2 But where, as
here, the prohibition of an exchange of currencies in-
terferes with the effective payment of income from an
investment, such restriction is inconsistent with the
Articles. Judge Keating, then, was quite correct.
E. Regulations Affecting the Interational Transfer
or Assignment of Equity Interests
The case of Moojen v. Von Reichert,1 33 decided in
June 1961 by the Court of Appeal of Paris (First Cham-
ber), raised the question of whether a transfer or sale
of equity interests would be subject to restriction by
members of the IMF. Moojen, a Dutch national residing
in France, assigned shares of the Gutenberg Corporation,
a French corporation located in France and dealing in
French real estate, to Von Reichert, a German national
resident in Bonn, in consideration of a sum of French
francs. The instrument was dated in Paris and had been
registered and deposited with the Commercial Tribunal
of that city, but it was alleged to have been signed in
the Netherlands. The instrument and the corporate by-
laws provided that disputes were to be litigated in the
French courts.
Moojen, the assignor, brought an action in the
Netherlands, seeking to have the assignment nullified
as a violation of Dutch exchange control regulations.
The regulations in question required that the disposi-
tion of foreign assets by residents be licensed, and
Moojen had obtained no license. The Dutch courts de-
clared the assignment to be null. But when Mrs. Moojen,
the assignor's widow, sought execution of the Dutch
judgment in France, she was unsuccessful.
131. See Frantzman v. Poinjen, [1959] N.J. No. 290 D. Ct.
Maastricht, June 25, 1959); note 90 supra and accompanying text.
132. See generally 2 J. GOLD, THE FUND AGREEMENT, supra
note 65, at 67-71.
133. 85 JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 1050 (1958) (Civil
Tribunal of the Seine 1957), rev'd, 89 JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNA-
TIONAL 718 (1962) (Court of Appeal of Paris 1961), reviewed in 1
J. GOLD, THE FUND AGREEMENT, supra note 76, at 143,50,
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The Tribunal of the Seine (Fifth Chamber) found
error in the Dutch court's determination that the
assignor was a resident of the Netherlandsl34 and
found instead that Moojen had been residing in France.
The court held the assignment to be good, for Dutch ex-
change control regulation did not apply to Moojen's
assignment, This debate as to residence and conflict
of law was carried to the Court of Appeal of Paris
which reversed the lower tribunal on that issue, find-
ing Moojen to have indeed been a resident of the Nether-
lands at the time of the assignment. 1 3 5 The Court of
Appeal rejected defendant Von Reichert's suggestion
that the transfer of shares did not affect the exchange
resources of the Netherlands (i.e., that the Dutch cur-
rency was not involved) and his argument that the trans-
fer was not an "exchange contract."136 Rather, it was
of the view that .repatriation of the proceeds from the
disposition of foreign assets would affect the Dutch
economy, The assignment was held to be unenforceable
and null, apparently on the theory that it was a capi-
tal transaction, contrary to the regulations of the
Netherlands which were consistent with the Articles,
The Court of Appeal said:
[A]Ithough the signatories.. .intended to
prohibit Member States from imposing,
without the approval of the Fund,
restrictions relating to payments for
current international transactions,
they did not lay the same claim in
regard to instruments that do not fall
within that class, as the assignment by
a resident of assets situated abroad.137
Despite the failure of the court to identify ex-
pressly the transfer of shares as a capital transaction
and despite the argument of the defendants that the
transfer was neither current nor capital but of some
other, unknown character,13 8 it is a fair inference
134. It is interesting to note the somewhat anomalous pos-
ture of this case. The petition for French exequatur of the judg-
ment of a Dutch court brought the French courts to review and find
error in the Dutch court's determination of an essential fact.
135. 89 JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL at 724, 725.
136. See id. at 724-27.
137. Id. at 726, 727.
138. Id.
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from the structure of the Articles that such a trans-
fer is in fact a capital transaction.13 9 The transfer
or sale of equity interests differs inherently from
the remittance of investment proceeds. The sale or
transaction of equity interests gives rise to a pro-
prietary interest in future proceeds from the invest-
ment -- in other words, such a sale or transfer has as
its quid pro quo the claim to a future return and to
liquidation proceeds (to the extent liquidation is per-
mitted and theproceeds are expatriable under local law)
denominated in the currency of the country in which the
investment is located. As such, the sale or transfer
of equity interests is a capital transaction (see p.9
s~pra). However, the investment proceeds themselves
are the income from current business, the entitlement
to which may be affected by the sale or transfer of
equity interests. As income, the payment of such pro-
ceeds is defined by the Articles to be a payment for
current transactions, Thus, the suggestion that the
transfer of equity interests should fall within some
unidentified classification ignores the definitional
scheme of the Articles. Nevertheless, the result in
this case is correct, for the exchange regulations of
the Netherlands were upheld -- as though the affected
assignment of equity interests, in violation thereof,
were of a capital nature and therefore were regulable,
F. Regulations upon the Enforcement of a Letter of
Credit
A somewhat surprising case is J. Ze 'vi and Sons.,
Ltd. v. Grindlays Bank (Uganda), Ltd., NO which the
Court of Appeals of New York decided in 1975. On March
24, 1972, plaintiff, an Israeli corporation, purchased
from defendant Grindlays Bank (Uganda) an irrevocable
letter of credit in the amount of $406,000 which was
139. See Gold and Lachman, supra note 78, at 676, para. 9,
discussing the possibility of a third, unnamed category of inter-
national transactions, in addition to current and capital, that
might be comprehended by the Articles.
140. 37 NY.2d 220, 333. N.E.2d 168, 371 N.Y.S.2d 892 (1975).
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 866 C1975),
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valid until January 31, 1973. The letter was to be
drawn in ten equal amounts and it authorized any nego-
tiating bank to claim reimbursement from the First
National City Bank CCitibank) in New York, the agents
for Qrindlays. The Minister of Finance of Uganda, act-
ing under the Exchange Control Act of that country, is-
sued directives on March 28, 30, and April 13, 1972,
effectively prohibiting payment in Ugandan funds of any.
claims arising out of this letter of credit. Thereupon
Grindlays instructed Citibank not to effect reimburse-
ment on the letter and Citibank declined to reimburse
the Chemical Bank which had negotiated several of the
ten equal drafts received from Zeevi's supplier and
presented to them for payment.
Zeevi commenced action against Grindlays in New
York and the Supreme Court ordered attachment of defen-
dant's funds on deposit with Citibank. The order of
attachment was affirmed by the Appellate Division and
by the Court of Appeals, But the court rendered a very
narrow interpretation of Article V11, Section 2(b),
thereby attempting to do justice and to support the
interest of New York, as the "financial capital" of the
world, in havin a well-reasoned and stable body of
commercial law.14l To avoid defendant's argument that
"enforcement of the letter of credit would violate the
foreign exchange laws of Uganda in disregard of... [the
Bretton Woods] treaty,"142 it held the treaty inappli-
cable. The court considered that, "even when read in
its broadest sense,"l143 the letter of credit could not
be brought within the meaning of "exchange contract."
This being so, the court declined to hold the letter un-
enforceable and the plaintiff recovered thereon.
Although the result seems correct, the rationale
of the court is awkward, if not erroneous. An inter-
national letter of credit is very clearly an exchange
contract, even under the most narrow interpretation of
the term.144 Not only does it "affect" the exchange
141, 37 N.Y.2d at 227, 333 N;E.2d at 172-73, 371 NY.S,2d
at 898.
142. Td. at 228, 333 N.E.2d at 174, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 900,
143. Td. at 229, 333 N.E,2d at 174, 371 N.YS.2d at 900.
144. See Nussbaum, Exchange Control and the Internationa4
Monetary Fund, 59 YALE L.J, 421, 426 (1950), 5ee also Gold, The
Fund Agreement in the Courts-,-XI, 24 IMF STAFF PAPERS 193, 222
(1977).
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resources of the members in whose currency it is pur-
chased and negotiated, but it frequently must have as
its immediate result, and perhaps as its object, the
exchange of currencies.
Such a letter of credit is subject to appropriate
regulation by members, so long as they do not transgress
the Articles. However, in the case at hand, the latter
was used in the purchase of merchandise, most definite-
ly a current transaction. Moreover, even if the letter
of credit were not related to current transactions, but
were plainly a capital transaction, if its purchase had
preceded the imposition of restrictions against payment
thereon, the application of such restrictions would be
inconsistent with the Articles as inhibitive of the
settlement of a commitment. Further, it should be noted
that the credit was to expire less than one year after
the date of its purchase. Thus, payments on the credit
would have been in the nature of "short-term banking
and credit" and beyond the capacity of members to
restrict. The Court of Appeals would have done well to
avoid its narrow interpretation of Article VIII, Sec-
tion 2(b), by holding the Ugandan directives to be in-
consistent with the Articles as applied to Zeevi's
transactions.
G, Regulations Affecting Personal 6ervice Contracts
In Da-ei Motion Picture Company, Ltd, v. Zavic,,
1 4 5
the Court of Appeal of Paris (Fourth Divisionj accepted
the broad definition of "exchange contracts" as those
that involve the currency of any member. It held a
transnational contract for personal services to be sub-
ject to members' regulation.
According to a contract between Daiei Motion Pic-
ture Company (Daiei), a Japanese corporation, and
Zavicha, a resident of France, the latter was to repre-
sent Daiei exclusively in Europe for ten years. Zavicha
undertook, at his own expense, to maintain offices and
hire employees for the conduct of the business, in
return for an annual salary of F, 10,000 plus bonuses.
The contract was dated September 1, 1966, and Zavicha
145, See L1971] Jt C. P. II No. 21, 16751 (trial cqurt pro-
ceedings). The disposition on appeal is, reviewed i'i.Gold, The Fund
Agreement in the Courts--XIT, supra note 144, at 195,201.
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began work and incurred expenses in October 1966. In
February of 1967 the Daiei Company informed Zavicha
that it was experiencing difficulty in obtaining ap-
proval of the contract by Japanese exchange control
authorities. Daiei first offered to renegotiate and
then, on June 5, 1967, informed Zavicha that the con-
tract was void under Japanese law. Zavicha sued for
damages on Daieits breach of the contract.
The Court of Appeal viewed the arrangement as an
"exchange contract," even though its obligations were
not denominated in yen, the currency of Japan, whose
regulations were in issue.146 And it held the contract
to be unenforceable under Article VIII, Section 2(b),
as contrary to the Japanese regulations. Plaintiff's
claim on the breach was therefore denied. However, the
court found a duty owed by the defendant to do all that
it could to secure authorization of the contract by
Japanese exchange control authorities, which duty had
not been fulfilled. Although plaintiff could not
recover in an action on the contract, he was entitled
to a quasi-delictual remedy, analogous to restitution
and tort, and damages were awarded.
In its finding of unenforceability, the Court of
Appeal tacitly recognized the consistency of the Japan-
ese control regulations with the Articles, Such
recognition is surprising on first impression for
Article XXXCd) expressly includes payments due in con-
nection with foreign trade and services in its defini-
tion of "payments for current transactions." If the
Japanese controls were viewed solely as a restriction
on the payment for services abroad, then they would
quite clearly be inconsistent with the Articles. In
the case at hand, the Japanese regulations prohibited
unauthorized entry into the underlying service contract
as well as payment thereon. The court appears to have
regarded these regulations as consistent with the
146. The court in Dai-e seemed to take a view similar to
that in Moojen v, Von Reichert, 85 JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL
718 (1958), that the exchange reserves of a country might indeed
be affected by a transaction in which that country's currency was
not directly involved. See note 88 supra regarding the predomi-
nance in the cases of the broad definition of "exchange contract."
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Articles,147 for the entry into contracts is legiti-
mately within the control of members' domestic laws,
as are most regulations upon the import and export of
goods. 148
Such reasoning permits the conclusion that the
Japanese controls, prohibiting both entry into and
performance of unauthorized service contracts, are less
offensive to the Articles than they at first appear.
However, recognition of Japan's domestic contract regu-
lations by foreign courts is not an appropriate appli-
cation of the IMF Articles. Such recognition would
lend the imprimatur-of international law to national
regulations on personal service contracts, a result not
warranted by the Articles. Perhaps the Court of Appeal
should have achieved its result by holding the Japanese
regulations, insofar as they proscribe the payment or
performance of personal service contracts, to be incon-
sistent with the Articles. It could then have awarded
damages on the contract directly and left redress for
the violation of the prohibition against entry into
such contracts, if any redress there be, to the domes-
tic law of Japan.
H. Limitations on the Transferability of Benefits
Accrued under Pension Agreements
The transfer of pension benefits lies somewhere
between an exchange of currencies and the transfer of
the proceeds from insurance contracts. Such benefits
147. See Gold, The Fund Agreement in the Courts-XT, supra
note 144, at 195, 198 n.14. See also JAPAN: LAWS, ORDINANCES AND
OTHER REGULATIONS CONCERNING FOREIGN EXCHANGE AND FOREIGN TRADE
A9-A12 (1976) (arts. 27-46) Foreign Exchange Control Law (Law
No. 228 of 1949, as amended by Law No. 99 of 1968) (Tokyo 1975);
id. at A41-A42 (§§16,17, Cabinet Order Concerning Control of
Foreign Exchange (Cabinet Order No. 203 of 1950, as cmended by
Cabinet Order No. 324 of 1972)).
148. See Gold, The Fund Agreement in the Courts--XII, supra
note 144, at 198. See also Decision No. 1034-(60/27), supra note
58, which establishes the guiding principle, for the determination
of whether a regulation is a restriction on payments for current
transactions, to be whether the restriction imposes a direct
governmental limitation on the use of exchange as such.
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might well have both current and capital elements (see
pp. 23.:-27 supra), yet the receipt of such benefits is
often contingent upon certain conditions such as age,
duration of employment, and place of residence. The
entitlement to such benefits, and the payment thereof
to the beneficiary, fall within the definition of cur-
rent payments discussed in part II above. And certain-
ly such payment, according to the terms of the instru-
ment creating the pension, qualifies as a remittance in
the settlement of commitments. So viewed, both the
entitlement to such benefits and their payment to the
beneficiary would be beyond the capacity of members to
restrict. However, the transfer of funds which have
been paid to the beneficiary or to his account could
be viewed as a capital transaction not directly related
to the prior payment. If the transaction were treated
as though it had two separate parts, Article VI, Sec-
tion 3 might permit restriction of the latter, "capi-
tal' transfer.
The case of Perutz v. Bohemian Discount Bank in
Liquidationl1 49 raises these questions. That case in-
volved a contract, made in Prague, between plaintiff's
decedent, Perutz, and his employer, the defendant, in
1938. Under the contract, Perutz was entitled to a
monthly pension which was payable "'always [at] the
place of business of the bank.,"150 The laws of Czecho-
slovakia, in effect from 1924 until after the action
was commenced, forbade residents to make any payment in
currency or foreign exchange to a nonresident, unless
the Czech exchange authority licensed such payment.
Perutz left Czechoslovakia in 1940 and became a citizen
of the United States; although he received his pension
until 1942, thereafter it was paid into a blocked ac-
count in Czechoslovakia for which no licenses for pay-
ment or withdrawal were granted. Before his death in
1949, Perutz commenced an action against the defen-
dant. His widow obtained a judgment in her favor from
the Appellate Division.
This judgment, however, was reversed by the Court
of Appeals of New York, which observed that,
149. 279 App. Div. 386, 110 N.Y.S.2d 446 (1952), rev1d,
304 N.Y. 533, 110 N.E.2d 6 (1953).
150. 304 N.Y. at 536, 110 N.E.2d at 7.
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[olur courts may...refuse to give effect
to a foreign law that is contrary to our
public policy. But the Czechoslovakian
currency control laws in question cannot
here be deemed to be offensive on that
score, since our Federal Government and
the Czechoslovakian Government are mem-
bers of the International Monetary
Fund.,. .151
The Court of Appeals did not discuss the provisions of
Article VII, Section 2(b), but its rationale suggests
that it felt bound to recognize the Czech exchange
regulations and that it regarded them as consistent
with the Articles. The opinion suggests either that
the transfer of pension benefits was a capital transac-
tion or, if current, that the restrictions imposed were
consistent with (then) Article XIV, Section 2, which
excused transitional members from many of the obliga-
tions of Article VIII. Significant, too, are the terms
of the pension agreement, which made the benefits pay-
able at the offices of the bank. The fact that these
terms had been fulfilled facilitates the separate
treatment of the component parts of the transaction.
Though Czechoslovakia did not permit the plaintiff to
transfer his benefits out of the country, which effec-
tively frustrated his entitlement to them, it did not
restrict their payment. Nor was the blocked account a
restriction on the settlement of a prior commitment,
for the bank had performed its duties under the pension
agreement.
Although the court did not deal explicitly with
the character of the transaction or with the severabi-
lity of its parts, one concludes that members may
restrict the transfer of pension benefits, as distinct
from their payment. To be sure, the facts of the case
limit the rule. Had the pension agreement provided for
payment to the beneficiary wherever he resided, the
court might have decided differently. Alternatively,
if members' restrictions on the transfer of all forms
of capital were forbidden, except where authorized by
the IMF, courts could avoid outcomes such as that in
Perutz.
151. 304 N.Y. at 537, 110 N.E.2d at 7 (citation omitted).
Czechoslovakia announced its withdrawal from the Fund on
December 31, 1954, which withdrawal the Fund acknowledged on
January 5, 1955.
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I. LegaZ Tender Laws and Exchange Surrender
Requ-rements
The courts of some members have denied interna-
tional application to the legal tender laws of member
countries, even where such laws affect the exchange
resources of members by prescribing the acceptable cur-
rency for the conduct of certain transactions, Such
denial is based upon the characterization of legal ten-
der laws as part of the domestic law of members, not
within the meaning of "exchange regulations" as used in
Article VIII, Section 2(b), and limited therefore to
the domestic jurisdiction of the enacting member.
In Loeffler-Behrens v. Beerman,1 5 2 the Mannheim
(Germany) Regional Court confronted a Brazilian de-
creel53 which, as applied to German nationals resident
in Brazil, prohibited the contractual incurrence of
obligations denominated in foreign currencies, In al-
leged violation of this decree, plaintiff had delivered
$5,500 to defendant in April 1959 in return for defen-
dant's promise to pay the equivalent in cruzeiros by
May of 1959. In October of that year, having only
partially fulfilled this obligation, defendant issued
another promise to pay, with modifications that are not
here material.
After defendant had returned to Germany in 1961,
plaintiff, as yet unsatisfied in his claim, brought
suit in the Mannheim court, which awarded him judgment.
On appeal the Karlsruhe Regional Court of Appeals af-
firmed the judgment. Referring to a letter from the
General Counsel of the Fund,154 the court found that
the Brazilian decree was not an exchange control regu-
lation entitled to recognition under Article VIII. It
concluded that, although Brazilian law governed the
contractual liabilities of the parties, German law
152. This case is reviewed in 2 J. GOLD, THE FUND AGREE-
MENT, supra note 65, at 50-54. The judgment of the Mannheim
Landgericht (Regional Court) was appealed to the Karlsruhe Ober-
landesgericht (Regional Court of Appeals), which affirmed the
lower court's judgment for the plaintiff on somewhat different
grounds.
153. The Brazilian decree, No. 23501, of Nov. 27, 1933,
prohibited "on pain of nullity" the stipulation of payment in
foreign currencies in contracts to be performed in Brazil, Id,
at 52.
154. See id, at 52, 53.
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governed the monetary liabilities.1 55
This is not a "bad" result. But the court was a
bit disingenuous in separating contractual from mone-
tary liabilities, where the contract appeared to con-
sist of mutual promises to pay and contained no other
duties or liabilities. Conceivably, the court could
have recognized the Brazilian prohibition as affecting
that country's exchange resources, and yet have awarded
judgment for the plaintiff on the theory of quantum
meruit.156
While reducing or eliminating restrictions on
payments for both current and capital transactions
might well improve world economic welfare (see part V,
jnfra), it is surprising that foreign courts should
deny international recognition to legal tender laws
obviously within the exercise of national sovereignty
and not necessarily restrictive of international pay-
ments and transfers. This is especially so in view of
the predisposition of the courts to uphold memberst ex-
change control regulations without serious inquiry into
their characteristics and propriety under the IMF
Articles.
A New York court took an approach similar to that
of the German courts in De Sayve v. De la Valdene.1 5 7
After the conclusion of a contract by which the French
defendant agreed to pay to the French plaintiff a sum
of dollars and sterling, France passed a legal tender
law Ccours force) declaring void as against public
policy any contracts denominated in gold or foreign cur-
rencies. The court found that the law did express the
public policy of France, but that it was not an "ex-
change control law of the type whic the Bretton Woods
Agreements now make enforceable."1 59 Since the French
statute did not bear upon the validity of the contract
or plaintiff's entitlement to the sums agreed to be
paid,159 defendant was liable.
155. Id. at 52.
156. Although this writer is uncertain as to the existence
in Brazilian law of theories analogous to those of quantum meruit
and unjust enrichment, it seems reasonable to expect that such
theories would have developed. Recall the quasi-delictual remedy
applied in the Daiei case, supra p, 41.
157, 124 N.Y.S,2d 143 (Sup. Ct. 1953), affld, 283 A.D.
918, 130 N.Y.S.2d 865 GL954),
158. 124 N.Y.S.2d at 153.
159. 124 N.Y.S.2d at 150-52,
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Courts also have not regarded exchange surrender
requirements as "exchange control regulations" and
therefore litigants have not succeeded in having
declared unenforceable exchange contracts that violate
members' surrender requirementg. Banco do Brasil, S.A.
v, A. C. Israel Commodity Co. 16 0 involved an arrange-
ment by which defendant, a Delaware coffee importer,
had agreed to pay a Brazilian exporter directly in
dollars, rather than exchanging dollars for cruzeiros
and paying the exporter in cruzeiros. The arrange-
ment violated Brazilian law, which required that for-
eign currencies be exchanged with the plaintiff bank
and that payment be made with the domestic eurrency.
Plaintiff claimed damages of $1.3 million.
The Court of Appeals of New York found that the
transaction was not an "exchange contract" within the
meaning of Article VIII, Section 2(b), and that the law
was not an "exchange control regulation" but a "revenue
law" and there ore not entitled to recognition under
the Articles. 191 Thus, the court saw no violation, nor
did it find in the Articles an implied obligation to
impose tort penalties on contracting parties who vio-
late the revenue laws of another member. The lower
court's judgment in favor of the defendant was affirm-
ed. This approach probably has been repudiated, how-
ever, in a more recent case, Banco Frances e Brasileiro
S. A. v. Doe. 1 6 2 On somewhat different facts (the
Banco do Brasil case was distinguished), the Court of
Appeals of New York acknowledged strong policy reasons
for favoring foreign revenue regulations, "...especial-
ly one involving currency exchange or control."1 63 It
stated further that
even assuming the continuing validity of
the revenue law rule and the correctness
of the characterization of a currency ex-
change regulation thereunder, United
States membership in the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) makes inappropriate tHe
refusal to entertain the instant claim.16
160. 12 N.Y.2d 371, 190 N,E,2d 235, 239 N.Y.S,2d 872 (1963),
cert. denied, 376 U.S. 906 (1964); see also 1 J, GOLD, THE FUND
AGREEMENT, supra note 76, at 135,-139 Cdiscussing case),
161. 12 N.Y.2d at 375, 377, 190 N.E.2d at 236, 237, 239
N.Y.S.2d at 874,875.
162. 36 N.Y.2d 592, 331 N.E.2d 502, 370 N.Y.S.2d 534, cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 867 (1975).
163. 36 N.Y.2d at 597, 331 N,E.2d at 506, 370 N.Y.S.2d at
538.
164. 36 N.Y.2d at 598, 331 N.E.2d at 506, 370 N.Y.S.2d at
539.
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If Banco Frances e Braailero continues to be the
la', exchange surrender requirements and, perhaps, le-
gal tender statutes will no longer be ignored as "rev-
enue laws." Courts, then, would recognize such stat-
utes as exchange control regulations and hold unen-
forceable contracts in violation thereof. Tort
remedies, however, go quite beyond the "unenforceabi-
lity" required by the ArticlesT65 and beyond theories
of quantum meruit or quasi-delictual liability.16 6
Most important is the qualification that, if such laws
are indeed accorded international recognition as "ex-
change control regulations" under Article VII, Sec-
tion 2(b), then the courts must analyze the character
of the regulations to determine whether they are
"maintained or imposed consistently with" the Articles.
Assuming that true legal tender laws and exchange sur-
render requirements do not restrict the availability of
exchange as such, but merely regulate the means by
which the exchange is employed, then such regulations
must comport with the Articles, despite their effect on
current international transactions,
J. Summary
This part of the paper has categorized and discus-
sed several types of exchange control regulations liti-
gated under the Articles. Most actions which call into
question a particular exchange regulation arise under
Article VIII, Section 2(b). Courts must resolve the
threshold question of whether a particular transaction
is an "exchange contract" which "involves" the currency
of a member before they can determine the consistency
of that member's regulations with the Articles and the
enforceability of the contract.
Although the cases and commentaries are far from
unanimous, the weight of authority and the economic
purposes of the Articles support the theory that ex-
165. See, e.g., Banco do Brasil S.A. v. A. C. Israel
Commodity Co., 12 N.Y.2d 371, 376, 190 N.E.2d 235, 237, 239
N.Y.S.2d 872, 874 (1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 906 (1964),
166. See Daiei Motion Picture Company, Ltd. v. Zavicha,
[19711 J. C, p, Zi Not 21, 16751 (trial egurt proceedings) (the
dispositiQn on appql is, reviewed in- Cola, The Fund Agreement
i'n the Courts--XZI, supra note 144, 9t 195-2Xi); see aiso
pp. 41-43 supra.
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change contracts involving the currency of a member
are those which in any way affect the member's exchange
resources. Two recent cases have adopted the narrower
view, which holds both that the exchange of currencies
must be the immediate object of the contract and that
the contract must be denominated in the currency of
the member that claims to be involved. These, however,
appear to be aberrations from the predominant, broader
view.
Having determined that a transaction is an exchange
contract within the meaning of Article VIII, courts
must pass upon the enforceability of the contract and
the liabilities of the parties thereunder. By the
terms of Section 2(b), a contract will be unenforceable
if it is contrary to an affected member's valid ex-
change regulations. A determination of validity re-
quires a finding that the regulation is imposed consis-
tently with the Articles--i.e., that it does not res-
trict payments for current transactions (Article
VIII, Section 2(a)), or, if it restricts capital tran-
sactions (which are normally permitted), that it does
not unduly delay transfers of funds in the settlement
of commitments (Article I, Section 3).
Several of the cases confirm the definitions dis-
cussed in part II. Thus, the mere exchange of cur-
rencies, in Frantzman v. Poinjen, and the assignment
of shares of stock, in Moojen v. Von Reichert, are
treated as capital transactions, subject to members'
restrictions under Article VI, Section 3. However,
in many cases the courts do not address the economic
purposes of the IMF. Occasionally the courts have
chosen to decide the cases according to verbal consi-
derations or "easy" readings of the Articles, apparent-
ly because of their unfamiliarity with the economic
concepts involved. At other times, a noneconomic
approach reflects considerations of policy that are
not expressed. Many of the opinions are result-
oriented and utilize a "forced" reading of the law in
order to compensate the damages suffered by a party to
a contract. In such cases, the courts often assume
the consistency or inconsistency of a given regulation
without discussing its fundamental nature. The "right"
result often is obtained for the "wrong" reasons.
An economic application of the law would broaden
the protections of Article VII, Section 2(a), and en-
able the courts more elegantly to derive the desired
results. The insurance cases and the case involving
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the personal service contract, Daiei, would have bene-
fited notably from economic analysis. Had the under-
lying transactions been analyzed and found current,
the courts would not have had to rely on territorial
limitations or on quasi delictual remedies to provide
the deserved relief. Similarly, in Zeevi, had the
court viewed the letter of credit as an exchange con-
tract relating to short-term financing of trade, it
could have held the restrictive exchange laws of Uganda
to be inconsistent with the Articles.
Unfortunately, the cases do not provide an exposi-
tion of criteria that are helpful in determining the
current or capital nature of ambiguous transactions.
Instead, they reveal the unwillingness or inability of
courts to engage in the economic analysis that is
necessary to apply the current/capital distinction. To
the extent that judicial error is likely, these circum-
stances militate against the maintenance of the dis-
tinction.
To be sure, the economically significant exchange
restrictions are unlikely to come before the courts.
Yet, the limitations that stronger, better-reasoned
opinions would impose on the scope of inconsistent or
overbroad regulations would facilitate commerce that
otherwise might suffer.
A more comprehensive solution to the courtst fail-
ure to deal adequately with the economic issues would
be to treat capital movements like current payments
and to prohibit members from restricting such move-
ments except with the approval of the IMF. The result-
ing presumption against the validity of any exchange
restriction would limit the issue to a determination of
IMF approval. Restrictions would decrease and in liti-
gated matters the courts would not be called upon to
make economic distinctions. Further, even where courts
fail to recognize the current nature of the underlying
transactions, as they did in Ugalde and Perutz, such
unfortunate results could be avoided if the IMF would
prohibit restrictions on capital transfers. Moreover,
the proposed reform would eradicate many of the eco-
nomically significant but seldom litigated exchange
controls.
Whatever the judicial and economic wisdom of this
alternative, its adoption would be difficult to achieve.
The concern of the delegates to Bretton Woods, that
countries retain control over capital movements, still
19791
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prevails among governments.
IV. An Historical Background to the Distinction
between Payments and Transfers for Current
and Capital Transactions
The drafters foresaw the difficulty that the
courts would encounter in distinguishing between pay-
ments for current and capital transactions, and in
passing upon their consistency with the Articles.
Committee Two at Bretton Woods, discussing the pro-
visions of Article VI that relate to capital controls,
said:
This Article is certainly a very important
one because it recognizes the right of
any member country to organize or to
maintain an exchange control for capital
movements .... Although the general purpose
of the Fund is to foster free exchanges,
it is remarkable that the experts have
found it advisable not only to make pro-
visions allowing exchange control for
capital movements, but also recommending
it in some cases. It will certainly be
difficult to draw a line between control-
ling movements of capital and controlling
transactions for trade purposes.1 67
This observation not only anticipates the administra-
tive problems inherent in the current/capital dis-
tinction, but also alludes to the fundamental incon-
sistency between the purposes of the IMF and its
design to permit and sometimes require national con-
trols on capital movements. To find the reasons for
the experts' advice that such controls be permitted,
it is necessary to delve further into the proceed-
ings of the Bretton Woods Conference and into the con-
temporary understanding of the world monetary experi-
ence between the great wars.
167. 1 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, PROCEEDINGS AND DOCUMENTS
OF THE UNITED NATIONS MONETARY AND FINANCIAL CONFERENCE 314,
Document Number CI/2/RPl (1948) (emphasis supplied) [hereinafter
cited as IROCEEDITG$ AND DOCUMENT].
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The exchange depreciation in Europe which follow-
ed the First World War was widely believed to be a
consequence of inadequate European supplies of real
and financial capital.1 68 The shortages of material
needed for post-war reconstruction generated heavy im-
port demand and, consequently, heavy demand for
foreign exchange (such as the dollar). This, in turn,
caused the European currencies to depreciate. Although
depreciations sometimes generate what have been termed
"destabilizing" capital movements--i.e., movements of
financial capital from assets denominated in the depre-
ciating currency to assets denominated in other cur-
rencies in anticipation of further devaluationl69--
the post-war depreciations in Europe initially had
quite the opposite effect. Many investors, believing
the depreciations to be temporary aberrations from
the higher, "natural" values of the currencies, saw
opportunities for future gain and purchased assets
denominated in the depreciating currencies. The flows
of financial capital into the depreciating currencies
helped to finance the heavy demand for imports and to
curb pressures for devaluation.17 0
This pattern of investment contributed to what
the IMF, in a recent Annual Report, described as the
pre-1930 view "that freedom of capital movements was
highly desirable in itself and that movements of short-
term funds might be viewed as an equilibrating factor
in international payments.1:171 Investor optimism is
not boundless, however, and such a pattern could not
continue indefinitely. When the countries failed to
168. See LEAGUE OF NATIONS, INTERNATIONAL CURRENCY
EXPERIENCE 113 (1944), and Chapters V and VII therein. Another
factor likely to have contributed to the post-war trend of ex-
change depreciation was widespread inflation due to inadequate
taxation, administrative weakness, and political upheavals.
169. "Destabilizing" capital movements are believed to
be self-justifying to some extent. A depreciation in the ex-
change value of a currency is likely to generate a fear of further
depreciation and, consequently, an exit of capital from the
depreciating country; such an exit of capital will accelerate,
in fact, the advent of the feared further depreciation. Although
this cycle clearly cannot continue forever, its limits seem as
likely to be found in mass psychology as in the science of econo-
mics.
170. See LEAGUE OF NATIONS, INTERNATIONAL CURRENCY EXPERI-
ENCE, supra note 168, at 113-15.
171. IMF, ANNUAL REPORT 12 C1965).
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curb inflation and when depreciations persisted, even
after large inflows of investment capital, it became
apparent that the devaluations were not merely tempor-
ary aberrations from the higher norm, but part of a
trend to a lower equilibrium exchange rate. A loss of
confidence and withdrawal of capital soon followed
which accelerated the depreciations. 1 7 2
Individual countries undertook stabilization
policies, but in a "piecemeal" and "uncoordinated man-
ner."1 7 3 In the 1920's several countries expressed the
value of their currencies in gold, with little or no
regard to the level of any single currency relative to
that of other currencies. The resulting melange of
over- and under-valued currencies disintegrated in the
1930's.174
Characteristic of this period of economic and
monetary disintegration were large and sudden changes
in exchange rates, sometimes designed to stimulate
export production and real income.i7 5 Such deliberate
devaluation has been aptly termed "competitive" devalu-
ation. Occasionally, monetary stability was disrupted
when investors, seeking to avoid anticipated devalua-
tions, moved "hot" money rapidly between countries on
the slightest provocation,176 precipitating changes in
exchange rates.l7 7 Such speculative activity, psycho-
logically induced, was unresponsive to discount poli-
cies designed to slow or reverse the capital out-
flows. 178
172*. THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS, INTERNATIONAL CURRENCY
EXPERIENCE, supra note 168, at 114-15.
173. Id. at 116.
174. Id. at 117-31.
175. See id. especially at 127-29; see also J. J. Polak,
International Coordination of Economic Policy, 9 IMF STAFF PAPERS
149, 169 (1962).
176. LEAGUE OF NATIONS, INTERNATIONAL CURRENCY EXPERIENCE,
supra note 168, at 123.
177, Id, at 133-34, 162. The speculative capital flight
from some countries (Hungary, Bulgaria, Greece) was not regarded
as the predominant cause of depreciation there in the early 1930's.
For other countries, however, the capital flight was clearly the
major factor precipitating devaluation; Argentina, Austria, Czecho-
slovakia, Denmark, Estonia, Germany and Latvia experienced deple-
tion of gold and foreign exchange resources that were far greater
than any deficits in their current account balances.
178. Id. at 162-63.
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Consequently, many countries attempted to prevent
abnormal or disruptive capital movements through the
imposition of controls on capital movements, 7 Some
controls required the repatriation of funds held abroad
by residents and others curtailed the flight of domes-
tically-owned funds. However, later observers have :
contended that the imposition of such controls had fur-
ther adverse effects on investor confidence. If so,
the controls actually inhibited the repatriation of
funds and, perhaps, even encouraged outflows wherever
these were possibleld0 Additionally, most of the
countries that imposed capital controls during this
period experienced a worsening in their current
balances, due to the effect of the controls on the ex-
change rate (increasing the rate or slowing its de-
cline). or to inflation, or to a combination of fac-
tors. 11 Although the benefits from a reduced level of
speculation and greater monetary stability may have off-
set the self-aggravating aspects of capital controls to
some degree, the imposition of controls during this
period, even where needed, clearly did not produce uni-
formly corrective results. So it was that the dele-
gates from many countries convened at Bretton Woods to
draft the original Articles of the IMF, having exper-
ienced recent competitive and self-perpetuating de-
valuations and capital movements that had been both
stabilizing and destabilizing. The product of their
efforts established a system of fixed but (rarely) ad-
justable par values and imposed obligations on the part
of members to maintain these values, The Articles were
a reform of monetary relationships that reflected the
world-wide concern for a stable system of exchange
rates.1 82 The provisions that preserve to members the
capacity to control capital movements indicate the con-
viction of the delegates that such controls helped to
maintain an orderly monetary system.
The British Proposals for an International Clear-
ing Union, authored largely by John Meynard Keynes,
stated that "control of capital movements, both inward
and outward, should be a permanent part of the post-war
179. See generally id. at 163-66,
180. Id. at 163.
181. Id. at 165-66.
182. See generaZlly the Articles, supra note 1, and R.
SOLOMON, THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM 1945-1976, supra note 4,
at 11-13.
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system."118 3 The British planners believed that there
was
no country which can, in future, safely
allow the flight of funds for political
reasons, or to avoid domestic taxation
or in anticipation of the owner turning
refugee. Equally, there is no country
that can safely receive fugitive funds
... [which] cannot safely be used for
fixed investment. 184
The plan eschewed cumbersome international regulation
of capital movements and proposed instead unilateral,
nationally administered controls. Despite its broad
grant of national control of capital movements, the
plan, as enacted, adhered to its overriding purpose to
promote trade, employment, and income, and to reduce
the level of exchange restrictions.lBS The plan there-
fore cautioned against the use of "drastic measures,"
and advised that regulation of inward flows of capital
would be less onerous than regulation of outward flows.
A closely related concern was that, with fixed
"stable" exchange rates, national regulation of capital
movements was necessary to maintain domestic control
over interest rates. Assume that under fixed rates a
country undertakes a restrictive monetary policy, per-
haps to quell inflationary pressures. An increase in
that country's interest rate relative to the rate in
other countries would tend to attract foreign capital,
which in turn would lower or moderate the rise in
interest rates and frustrate the restrictive policies.
Conversely, a country undergoing monetary expansion
would experience a capital outflow, as the expansion
would cause its interest rates to fall (see genera lZy,
part V, infra).1 8 6
This concern is based not on the transient psycho-
logy of speculation, but on the fundamental economic
premises that interest-sensitive capital, if not inhi-
bited, will move internationally and that, under fixed
183. Keynes, Proposals for an International Clearing Union,
para. 33, originally issued April 1943, reprinted in 3 THE INTERNA-
TIONAL MONETARY FUND 1945-1965, at 19-36 (J.K. Horsefield ed. 1969)
and in J.M. KEYNES, THE NEW ECONOMICS 335 (S. Harris ed. 1947).
184. Id. at para. 32.
185, See Article I, Second Amendment, supra note 3.
186. See IMF, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY REFORM: DOCUMENTS OF THE
COMMITTEE OF T1ENTY 80, para. 9 (1974), acknowledging the importance
of interest-rate differentials as a factor motivating capital flows.
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exchange rates, international payments on both the capi-
tal and the current accounts must finally balance. As
Lord Keynes reminded the Parliament, "Unless the aggre-
gate of the new investments which individuals are free
to make overseas is kept within the amount which our
favorable trade balance is capable of looking after, we
lose control over the domestic rate of interest."1 87
Nationalist sentiment, too, contributes to the in-
terest in preserving members' control of capital move-
ments. No participating country relished the notion of
relinquishing sovereignty in economic policy. In an
address before the House of Lords on May 23, 1944,
Keynes assured his peers:
We are determined that, in future, the
external value of sterling shall conform
to its internal value as set by our own
domestic policies, and not the other way
round.... We intend to retain control of
our domestic rate of interest, so that we
can keep it as low as suits our purposes,
without interference from the ebb and
flow of international capital movements
or flights of hot money,.., [and] whilst
we intend to prevent inflation at home,
we will not accept deflation at the dic-
tate of influences from outside.18 8
Keynes commented further that the proposed system
secured, "on firmer foundations than ever before," the
explicit right to control all capital movements and the
domestic capital market. Yet the importance of the
nationalist sentiment should not overshadow the desire
of the planners to enhance stability, trade, and eco-
nomic welfare. Keynes was careful to note that the
187, Lord Keynes' address to the House of Lords, May 18,
1943, reprinted in THE NEW ECONOMICS, supra note 183, at 364. The
view that capital movements under fixed exchange rates could reduce
the scope of national interest rate policy has been widely accepted.
See H.G. JOHNSON, The Case for Flexible Exchange Rates, 1969 in
FURTHER ESSAYS IN MONETARY ECONOMICS 199 (1973); Aliber, Monetary
Independence Under Floating Exchange Rates, 30 J. FINANCE 365, 367
(1975); J.J. Polak, supra note 175, at 171. See generally part V
infra.
188. Lord Keynes' address to the House of Lords, May 23,
1944, reprinted in THE NEW ECONOMICS, supra note 183, at 374.
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capital controls should not prevent the conduct of
"innocent current transactions. "189
The United States originally took a less restric-
tive approach toward the regulation of capital move-
ments. In the April 1942 version of the White Plan
for a Preliminary Draft Proposal for a United Nations
StabZlization Fund and a Bank for Reconstruction and
Development of the United and Ass-ociated Nations, a
condition of membership was that a country agree "to
abandon, not later than one year after joining the
Fund, all restrictions and controls over foreign
exchange transactions with member countries, except
with the approval of the Fund."1 9 0 Although this pro-
posal assumed that the International Monetary Fund
would approve necessary regulation, its clear objective
was "foreign exchange trading in an open, free and
legal market."191 A later version of the White Plan
did not take so permissive a view of capital movements.
The revised plan acknowledged the purposes of the IMF
to foster "the smooth flow of foreign trade and of
productive capital among member countries" and to
'reduce the use of such foreign exchange restrictions
... and discriminatory foreign exchange practices as
hamper world trade and the international flow of pro-
ductive capital."19 2 This revision, however, did not
require members to refrain from imposing restrictions
on capital transfers. Rather, it proposed that members
undertake to "abandon, as soon as ... conditions permit,
all restrictions (other than those involving capital
transfers) over foreign exchange transactions with other
member countries, and not to impose any additional
restrictions (except on capital transfers) without the
approval of the Fund."l93
The Congress and several influential Americans
expressed concerns similar to those of Lord Keynes in
his proposals and speeches to Parliament. A House
Report on the proposed U.S. participation in the Inter-
national Monetary Fund distinguished between payments
for current and capital transactions. Restrictions on
the former diverted trade and investment into "unecono-
mic channels" and were therefore correctly proscribed
189, Xd, at 375,
190. 3 THE INTERNATIONAL 140NETARY FUN 1945-65, supra
note 183, at 63.
191. Id.
192, Id. at 86,
193, Id. at 95,
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by the proposed Articles, However, the Report assumed
the necessity of some control over payments for capital
transactions: "To avoid capital flights, member coun-
tries are authorized to control international capital
movements, and the Fund may require a member to exer-
cise controls to prevent use of the Round';s resources for
large or sustained outflows of capital.1'194 At the time
of the Conference, interest rates and inflation in the
United States were more likely to affect than to be
affected by economic events in other countries. The
relative monetary independence of the United States
during the inter-war period explains much of the readi-
ness of the House Committee to value capital controls
primarily as a curb on the disruptive effects of specu-
lation rather than as a tool for the maintenance of
domestic monetary autonomy.
The Senate Committee on Banking and Currency
heard witnesses who placed control of current transac-
tions "in a different category" from control of capi-
tal movements. 1 9 5 Some speakers stressed the neces-
sity of the capacity to control capital movements as a
means to temper or avoid speculative flows.196 Others,
however, feared that the Article VI, Section 3 provi-
sion authorizing controls might become an undesirable
complication1 9 7 which, by encouraging the exercise of
national capital controls, would institutionalize the
controlsl 9o and frustrate the purposes of the IMF.1 9 9
194. HOUSE COMMITTEE ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, H.R. REP.
NO. 629, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1945).
195. SENATE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, HEARINGS ON
THE BRETTON WOODS AGREEMENT ACT, H.R. 3314, 79th Cong., 1st
Sess. 327 (1945) [hereinafter referred to as SENATE HEARINGS
(Statement of J.H. Williams, Dean of the Graduate School of Public
Administration, Harvard University).
196. Id, at 207-08 (Statement of Harry D. White, Assis-
tant Secretary of the Treasury).
197. Id, at 276-77 (Statement of M. Palyi, Lecturer at
Oxford, University of Chicago, Northwestern University, and the
University of Wisconsir, And consulting economistl,
See also HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, HEARINGS ON
H,R. 2211, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 839 (1945) (Statement of E,
Kemmerer, Emeritus Professor of International Finance, Princeton
University) Ehereinafter referred to as HOUSE HEARINGS].
198. See SENATE HEARINGS supra note 195, at 306 (State-
ment of Allan Sproul, President, Federal Reserve Bank of New York);
see also SENATE HEARINGS, supra note 195, at 368-69 (Statement of
M.K. Hart, President, National Economic Council, New York).
199, X, Palyi alludes to those consequences in his State-
ment at the SENATE HEARINGS, supra note 195, especially at 275,
277,
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The acceptance by the United States and other
countries of the IMF Articles of Agreement, which con-
tained the familiar distinction between payments for
current and capital transactions, represents the
resolution of many, sometimes conflicting, interests
and concerns. In allowing member countries to retain
control of international capital movements, the draft-
ers acceded to the demands for domestic autonomy and
monetary stability. The resulting agreement compro-
mised the goals of increased trade, increased real
income, and lower levels of exchange restriction.
Nevertheless, the Articles provided the greatest de-
gree of stability possible, considering the domestic
economic necessities perceived by the countries in-
volved. 200
This compromise, however, has been called into
question by recent research on international monetary
reform by the Committee of Twenty,2 01 National capi-
200, See Press Release, Document No. 508 of the U.N. Mone-
tary and Financial Conference at Bretton Woods (July 21, 1944),
reprinted in PROCEEDINGS AND DOCUMENTS, supra note 167, at 1209,
1213. See also Address by Secretary of State Morgenthau, Closing
Plenary Session of the Bretton Woods Conference (July 21, 1944),
Document No. 522, reprinted in PROCEEDINGS AND DOCUMENTS, supra
note 167, at 1224, 1226, declaring that "Etjhere must be a reason-
ably stable standard of international exchange to which all coun-
tries can adhere without sacrificing the freedom of action neces-
sary to meet their internal economic problems." The Secretary's
later reference to the IMF as a remedy for "unnecessary exchange
restrictions" presupposes that, for certain (presumably internal)
reasons, some exchange restrictions are necessary.
201. The Committee of Twenty is formally titled:
Committee of the Board of Governors on Reform of the Internation-
al Monetary System and Related Issues. It was established in 1i71
to examine alternatives. for reform, $ee M. GARRITSEN DE TVRTES, THE
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 1966-1971, at 68, 556, 634 (1976). The
Committee included representatives of the major industrial coun-
tries and representatives of nine developing countries (each of
which, in turn, represented several other developing countries)-
Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Ethiopia, France,
West Germany, India, lndonesia, A!q,ra Italy, Japan, Vorocco, the
Netherlands, Sweden, the United States, the 'United Kingdom,
Venezuela, and Zaire.
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tal restrtctions, while perhaps effectlve in curbing
smaller disequlibrating.flows, dQ not withstand mas-
sive capital flows. Moreover, they may have deleter-
ious side effects en trade, 2 0 2 and thus cause problems
for developing countries (see part V, infra). 2D3 There-
fore the Committee recommended that members not use
capital controls, except infrequently and in coopera-
tion with other countries.204 Thus the amendment to
Article IV declares it an essential purpose of the IMF
to "provide a framework that facilitates the exchange
of goods, services, and capital among countries..... 205
In 1965, the Joint Economic Committee of the
United States Congress implicitly acknowledged the
counter-productive effects of controls on capital move-
ments. The Committee declared that "[ilt is one of the
many ironies and inconsistencies of modern life that,
to protect fixed exchange rates--the means--we have
compromised freedom of capital movements and, to some
extent, the ends which fixed rates were intended to
serve."20 6  Recognizing these effects, the United
States' negotiators of the Second Amendment stressed
the importance of capital mobility, 2 07 as did the
legislative hist~ry to the Congressional approval of
the Amendment. 2 00
But, despite the recognition of potential disad-
vantages to controls on capital movements, many of the
202. IMF, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY REFORM: DOCUMENTS OF THE
COMMITTEE OF TWENTY, 84-85, para. 21 (1974).
203. See id. at 87.
204. Id. at 12-13.
205. See Article IV, § 1, Second Amendment, supra note 3.
206. JOINT ECONOMIC COMM, 89TH CONG., ist SESS., GUIDELINES
FOR IMPROVING THE INTERNATIONAL -1ONETARY SYSTEM 18 (Ccmm. Priiit
1965).
207. See COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, ANNUAL REPORT, printed
in ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, TRANSMITTED TO THE CONGRESS
JANUARY 1973, at 127-128 (1973); J. GOLD, INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL
MOVEMENTS, $upra note 22, at 43-44; R. SOLOMON, THE INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY' SYSTEM, 1945-76, supra note 4, at 240-43.
208. See SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE, S. REP. NO.
94-1148, '94th Cong., '2d Sess. 10 (1976) (noting that adjustment,
under the Amendment, should take place in the exchange rate and the
national economy rather than through government regulation of trade
or capital flows). Approval of the Amendment was granted by Pub, L,
No, 94,564, 90 Stat. 2660 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 286e-5 (1976)).
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concerns that influenced the delegates to Bretton
Woods still prevail, A study group of the Committee of
Twenty, the Technical Group on Disequilibrating Capital
Flows, noted in its May 1973 report that
Lt]he Group were confirmed in the view
that the possibility of disequilibrating
capital flows continuing in future could
not be neglected, and that countries
should be able to use a variety of measures,
including controls, to influence them.2 0 9
This view derives from the common perception that capi-
tal flows had caused members' recent difficulties with
both international payment imbalances and disturbances
in their domestic economies. 2 1 0 Although some econo-
mists regard "disequilibrating" capital flows as a
persistent problem in the international monetary sys-
tem,2 1 1 others dispute the view that capital movements
are a causal element in international instability and
contend, instead, that such movements often are the
product of underlying instability.2 1 2
The concern for disequilibrating flows of capital
and the desire for national capital controls predomi-
nated among the European countries during the negotia-
tion of the Second Amendment. 2 1 3 Thomas D. Willett, a
prominent economist and former director of internation-
al monetary research at the U.S. Treasury Department,
observed that "most major countries are not going to be
willing, within the forseeable future, to give up a
great deal of autonomy in macroeconomic policy, wh -
ever mightbe:optimal in strictly economic terms.",21
209, IMF, supra note 202, at 84-85.
210, Id. at 78, 79.
211. See, e.g., Cooper, Monetary Theory and Policy
in an Open Economy, 78 SCANDINAVIAN J. ECON, 146, 162 (1976);
but cf. S.W. Black, Discussant, 78 SCANDINAVIAN J. ECON. 166, 168
(1976) Cviewing capital flows not as a source of difficulty,
but, rather, as essential to the proper functioning of the ex-
change market).
212. 5ee part V infra,
213. See R, SOLOMON, supra note 4, at 240, Cf, J, GOLD,
INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL XQVEMENTS-, supra note 22, at 44.
214. 5ee T,D. WILTETT, FLOATING EXCHANGE RATES AND INTER-
NATIONAL M4ONETARY REFORM 47 (1977).
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These concerns prevailed and, contrary to the
posture of the United States, the Second Amendment
preserves the provisions of Articles 7II1 and WV that
relate to the differential treatment of current pay-
ments and capital movements.
V. An Economic Analysis of Capital MoUiity under
Fixed and Flexible Exchange Rates: The Major
Xssues
It is very usual, in nations ignorant of
the nature of commerce, to prohibit the ex-
portation of commodities, and to preserve
among themselves whatever they think
valuable and useful. They do not consider,
that, in this prohibition, they act
directly contrary to their intention; and
that the more is exported of any commodity,
the more will be raised at home, of which
they themselves will always have the first
offer .... The same jealous fear, with
regard to money, has also prevailed among
several nations; and it required both reason
and experience to convince any people, that
those prohibitions serve no other purpose
than to raise the exchange against them
and produce a still greater exportation.
David Hume, Of the Balance of Trade
C17521215
That free commerce--in finance as well as in trade
--is generally of mutual benefit- to the parties in-
volved is a lesson hard-learned. Even the Second Amend-
ment, while affirming a system of flexible exchange
rates, which system should eliminate or greatly reduce
the need for nationally administered capital controls,
permits members to control capital movements. Under
flexible exchange rates, freely mobile capital is at
least as beneficial as restrictions are costly.
Part. V of this article will examine the role of
capital mobility in the international economy. Economic
analysis not only will elucidate why, under fixed ex-
change rates, capital mobility limits national monetary
215. 1 D. HUME, ESSAYS, MORAL, POLITICAL AND LITERARY330
(Longmans Green ed. 1898),
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autonomy, but also how capital movements enhance rather
than inhibit the effectiveness of monetary policy.
Further, the implications of capital mobility for the
promotion of world economic welfare will be discussed.
A. The Impact of the International Mobility of
Capital on Domestic Economic Policies under
Fixed and Flexible Exchange Rates
1. The Exchange Rate Systems and the Model
Adoption of the two exchange rate systems in their
pure forms avoids the complications of "limited" flexi-
bility, which is the result "of -government intervention 2 1 6
Flexible exchange rates, as the term is used in this
paper, are determined exclusively by supply and demand
in the foreign exchange market. Such a system is free
from restrictions on exchange rates and other forms of
intervention by national monetary authorities. 2 1 7 The
international demand and supply for a countryt s cur-
rency is determined by the amount of the currency
sought elsewhere for the purchase of that countryt s
exports and for investment in it, and by the amount
of the currency provided by its residents through their
purchase of imports and through their investment
abroad. 218 External changes in the supply and demand
216. For brief expositions on the complications which
attend government intervention in the exchange markets, see
H.G. GRUBEL, THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM, 109-10 (1969);
Aliber, Monetary Independence under Floating Exchange Rates, suprq
note 187, at 365; L{.v.N. Whitman, The Payments Adjustment
Process and the Exchange Rate Regime: What Have We Learned?, 65
AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC. 133, 135-136 (1975).
217. The assumption of complete and free flexibility of
exchange rates is made in most theoretical arguments in support
of flexible rates. See, e.g., M. FRIEDMAN, The Case for Flexi-
ble Exchange Rates in ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS 157-203 (1953);
HG, JOHNSON, The Case for Flexible Exchange Rates, 1969 in
FURTHER ESSAYS IN MONETARY ECONOMICS 198 (1973),
218, The supply and demand for currencies on the inter-
national exchange markets is affected by noneconomic as well
as by economic factors, Political instability, politically
motivated trade sanctions (e.g., the oil embargo), and military
activities might influence exchange rates. Yet the fundamental
determinants continue to be the export, import, and investment
demands and the corresponding supplies of goods and capital
in the participating economies,
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for a country's currency, and incipient trade and capi-
tal imbalances, do not result in external disequili-
brium (net payments deficits or surpluses) under pure-
ly flexible rates, because the rate appreciates or
depreciates according to the change. The current ex-
change rate, by definition, is the equilibrium exchange
rate.
In a fixed exchange-rate system such as that
established at Bretton Woods, monetary authorities of
the participating countries determine "par" values for
each currency vis-a-vis the U.S. dollar or gold, and
each country binds itself to maintain the foreign
value f9its currency within a narrow margin of the par
value. 9 The governments therefore act as residual
buyers and sellers in the foreign exchange market,
2 2 0
using gold, other international reserves, and their
credit with the IMF 2 2 1 to support the par values when
trade and capital imbalances bring about external dis-
equilibrium.2 2 2 According to the original Articles, a
country could alter the par value of its currency only
in the event of a "fundamental disequilibrium" and
then only after consultation with the IMF. 2 2 3 This
limitation compelled countries to favor means other
than changes in their exchange rates to compensate for
219. See generally Article IV, First Amendment, supra note
2.
220. H.G. JOHNSON, The Case For Flexible Exchange Rates,
1969, supra note 217, at 198.
221. See generally Article IV, § 8, and Article V, §§ 3,6,7,
First Amendment, supra note 2.
222. External disequilibrium occurs when the foreign dis-
bursements of a country (e.g., payments for imported goods, the
transfer of funds abroad for foreign investments, foreign aid and
military expenditures) do not equal foreign receipts (e.g., pay-
ments for exports, investments by foreigners, repatriation of
foreign earnings) at a given exchange rate. The resulting im-
balance (net surplus where receipts exceed disbursements, net
deficit where disbursements exceed receipts) must be "financed"
by inter-country loans, by loans fiom the IMF, by the depletion
of exchange reserves or gold, or by the generation of new inter-
national reserves, if the exchange rate is to be held constant,
at "par, '
223. See Article IV, § 5, First Amendment, supra note 2.
Compare Article IV, Second Amendment, supra note 3, in which a
variety of exchange arrangements is authorized (hQth fixed and
flexible).
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external disequilibria.224 Therefore, changes in ar
values occurred rarely in the period before 1971.2 5
The following analysis of the impact of capital
mobility on domestic economic policies relies heavily
on the widely-accepted M ndell-Fleming approach to in-
ternational economics.220 This approach assumes a
simple Keynesian model, free of trade barriers. Private
after-tax income and taxes vary directly with national
income; private expenditure varies directly, with after-
224, See Crockett and Goldstein, Infation under Fixed and
Flexible Exchange Rates, 23 IMF STAFF PAPERS 509, 511 (1976).
Such other means of adjustment may include: deflation by deficit
countries, to lower the prices of exported goods and to dampen im-
port demand; "tight" money, to attract foreign capital via higher
interest rates; and controls on capital exports, to curb the out-
flow of capital into various forms of foreign investments. Sur-
plus countries might be encouraged by deficit countries to inflate
their economies so that the price of their exports might be less
competitive and that their demand for imports might increase,
225. See generally M. GARRITSEN DE VRIES, THE INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY FUND 1966-1971, Part Five (1976); IMF, ANNUAL REPORTH for
the period 1945-1971; R. SOLOMON, THE INTERNATIONAII MONETARY SYSTEM,
1945-1976, supra note 4, at 30, 166-75, and 339-49.
226. See R. MUNDELL, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS (1968); Fleming,
Domestic Financial Policies Under Fixed and Floating Exchange
Rates, 9 IMF STAFF PAPERS 369 (1962); Mundell, Capital Mobility and
Stabilization Policy Under Fixed and Flexible Exchange Rates, 29
CANADIAN J. ECON. & POLITICAL SCIENCE 475 (1963).
For a sampling of the articles that have acknowledged ex-
pressly or implicitly the wide acceptance of the Mundell-Fleming
approach, albeit with occasional modification or criticisms, see
S, BLACK, FLOATING EXCHANGE RATES AND NATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY 27
(1977); E. SCHMEN, FLEXIBLE EXCHANGE RATES 141 (1969); Argy and
Porter, The Forward Exchange Market and the Effects of Domestic and
External Disturbances Under Alternative Exchange-Rate Systems, 19
IMF STAFF PAPERS 503 (1972); Cooper, Monetary Theory and Poli'cy in
an Open Economy, 78 SCANDINAVIAN J. ECONON. 146 (1976); Dornhusch,
Exchange Rate Expectations and Monetary Foli'cy, 6 J. INT'L ECON.
231 C1976).
The writer has relied heavily on the model developed by
J.H. Fleming, and is indebted to him. Any errors in the interpreta-
tion herein are those of the writer.
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tax income and inversely with the Interest rate. The
interest rate varies directly with the ratio of nation-
al income to the stock of money Ci.e,, other things
constant, an increase in the money stock or a decrease
in national income lowers interest rates and, converse-
ly, a decrease in the money stock or an increase in the
national income raises interest rates). 2 27 The balance
of payments comprises both the trade and capital ac-
counts. The balance of trade, equal to exports minus
imports, varies directly with the domestic value of
foreign exchange (ie., an appreciation of the domestic
currency lowers the domestic value of foreign currency,
increases imports relative to exports, and causes the
trade balance to decline), and inversely with domestic
expenditure, private and public. The capital account
balance varies inversely with the interest rate. Un-
less otherwise noted, capital moves freely in response
to interest-rate differentials.22d
2. The Role of Capital Mobility in Domestic Monetary
Policy 22 9
Expansionary monetary policy, with a corresponding
increase in the domestic stock of money, drives down
the interest rate, reduces the velocity of money and
stimulates private expenditure. Increased consumption
and investment generate increased income, output, and
employment. Accordingly, imports increase relative to
exports, causing a deterioration in the trade balance.
Although the rise in domestic income and investment may
moderate the decline in the interest rate, they will
not offset it completely (for, otherwise, there would
227. In slightly more technical terms: the interest rate
varies directly with the income-,velocity of circulation of money.
See Fleming, supra note 226, at 369,
228. See d, at .374-76, 9PR A dis.cug: Qn of the efedts
of capital mobility on certain aspects of the Fleming model.
229. Refer generally to 'Fleming, pupra note 226, roim whose
article this analysis is in large part adopted.
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be no real increase in investment or income), 2 3 0 To
the extent that the domestic interest rate, as expres-
sed through the medium of the exchange rate, declines
relative to the interest rates abroad, capital will
flow out of the expanding economy toward higher rates
abroad,2 3 1 Thus, a monetary expansion initially tends
to cause a deterioration in the balance of payments as a
whole, in both the trade and capital accounts, and an
increase in domestic expenditure and income.
Under fixed exchange rates, the outflow of capital
would continue until the decline of the domestic inter-
est rate were reversed2 3 2 and/or foreign interest rates
were forced down, or until the expanding country ex-
hausted its reserves2 3 3 and embarked on other policies,
230. This statement appears tautological. However, it must
be true for more than definitional reasons. If, initially, mone-
tary expansion gives rise to investment and income growth, it
must be supposed that this new investment will result in efficien-
cies and, likely, in greater output and employment. The increased
economic activity will doubtless exert pressure on the financial
capital markets and, in the absence of further expansion, tend to
push the interest rate upwards. Yet the real gains in efficiency
and employment will be retained, and a portion of the return to
labor and capital will flow back into the money market (since the
marginal propensity to save increases with income and with the
interest rate) to dampen the pressures thereon. See also id,
at 373.
231. The outflow of capital that is predicted by the
Mundell-Fleming model as a consequence of monetary expansion under
fixed exchange rates has been observed and analyzed empirically.
See generally Porter, Capital Flows as an Offset to Monetary Poli-
cy: The German Experience, 19 IMF STAFF PAPERS 395 (1972);. L.
Rhomberg, A Model of the Canadian Economy under Fixed and
Fluctuating Exchange Rates, 72 J. POL. ECON. 1 (1972).
232. As interest rates affect capital movements, so also
do capital movements, by altering domestic money stocks, affect
interest rates. See Floyd, International Capital Movements and
Monetary Equilibrium, 59 A1, ,CON. REV. 472? 473 (1969).
233, Fleming, aupra note 226, at 375, notes that under
fixed rates, monetary expansion--with the attendant deterioration
in the balance of payments--could not be financed or sustained
indefinitely.
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The consequent decline in the stock of money, or the
decline in its rate of growth, and the upward pressure
on domestic interest rates, would tend to offset the
gains in income and output contemplated above and frus-
trate the original expansionary policy. If capital is
infinitely mobile and sensitive to interest differen-
tials and foreign and domestic bonds are perfect sub-
stitutes, then monetary expansion under fixed exchange
rates would result in the importation of foreign bonds
in an amount equal to that which investors would have
placed in domestic bonds, were capital not mobile. The
result would frustrate the intended increase in domes-
tic expenditure and domestic employment; prices and
income would remain unchanged.234 Thus, the greater
the mobility of capital under fixed exchange rates, the
smaller the impact of monetary policy on domestic real
variables, such as income and employment.
This result not unreasonably contributed to the
desire for monetary autonomy already described. Thus,
while fixed exchange rates prevailed, restrictions on
capital movements, permitted by Article VI, Section 3,
were regarded as "less harmful" than other measures to
attain balance-of-payments equilibrium.2 3 5 And member
countries resorted to them with increasing frequency in
the mid-to-late 1960's. 236 The United States, for
example, enacted the Interest Equalization Tax and the
Foreign Credit Restraint Program, discussed below,2 3 7
to control capital outflows and free domestic monetary
234. See Aliber, Monetary Independence under Floating
Exchange Rates, supra note 187, at 369.
235. IMF, SEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT ON EXCHANGE RESTRICTIONS
5 (1956).
236. See M. GARRITSEN DE VRIES, THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY
FUND 1966-1971, at 499-500 (1976); R.N. Cooper,-The Nexes-Among
Foreign Trade, Investment, and Balance-of-Payments Adjustment, in
UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY IN AN INTERDEPENDENT
WORLD 520 (U.S. Commission on International Trade and Investment
Policy 1971), See generally IM, ANNUAL REPORT ON EXCHANGE
RESTRICTIONS for the years 1964-1969.
237. See pp. 87-96 infrat
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policy from external objectives,23 8
In contrast, under flexible exchange rates capital
mobility does not limit the effectiveness of domestic
monetary policies. Instead, the impact of monetary
expansion on income, output, and employment must always
be greater where capital is mobile than where it is
immobile.2 39 To demonstrate this proposition, it is
useful to distinguish among the potential effects of an
increase in the stock of money on the basis of whether
those effects are generated internally or externally.
Now, assume that capital is immobile; an increase
in the stock of money does not affect the capital
account, Monetary expansion will induce the increase
in income and expenditure through the internal media of
the interest rate, velocity, and investment expenditure,
described at p. 67, supra, Although the increase in
expenditure stimulates import demand and causes an in-
cipient deterioration in the trade balance, the expand-
ing country's currency will depreciate to a level at
which the trade balance will be maintained. By
diminishing the domestic demand for goods and services
238. Cf. G.M. Meier, The Bretton Woods Agreement--25 Years
After, 23 STAN. L. REV. 235, 250-55 (1971). Meier explains that
the loss of domestic monetary autonomy, through the continued free
mobility of capital under fixed exchange rates, was most serious
for the United States in the early 1960's. The country then had
to restrain the rate of domestic expansion in order to curb the
growth of its balance-of-payments deficit. The rate of interest
was often maintained at a level higher than that which would have
been appropriate for domestic expansion, in an effort to generate
an influx of foreign capital and to avoid growth in import demand.
Cf. S. REP, NO. 1267, REASONS FOR THE BILL, 88 Cong., 2d Sepg,
(1964). See qlso JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, SUBCOMITTEE ON INTER%
NATIONAL EXCHANGE AND PAYMENTS, 'NTERNATIONAL PAYMENTSM ALANCES,
87th Cong., 1st Sess. 113 (May 16, June 19,-2i, 1961)CStatement of
Mr. E.M. Bernstein) suggesting that, if interest rates "appro,-
priate to the needs of each country-induce large capital movement,
the way to deal with them is-through ... a reserve settlement
account." f'r. Bernstein perceived the potentially complex problems
thatmight arise when countries seek to avoid the impact of capital
movements- and yet are precluded, by Article,TV, supra note 1, from
using the Fund Resources to -meet a large, sustained outflow of
capital. Id. at 110.
See also Polak, International Coordination of Economic
Policy, supra note 175, at 171, noting that the greater freedom
and willingness of capital to move has reduced the scope of
interest-rate policy and of monetary policy in general.
239. See Fleming, supra note 226, at 375. Cf. Aliber,
supra note 18X, at 369.
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from other countries and by increasing the world demand
for the products of the expanding country, this de-
preciation will shift world demand from imports to the
expanding country, toward its exports to such an extent
as to exactly offset the initial expansion of import
demands that had been generated by the increase in
domestic income and expenditure. 240
The results of monetary expansion are quite dif-
ferent when the model incorporates the assumptions of
the mobility and interest-sensitivity of capital. An
increase in the money supply depresses the interest
rate and increases domestic income and expenditure
through the internal media, as described above. But
now, in addition to the increase in import demand and
incipient trade deficit, the falling interest rate
triggers an incipient outflow of capital and a deterio-
ration of the capital account balance. The capital out-
flow exerts pressure on the exchange rate beyond that
exerted by the incipient trade deficit. Therefore, the
currency of the expanding country depreciates to a
level below that which would be required to restore the
trade balance alone. Further depreciation more than
offsets the incipient trade deficit and generates a net
trade surplus through an increase in the demand for
exports. This increase in demand, generated externally,
stimulates domestic output, income, and employment to
levels higher than those which a similar expansionary
policy would attain under the condition of immobile
capital.
Therefore, under flexible exchange rates, the im-
pact of monetary policy on output, income, and employ-
ment will increase with the mobility and interest-
sensitivity of capital.2 4 1 Indeed, if capital were in-
finitely mobile and highly sensitive to the interest
rate, the outflow of capital would be so great as to
cause the exchange rate to depreciate to a level at
which the trade balance became so favorable, and income
and output so much increased, that the domestic economic
activity would raise the interest rate to its pre-ex-
pansion level. Domestic income would then increase at
the same rate as t e stock of noney, and not merely at a
fraction thereof. R2
240. See Fleming, supra note 226, at 374.
241. Id. at 373-74.
242. Id.
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A depreciation caused by an outflow of capital
during monetary expansion, though rendering exports
more competitive abroad, will not generate a subsequent
capital inflow under the Mundell-Fleming analysis.
This limitation results from the fact that it is a de-
cline in the interest rate, making domestic financial
assets less attractive for investment, that motivates
the initial outflow of capital. Therefore, the depre-
ciation will continue until the pressure toward an un-
favorable interest differential is effectively elimina-
ted by the exchange rate. Foreign financial assets,
then, will cost more per unit of return. At this
point, there is no further impetus for the exit of
domestic capital, and the depreciation ceases without
producing an interest differential that encourages
foreign investment in domestic financial assets.
Some recent theoretical studies of the interaction
between monetary policy and the exchange mapkets have
suggested that the Mundell-Fleming model might over-
state the impact of monetary policy under flexib e ex-
change rates whe capital is perfectly mobile.243
Argy and Porter2 4 incorporate into the model the con-
cept of the expectation of a future or "normal" ex-
change rate. If monetary expansion were to cause the
exchange rate to depreciate to a level below the ex-
pected future or "normal" rate, investors would be un-
likely to dispose of their capital assets denominated
in the depreciating currency, or to invest in capital
assets denominated in foreign currencies, for they
would anticipate a subsequent appreciation in the ex-
change rate to its expected or "normal" level. On
similar expectations, foreign investors would be likely
to invest in financial assets denominated in the
depreciating currency, despite a possibly unfavorable
interest differential, for they would hope to b nefit
from the contemplated subsequent appreciation.2 45 Thus,
a country undergoing monetary expansion might experi-
ence inflows of capital if its currency were expected
to appreciate. Such inflows would moderate, or perhaps
offset, the initial depreciation, and thus inhibit the
243. See generally Argy and Porter, The Forward Exchange Mar-
ket and the Effects of Domestic and External Disturbance Under
Alternative Exchange Rate Systems, 19 W STAFF PAPERS 503 (1972).
244. Id.
245, Td, at 512-13.
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external stimulus to domestic outout, income, and
employment and to export demand.2  This perverse
effect could continue only until expectations adjust
downward or until the exchange rate appreciates,
removing the gap between the actual and expected ex-
change rate, 2 47 rendering this phenomenon short-term.
3. The Role of Capital Mobility in Domestic Fiscal
Policy I
Unlike monetary policy, the mobility of capital
does not enhance effects of fiscal policy under flexi-
ble exchange rates. Rather, such mobility tends to
mute the effectiveness of fiscal policy.
An increase in public expenditure or a reduction in
tax rates will result in increased income, consumption,
and employment, and tend to increase imports relative
to exports.24 8 Under fixed exchange rates, the expan-
sion will cause a deficit in the trade balance. Assum-
ing a constant money stock,249 an increase in national
income results in an increase in the interest rate;
this, in turn, reduces capital outflows or increases
capital inflows, and develops a surplus on the capital
account.
246. Cf. Argy and Porter, supra note 243, at 512-13, 520;
Dornbusch, Exchange Rate Expectations and Monetary Policy,
supra note 226, at 234-36.
247. Cf. Argy and Porter, supra note 243, at 512-13, 516-17.
248. This analysis of domestic fiscal policy, like the
previous analysis of monetary policy, follows closely the theoreti-
cal exposition of J.M. Fleming, supra note 226. Other discussions
of the macroeconomic effects of flexible rates may be found in
Argy and Porter, supra note 243, at 516; Dornbusch and Krugman,
Flexible Exchange Rates in the Short Run, 1976 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 537, 542,r5l; -Laurse. andc 4etzler, Fexible Ex-
change Rates and the Theory of Employment, 32 REV. ECON. & STATIS-
TICS 281 (1950).
249. Fleming, supra note 226, at 370. To hold the money
stock constant in a period of budgetary expansion will require
enforced economy in the use of money, which likely will be achiev-
ed through higher interest rates.
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As the budgetary expansion generates divergent
pressures on the current and capital accounts, the net
impact on the balance of payments will depend, of
course, upon which account is most affected by the ex-
pansion. 2!0 A high propensity to import--as, for ex-
ample, where an increase in income would lead to an
increase in energy consumption and to large petroleum
imports--would tend to cause a net payments deficit.
Conversely, a highly mobile and interest-sensitive sup-
ply of capital would tend to cause a net payments
surplus. 251 Less mobile capital, or the imposition of
capital controls, could reduce the need both to hold
the money stock constant and to raise the interest rate,
depending on the type of control and on the economic
circumstances at the time of imposition.2 5 2 In theory,
at least, when an expansion results in chronic net defi-
cits, the expanding country is constrained to discon-
tinue its fiscal expansion when its foreign exchange
reserves approach depletion. But despite this potential
constraint imposed by the external balance, the expand-
ing country would realize an increase in national in-
come, consumption, and employment under fixed exchange
rates.
However, under flexible exchange rates the initial
increases in such variables which fiscal expansion
yields might dissipate if capital were highly mobile,
250. Id. at 371.
251. Id.
252. Although controls on the outflow of capital might
eliminate or forestall the need for restraint in the money markets,
they might also provide a disincentive for the needed inflow7 of
foreign investment in the country imposing the controls. Foreign
investors could view the imposition of controls as indicating
weakness in the controlled currency and as a factor likely to com-
plicate the expatriation of the proceeds of their investments.
Additionally, lack of restraint in the money markets, which would
otherwise be limited by international movements of capital, could
have inflationary consequences in the expanding economy. (However,
there appears to be a very fine line between the monetary
liberality necessary to the optimum rate of economic expansion and
that which is generativp of inflation; cf. E. DESPRES, INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC REFORM 210 (C. 'Meier ed. 1973). Another important consi-
deration in the imposition of capital controls is the welfare effect
of such a policy, which is likely to be adverse. See part V infra.)
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Increased income and consumption produce an increase
in import demand, which in turn exerts deficit pres-
sures on the trade balance. If capital is immobile,
the exchange rate depreciates to maintain equilibrium
in the trade balance; the depreciation shifts demand
from imports toward exports until the two are equal,
and the expansionary policy operates on income, con-
sumption and output as though the economy were
closed,253 But, if capital is both mobile and inter-
est-sensitive, the increase in interest rates causes
an incipient surplus on the capital account, This
incipient surplus tends to drive the exchange rate up-
ward and shifts demand from domestic goods (exports)
to foreign goods (imports), thereby reducing the ini-
tial ingreases in income, consumption, and employ-
ment. 2 5 4 The greater the mobility and interest-sensi-
tivity of capital the more pronounced the incipient
surplus in the capital account, the exchange apprecia-
tion, and the consequent muting of the domestic expan-
sion. If capital were infinitely mobile, then the ex-
change appreciation would be sufficiently large to
offset compZeteZy the original, and presumably intend-
ed, expansion,2 55
Mr. J.M. Fleming, a leading economist whose ap-
proach to international economics is followed closely
in this article, has suggested that monetary restraint
of sufficient stringency to cause an increase in the
interest rate and significant pressures for exchange
appreciation seldom accompanies fiscal expansion.256
Normally, fiscal expansion is funded in part by an
increase in the stock of money, and capital flows do
not interfere (or interfere less) with the desired
objectives of increased income, consumption, and
employment. Other economists, however, have observed
expansionary fiscal policy and monetary restraint to
produce the frustrating capital flows in some coun-
tries. 2 5 7 Thus, though it is possible that capital
253. See Dornbusch and K~ugnan, supa ngte 248, at 543;
Fleming, supra note 226, at 372.
254. Fleming, supra note 226, at 372, 375.
255, Id,
256. Td. at 372.
257. See id.5 citing Mr. R. Rhomberg's econometric-model of
the postwar Canadian economy. supra note 231.
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mobility might reduce the effectiveness of domestic
fiscal policy under flexible exchange rates, such a
result is improbable.
4. The Monetary Model
The recent formulations of a "monetary" or asset-
market approach to exchange-rate determination suggest
further Eefinements of the traditional Mundell-Fleming
model.2 5d A fundamental point distinguishing the
Mundell-Fleming and the monetary models is the charac-
terization of capital flows. The traditional model
views such flows as responsive to differentials in
interest rates or effective yields, without balance-
sheet constraints; 2 5 9 such flows may continue for the
duration of the interest-rate differential. As has
been shown, this model utilizes a concept of flow
equilibrium, in which the exchange rate moves to
balance receipts from exports and capital inflows with
payments for exports and capital outflows. 2 0
258. This "monetary" approach, which has been much dis-
cussed in the recent economic literature, is to be distinguished
from a monetaristic approach, which treats output as given. It
is also to be distinguished from the monetary approach which,
though dealing with domestic and foreign monetary equilibria, and
with the determinants of money demand, does not entertain the con-
cept of asset substitutability. See M.G. Porter, Monetary Versus
Portfolio Balance Models of International Economic Adjustment.,
(unpublished notes for Economics 535 workshop at Yale University,
October 31, 1978) (explaining this distinction among "monetary"
approaches),
259. See R.N. Cooper, Monetary Theory and Policr in an
Open Economy, 78 SCANDINAVIAN J. ECON. 146, 150-51 (1976).
"Balance-sheet constraint" refers to the portfolio limitation,
in the monetary approach, on the question of capital that is free
to flow at any given level of income, interest, wealth, and
expectations. That such a limitation is assumed in the monetary
model constrains the flow whereas under the more traditional view,
no such limitation is imposed: capital is assumed to flow so long
as an interest differential endures to stimulate the flow.
260. Id. at 150; see also S.W. BLACK, FLOATING EXCHANGE
RATES AND NATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY 10 (1977).
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In contrast, the monetary model defines capital
movements as the product of changes in portfolio hold-
ings, which holdings are affected by asset yields and
wealth.261 Capital flows cease when portfolio equili-
brium is attained at a given level of wealth and inter-
est rates. The exchange rate, as the relative price of
monies, is also the price that equilibrates the inter-
national market for financial assets.26 2 Therefore,
the monetary model not only takes into account the
behavior of imports and exports, but also the behavior
of the s plies and demands of money and financial
assets. O
A simple model for demonstrative purposes must
disregard some of the assumptions that give rise to
interesting, but complex, analyses in the current liter-
ature. Consider the basic model of one country in a
many-country world.2 6 4 There are three assets avail-
able in that country: money, which is a non-earning
asset; domestically-issued assets, which are denominated
in the home currency; and foreign-issued assets, which
are denominated in foreign currency. Wealth consists
of the stock of money and the holdings of domestic and
foreign assets (the domestic value of which is adjusted
by the exchange rate). The portfolio demand for these
assets depends on wealth and the rates of return on
domestic and foreign assets. An increase in wealth in-
creases the demand for all three assets. The demands
for domestic and foreign assets rise as their respective
rates of return increase. Demands for domestic and
foreign assets, however, respond negatively to changes
in the rate of return of the other asset. And the de-
mand for money responds negatively to changes in the
rate of return on either domestic or foreign assets.
As domestic or effective foreign interest rates grow,
investors will shift their portfolio holdings from
261. R.N. Cooper, supra note 259, at 150.
262. See P.J. Kouri, The Exchange Rate and the Balance of
Payments in the Short Run and in the Long Run: A Monetary Approach,
78 SCANDINAVIAN J. ECON. 280, 281 (1976).
263. Id.
264. The model used here draws heavily from that which is
developed in greater detail in W.H. BRANSON, ASSET MARKETS AND
RELATIVE PRICES IN EXCHANGE RATE DETERMINATION (Seminar Paper No.
66, Institute for International Economic Studies, University of
Stockholm 1976). Any errors or omissions herein are the responsi-
bility of the writer.
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money into the asset on which the return has increased.
With these assumptions, and under a system of
flexible exchange rates, an expansionary monetary
policy will affect domestic real variables in a fashion
similar, but not identical, to that described by the
Mundell-Fleming model. An increase in the stock of
money, by expanding wealth and depressing the return on
domestic assets, will create a portfolio disequilibrium.
As domestic investors shift their holdings from money
to foreign assets, the domestic currency will depre-
ciate. This initial depreciation will generate a
trade surplus and, thus, will stimulate domestic out-
put; if the interest-response of money demand is lower
than the interest-response of demand for earning as-
sets, this initial depreciation will be proportiogte-
ly greater than the increase in the money supply.' 5
However, the capital outflow will diminish and cease
as domestic investors accumulate stocks of foreign
assets and approach the desired equilibrium at the new
levels of wealth and interest rates. This temporary
trade surplus will decline over time, because the
rising demand for domestic assets, generated by in-
creased wealth, will cause the currency to be bid up,2 6 6
though it is not likely to appreciate to its pre-
expansion level.26 7 Repatriation of the earnings that
accrue to the newly accumulated foreign assets may well
cause a further, slight appreciation in the currency
and a trade deficit equal to the amount of the repatri-
ated flow of earnings. 2 6 8
Thus, the monetary model predicts that monetary
policy will have real impact on domestic output and
income under flexible rates. However, the portfolio
constraint on capital flows, and the long-term appre-
ciation, will reduce the strength and duration of the
externally generated demand to a level below that
which the traditional model anticipates.
265. See P.J. Kouri, supra note 262, at 290. See also
Dornbusch, supra note 226, at 262; J.C. Ingram, Expectations and
Floating Exchange Rates, 114 Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 422, 435
(1978).
266. See W.H. BRANSON, supra note 264, at 26-27.
267. Id. at 25 (noting that the extent of the initial
depreciation will depend, in a complicated fashion, on the ini-
tial proportions of assets in portfolios and on the relative
substitutability of the assets).
268. Id. at 27.
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Where fixed exchange rates and capital mobility
are assumed, however, both models predict similar
results from monetary expansion. An increase in the
supply of money will have no real impact domestically.
This is so in the monetary model because any attempt to
increase the money supply over that which is required
for portfolio balance will induce offsetting adjust-
ments.2 6 9 Corresponding outflows of capital, though
of limited duration, will occur in the amount of the
monetary expansion, and frustrate its intended effect.
Some formulations of the monetary model incorpor-
ate investor expectations of future exchange rate
levels as determinants of the prevailing or "spot"
rate. 27 0 This modification closely resembles that
suggested by Argy and Porter (see p. 72 supra). If a
depreciation, caused by monetary expansion, generates
expectations of a subsequent appreciation in the ex-
change rate, the real domestic effects of the expansion
will be dampened. At the point of a depreciation, such
expectations will place a premium on the future exchange
which, despite the declining interest rate, will en-
hance the effective return on domestic assets. There-
fore, the portfolio adjustment in favor of foreign
assets and the related depreciation will be smaller than
would have occurred in the absence of such expecta-
tions.2 7 1 Of course, the opposite result would follow
if expectations of further depreciation prevailed.
The proposition that an increase in the money
stock would raise the domestic price level may compli-
cate further these formulations of the monetary model 
7 2
The speed and magnitude of the domestic price adjust-
ment may affect the duration of the trade surplus.
Clearly, an economy at full employment will experience
a more rapid increase in its domestic price level than
one in which there is substantial unemployment.2 7 3 But
269. See R.N. Cooper, supra note 259, at 151-52 (citing
several studies in support of this proposition).
270. See generally S;W. BLACKgusppa note 260; Dornbusch,
$upr note 226; ").J. Kouriqupra note 262.
271. See SW. BLACK, supra note 260, at 31-33; Dornbusch,
supra note 226, at 268.
272. W.H. BRANSON, suppa note 264, at .23-24.
273. Id.
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a determination of the nature of price adjustment in
any particular case would depend on a great variety of
factors, the consideration of which is beyond the
scope of this paper. Nevertheless, some increase in
domestic prices would render the trade surplus genera-
ted by monetary expansion smaller and of shorter dura-
tion than would be the case were prices held constant.
If, over the long term, prices rise in equal propor-
tion to the stock of money, the internal effect of
monetary expansion will be nominal, but if the currency
initially depreciates proportionately more than the
money supply increases (see page 72, supra), it will
diminish but not eliminate the trade surplus.274
The monetary model differs most from the Mundell-
Fleming model in its treatment of fiscal policy. As-
sume that expectations of future exchange-rate changes
are neutral: investors expect the current rate to pre-
vail indefinitely. A tax-financed increase in govern-
ment expenditure will raise money income and the inter-
est rate, causing an increase in the demand for imports
and a portfolio adjustment in favor of domestic assets.
Portfolio-holders will sell off foreign assets, produc-
ing an inflow of capital. Due to the portfolio con-
straints assumed by the model, this inflow must termi-
nate. Therefore the pressure toward appreciation
which it generates will endure only in the short term.
But, since the portfolio model does not constrain the
increased demand for imports, such demand, as well as
the consequent pressure toward depreciation, will per-
sist.
Of course, the predominance of either of these
divergent pressures in the short term depends on their
relative magnitudes and, thus, on the response of 'im-
port demand to fiscal expansion and on the sensitivity
of portfolio-holders to changes in wealth and interest
rates. The resolution of these pressures may result
in short-term appreciation or depreciation. Then,
too, the pressures may cancel, leaving the exchange
rate unchanged at a temporary equilibrium level; in-
deed, the expanding country may experience a trade
deficit at this temporary equilibrium rate.2 75 Even
after the portfolio adjustment is completed, however,
the increased import demand will probably continue
274. See Dornbusch, supra note 22§, at 263. Compare
Dornbusch, supra note 226, at 263-69 with W.H. BRANSON, supra note
264, at 23, 28-30.
275. See P.J. Kouri, supra note 262, at 298.
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over the long term. Due to this demand, the exchange
rate will depreciate gradually and, thereby restore
the trade balance of the expanding country.276
The result here differs significantly from the
traditional model, which envisions an appreciation of
the currency during fiscal expansion where capital is
highly mobile. Here, there is no possibility for
currency appreciation,2 7 7 for the constraint on the
capital inflow, and the simultaneous activity of the
trade account, stabilize the exchange rate in the short
run. Both the trade deficit that endures until the
subsequent depreciation, and its inhibiting effect on
the real impact of the fiscal expansion, necessarily
must be smaller than that which an initial appreciation
of the currency would generate.
An assumption that expectations of future ex-
change-rate changes are rational further enhances the
effectiveness of fiscal policy.27o Under this varia-
tion of the model, speculators anticipate the long-run
depreciation of the currency. Overcoming their desire
to invest in the higher-yield domestic assets, they
will adjust their portfolios immediately in favor of
foreign assets. This adjustment will cause the cur-
rency to depreciate, generating a trade surplus and
further stimulating domestic output. The surplus will
gradually decrease as the foreign purchasers of goods
bid up the currency to its long-run equilibrium level,
and the trade account will balance.2 79
5. Summary
The traditional Mundelle-Fleming model yields re-
sults that have intuitive appeal for their clarity and
for the direct procedure of their derivation. The
newer monetary approach does not dispute many of these
results. 2 0 Yet the portfolio constraints of the
276. Id. See also S.W. BLACK, supra 260, at 32.
277. Cf. SW. BLACK, supra note 260,- at 32.
278. Cf. P.J. Koti., supra note 262, at 298.
279. S.W. BLACK, supra note 260, at 32; Cf. P.J. Kouri,
supra note 262, at 298.
280. Siee- S,W'. BLACK, .supra note 260, at 30, See generally
R.N. Cooper, upra note 259.
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monetary model, and its recognition of the role of
expectations, qualify the traditional results. Mone-
tary policy has real effects under flexible exchange
rates where capital is mobile, but the real impact of
monetary expansion exceeds that which is predicted by
the traditional model. And, somewhat contrary to the
Mundell-Fleming result, the mobility of capital with
appropriate expectations will not hinder fiscal policy
at all.
These results strongly favor the free mobility of
capital under flexible exchange rates. Whereas under
the traditional model the attainment of greater mone-
tary effectiveness, through increased capital mobility,
would require forfeiture of fiscal potency, the modi-
fied results of the monetary model would not necessi-
tate this sacrifice.
B. The Foreign Impact of Domestic Policies Affected
by Capital Mobility
As shown in the preceding subpart A, the efficacy
of monetary expansion under flexible exchange rates
derives, in large part, from an outflow of capital
from the expanding country and a depreciation of its
currency. Through the consequent shift in demand,
from foreign to domestic goods, capital movements and
the related depreciation transmit certain effects of
monetary expansion to foreign markets.
However, the foreign impact of monetary expansion
contrasts with its domestic impact. A net shift in
demand from foreign to domestic goods, other things
being equal, requires that foreign output and income
must fall. In a two-country model, where one country
expands its money supply and becomes a net exporter of
goods, the other country must become a net importer,
whose purchases of foreign goods are financed by the
capital outflow from the expanding country. In short,
"income will rise in the country where the money sup-
ply increases and ... income will fall abroad. 'i8
This effect might be mitigated to the extent that the
goods imported by the foreign country are productive
goods (e.g., capital goods, such as heavy machinery)
that are likely to generate a future stream of income
281. Dornbusch and Krugman, supra'note 248, at 546.
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at a relatively lower cost than if the exchange de-
preciation had not occurred. Such mitigation, however,
is marginal and cannot offset fully the adverse impact
of unilateral monetary expansion on foreign output and
income.
In contrast, fiscal expansion, where exchange
rates are flexible and capital is mobile, will benefit
foreign markets. Such an expansion generates increased
import demand which stimulates foreign output and in-
come. When monetary restraint accompanies a fiscal
expansion, interest rates rise and a capital surplus
develops causing the currency of the expanding country
to appreciate. This appreciation will further increase
import demand and foreign output and income. Therefore,
"under perfect capital mobility, fiscal expansion ...
raises equilibrium income everywhere in the world.h12 82
A means for the international coordination of
economic policy may be necessary if any country is to
realize the full benefits of capital mobility and avoid
the possibly harmful repercussions from the enforced
sharing of the burdens introduced by ill-advised
changes in domestic policies.283 Simultaneous monetary
expansion in several countries would enable those coun-
tries to enjoy increasing income, output, and employ-
ment, without imposing on trading partners reductions
in income.28 4 Ideally, internationally coordinated
fiscal and monetary policies would raise world income
to a higher level than either policy alone could
achieve.2 5
The United States and most other countries are
independent in their choice of domestic economic goals
and policies. Yet, if countries were to engage in
informal policy negotiations to achieve commonly
desired objectives, the world could witness consider-
able de facto coordination of national policies without
its being imposed de jure. The free mobility of capi-
tal, by contributing to international financial inte-
gration, might also stimulate a coordination of nation-
al policies to "manage" the distribution of benefits
282. Id. at 545.
283. Id. at 547.
284. See id. at 547, 574-75.
285. Id. at 546-47.
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from economic expansion.2 86
C. The Welfare Argument for the Free Mobility of
Capital
The welfare argument is perhaps the strongest
argument in favor of the free international mobility of
capital. Stated simply, the welfare theory holds that,
under perfect competition and absent "market fail-
ures,"287 freedom of movement of the factors of produc-
tion yields the most efficient distribution of the
world's productive resources.2 88 Such a distribution
leads to the welfare optimum,289 or the maximization of
"gross social return." ,0 To avoid the problem of
assessing subjective values which may inhere in the
concept of gross social return, the welfare optimum is
assumed to be identical to the maximization of world,
income.29 1 Much like the theory of international trade,
the welfare argument asserts that the free movement of
capital is superior to the restricted movement of this
286. For analyses of the phenomenon of international
financial integration and coordination of economic policies, see
Dornbusch and Krugman, supra note 248; Lutz, Foreign Exchange Rate
Policy and European Economic Integration in INTERNATIONAL MONETARY
PROBLEMS 107 (F. Machlup, A. Gutowski, & F.A. Lutz, eds. 1972);
Polak, International Coordination of Economic Policy, 9 IMF STAFF
PAPERS 149 (1962).
287. See Bator, The Anatomy of Market Failure, 72 Q. J.
ECON. 351 (1958). "Market failure" is described as "the failure
of a more or less ideal system of price-market institutions to
sustain 'desirable' activities or to estop 'undesirable' activi-
ties." The desirability of an activity is determined by its im-
pact on maximum welfare. Id.
288. See N. FIELEKE, THE WELFARE EFFECTS OF CONTROLS OVER
CAPITAL EXPORTS FROM THE UNITED STATES 3 (Princeton Essay in
International Finance No. 82? i97). See also C.P. KINDLEBERGE,
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 230-43 (5th ed. 1973). For discussions
of the welfare problem in other contexts, see Hause, The WeZfare
Costs of Dsequilibriu Exchange- Rates, 74 J.. POL. ECON. 333 (1966);
JQhnson, The WIefare Costs of Exchanget-Rate Stabilization, 74
J. POL. ECON. 512 (1966).
289. C.P. KINDLEBERGER, supra note 288, at 230.
290. Johnson, Theoretical Problems of the International
Monetary System, 7 PAKISTAN DEV. REV. 1, reprinted in INTERNATION-
AL FINANCE 304, 315 (R.N. Cooper ed. 1969) [hereinafter page
references in this article are cited to the reprint]. See also
N. FIELEKE, supra note 288, at 5-6.
291. See Bator, supra note 287, at 351 n.2 (explaining the
welfare optimum as Paretian efficiency).
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2 9 2
For the pur ose of this paper, capital is a factor
of production. 2 93  Capital attains its most efficient
distribution when the marginal efficiency of investment
Cthe return t9 capital, or the' interest rate) is equal
everywhere,294 To approach the optimally efficient dis-
tribution of capital, it must flow to where the return
on its application will be greatest until the rate of
return on each marginal increment of investment Cor dis-
investment) converges on a uniform rate. The world
economy, however, is not perfectly competitive, and mar-
ket failures do occur. Additionally, many other factors
affect the international movement of capital, such as
political and military uncertainty, taxes, and divergent
government policies regarding employment, inflation, and
other economic variables.2 9 5
292. The goal in free trade theory is, in the terms, of wel-
fare economics, to maximize real income, nationally and interna-
tionally. To that end, restricted trade is regarded as superior
to no trade, and free trade is regarded as superior to restricted
trade. Only the anomalous "optimum" tariff or subsidy, which
improves a country's terms of trade without causing a reduction in
trade, is superior to free trade. In most circumstances free trade
is the objective of international trade negotiation.
See generally G. HABERLER, THE THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
(A Stonier & F. Benham trans. 1937); OHLIN, INTERREGIONAL AND INTER-
NATIONAL TRADE (1933); P, SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS, Chapters 34, 35
(9th ed 1973); Bhagwati, The Pure Theory of International Trade, 74
ECON. J. 1 (1964).
On capital movements and the theory of the optimum tariff,
see generally Jones, International Capital Movements and the Theory
of Tariffs and Trade, 81 W. J. ECON. 1 (1967); Kemp, Foreign Invest-
ment and the National Advantage, 38 ECON. REC. 56 (1962); Kemp, The
Gain from International Trade and Investment, 56 AM. ECON. REV. 788
(1966); Mundell, International Trade and Factor Mob-lity, in
AMERICAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION, READINGS IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
101 (1969).
293. See N, FIELEKE, .qup~r note 288, at 5, Real capital is
one of the factors of production. 'Financial capital might be viewed
as the sublimation of real capital into a 'more liquid fqrm and as a
medium by which real capital is made 'mobile. Therefore, it is-
appropriate to regard financial capital as within the 'meaning of
"factor of production."
294. Id.
295. See generally Johnson, supra note 290, especially at
314-19.
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The question arises whether the movement of capi-
tal in response to these institutional factors neces-
sarily will result ii the optimally efficient distri-
bution of capital.296 For example, where capital move-
ments are motivated by tax considerations, it may be
that capital flows from jurisdictions where it is
scarce to those where it is abundant, 2 9 7 contrary to
its most efficient distribution. And, although capital
movements in response to monetary expansion tend to
equalize interest rates internationally, as described
earlier in part V, the market rates may var4rom the
real returns on the application of capital. 9o There-
fore, one must conclude that the free movement of
capital, in response either to various institutional
factors or to the interest rate, will not always result
in the maximization of welfare.
This conclusion alone does not support the imposi-
tion of controls or restrictions on capital movements.
Such controls must justify themselves by their remedial
effects. If it is accepted that certain national poli-
cies and their related capital movements create "a
serious distortion of the allocation of new real invest-
ment resources, and a consequent welfare loss for the
countries concerned and the world economy," 2 9 9 the best
solution would be to alter or suspend the distorting
policies. Nevertheless, where this solution is impos-
sible or politically undesirable, other policies, such
as capital controls designed to correct the observed
distortions, may have to serve. Thus the argument for
controlling capital movements rests on the theory of
the "second-best. "300
A further and vitally important question thus
arises as to whether controls on capital movements are
likely to be remedial in their effects and, hence,
296. See Johnson, supra note 290, at 315.
297. C.P. KINDLEBERGER, supra note 288, at 230.
298. Id. at 231. Kindleberger notes that many economists
consider the probability of divergence between market and real
returns to be so high as to warrant a presumption against their
convergence.
299. See Johnson, supra note 290, at 314.
300. For a general exposition of the concept of "second-
best" alternatives, see Lipsey and Lancaster, The General Theory
of Second Best, 24 REV. ECON, STUDIES 11 C1956).
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successful as second-best measures. The impact of the
distorting gloss that various national policies and
other institutional factors cast on the world's capital
markets is difficult to measure.3 01 While it is true
that policy-makers may attempt to identify the sources
of the distortions of capital distributions, there is
nothing to assure the accuracy of their estimates.
Moreover, there can be no guarantee that they would
discern all--or even most--of the contributing factors
and the interrelationships among them. Nor is there
any certainty that the corrective policies undertaken
would operate as intended. Indeed, there is consider-
able risk that such policies might magnify indirectly
the existing distortions. Or such policies may have
unexpected ramifications and simply alter the locus or
form of the target distortion. A leading economist,
Mr. Harry G. Johnson, has suggested that a fundamental
problem with all second-best arguments is that
,..determination of the conditions under
which a second-best policy actually leads
to an improvement of social welfare re-
quires detailed theoretical and empirical
investigation by a first-best economist.
Unfortunately, policy is generally formu-
lated by fourth-best economists and ad-
ministered by third-best economists; it
is therefore very unlikely that a second-
best welfare optimum will result from
policies based on second-best arguments, 302
Statements in the legislative history of the
Interest Equalization Tax (IET)30 3 offered a variation
of the second-best argument. Supporters viewed it as
a sort of "optimum tariff" which would improve the
balance of payments (presumably in the amount of the
301. 4ee C.P, KINDLEBERGER, supra note 288, at 230-33.
302. Johnson, The Efficiency and Welfare Implications of
the International Corporation, in THE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION,
35, 56 (C.P, Kindleberger ed. 1970).
303. Interest Equalization Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 88-563, 78
Stat, 809 (1964) (repealed 1976). Though the lET was not a direct
control on capital movements, the subsequent Foreign Credit Res-
traint Program and Foreign Direct Investment Program did directly
inhibit capital flows from the United States. For the purpose of
illustrating the welfare implications of capital controls, the
tax and these programs are regarded as integral parts of a larger
policy of capital control.
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tax) without hindering capital movements.304 Some
might have regarded it as a means to compensate for the
divergence between the real and market returns to capi-
tal.3 05 It would be inaccurate, however, to ascribe
such a limited economic purpose to the tax, for the
testimony in support of the IET indicates that the
legislators' chief concern was to curb capital outflow
from the United States. 3 09 The tax was "designed to aid
our balance-of-payments position by restraining the
heavy and accelerated demand on our capital market from
other industrialized countries." 3 07 Not only was the
second-best argument subordinate to the predominant con-
cern for t~e capital account deficit, but it was ill-
applied.3 0  For the IET supported the exchange rate and
304. See N. FIELEKE, supra note 288, at 4, citing statements
from HEARINGS ON THE CONTINUING DEFICITS IN OUR BALANCE OF PAY-
MENTS AND THE RESULTING OUTFLOW OF GOLD: HEARINGS BEFORE A SUB-
COMM. OF THE SENATE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, Part I, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess. 127 (1965) [hereinafter cited as 1965 BALANCE OF
PAYMENTS HEARINGS, PART I] and from S. REP. NO. 1267, 88th Cong.,
2d Sess. 2 (1964).
305. Johnson, supra note 290, at 314-15.
306. See N. FIELEKE, supra note 288, at 4; IMF, ANNUAL
REPORT 53 (1964); Forte and Scott, The Use of Selective Taxes as
a Means of Achieving Balance of Payments Equilibrium, 3 NAT'L
BANKING REV. 439 (1966),
307. S. REP. NO. 1267, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1964).
308. The theoretical analysis of the Interest Equalization
Tax by Norman Fieleke concludes somewhat tentatively that the tax
did not successfully remedy the market imperfections to which some
had attributed the heavy outflow of capital from the United States
and, hence, that it did not constitute the "second-best" alterna-
tive. See N. FIELEKE, supra note 288, at 20. If the high cost
of borrowing abroad were due largely to institutional factors,
such as issue taxes or "tight" monetary policies, and if the IET
had equalized the costs of borrowing and offset the institutional
distortions, then the tax might have been a "second-best" measure,
actually improving the world distribution of capital. However, if
the differences between the United States and Europe in the cost
of borrowing were due primarily to differences in efficiency in
the respective capital markets and to a higher European demand for
capital relative to supply, then the imposition of the tax would
disrupt these efficiencies and impose greater costs in both mar-
mets; it then would not be justifiable as a second-best alterna-
tive. See id. at 9-12.
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the domestic policies that allowed the capital outflow
to continue, and it has had adverse welfare effects in
the United States and abroad.
The Interest Equalization Tax applied to certain
securities acquisitions made after July 18, 1963,309
and ceased to apply after June 30, 1974,310 following
several extensions and amendments. It imposed a tax
on "each acquisition by a United States person ... of
stock of a foreign issuer or of a debt obligation of
a foreign obligor... .,311 The tax was computed on a
sliding scale, increasing with the length of the period
to maturity from 1.05% to 15%, and the legislation as
amended provided the President with authority to adjust
the tax within the range of 0% to 22,5%.312 The IET
excluded several types of securities and debt obliga-
tions that might be construed as current international
transactions,313 thus avoiding the possible violation
of Article VI, Section 3 and Article VIII, Section
2Ca).314 The most important exemptions from the wel
fare standpoint were the securities of corporations of
less-developed countries, the obligations of less-
developed countries, and the direct investments in
corporations or partnerships 10% or more of which were
309. Pub. L. No. 88-563, 78 Stat. 809 (1964) (codified,
as amended, at I.R.C. §§ 4911-22, 4931 (1970)) (repealed 1976),
310, See Pub. L. No. 93-17, § 2, 87 Stat. 12 (1973);
Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1904(a)(21), 90 Stat. 1814 (1976).
311. Pub. L. No. 88-563, § 2(a), 78 Stat. 809 (1964)
(codified, as amended, at I.R.C. § 4911(a) (1970)) (repealed
1976).
312. Pub. L. No. 88-563, § 2(a), 78 Stat. 809 (1964)
(codified, as amended, at I.R.C. § 4911(b)(1)(B)(1970)) (repealed
1976); Pub. L. No. 90-59, § 3(a), 81 Stat. 145 (1967) (codified,
as amended, at I.R.C. § 4911(b)(2) (1970)) (repealed 1976).
313. See I.R.C. §§ 4911, 4915(a)(i), 4917, 4931 (1970)
(added by Pub. L. No. 88-563, 78 Stat. 809 (1964), and repealed by
§ 1904(a)(21) Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1814 (1976)).
314. Such exclusion of apparently current transactions was
probably not required by Article VIII, § 2Ca), supra note 1, for
the tax was indirect and did not regulate the use of foreign ex-
change as such, See Decision No. 1034-(60/27), supra note 58.
However, the exclusion might indicate a policy preference that
favors free trade over the free movement of capital,
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owned by a U.S. investor. 3 1 5
The Voluntary Foreign Credit Restraint Program aug-
mented the IET when, in 1967, President Johnson an-
nounced a set of "guidelines" for banks and nonbank
financial business. In 1968 the Foreign Direct Invest-
ment Program (FDIP), imposed a more stringent mandatory
version of these guidelines.316 Under the FDIP, (1)
capital outflow plus reinvested earnings were subject
to annual limits, (2) a prescribed share of total earn-
ings abroad was required to be repatriated, and (3) a
limitation was imposed on the short-term financial as-
sets held abroad by residents, requiring repatriation
of the excess. 3 1 7
Few have attempted to measure the welfare effects
of controls on capital movements and interest-equaliza-
tion taxes. 318 But those studies that exist provide
insight into the effects of such controls on the wel-
fare of the countries involved.
315. Pub. L. No. 88-563, § 2(a), 78 Stat. 809 (1964) (codi-
fled, as amended, at I.R.C. §§ 4915(a), 4916 (1970)) (repealed
1976).
316. See Exec. Order No. 11387, 3 C,F.R, § 90 (1968), 33 Fed.
Reg. 47 (1968). See aZso Commerce Dep't Order No. 184-A, 15 C.F.R.
§ 1000 (1969), 33 Fed. Reg. 49 (1968) establishing the Office of
Foreign Direct Investments, and Commerce Dep't Organizational
Order No. 25-3A, 39 Fed, Reg. 25677 (1974), abolishing that Office
and related regulations, effective June 30, 1974. The IMF took
note of the Foreign Direct Investment Program in IMF, NINETEENTH
ANNUAL REPORT ON EXCHANGE RESTRICTIONS 462-68 (1968).
317. IMF, supra note 316, at 462-63. The D.F Report notes
that many other countries maintained or imposed various capital
controls during this period; some were designed to discourage the
influx of capital and others were to prevent the exit of capital,
as appropriate to the countries' respective balance-of-payments
positions. Consider especially the controls imposed by Germany,
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands. See also
IMF, SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT ON EXCHANGE RESTRICTIONS 6, 396, 399,
581-82, 594-95 (1966).
The IET and other successful controls were noted with some
approval by the IM. See IMF, ANNUAL REPORT 53-55 (1966).
318. Analyses of capital controls and their effects include:
A. CATRNCROSS, CONTROL OF LONG-TERM INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MOVE-
XMNTS (1973); N. FIELEKE, supra note 288; Johnson, supra note 290.
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From the perspective of the investing, capital-
rich country, an enforced limitation on foreign invest-
ment, when the return on investment is higher abroad,
imposes the obvious loss of the difference between the
domestic and foreign rates of return. If the average
rate of return on direct investment abroad is relative-
ly high, as it was for U.S. investors in the 1960's,
then a steady, non-accelerating outflow of investment
capital would not long keep pace with the mounting
income from investments.319 Therefore, although a
short-term benefit might result from curbing the out-
flow of capital and, under fixed exchange rates, defi-
cit pressures would lessen, the long-term loss of in-
come could well outweigh this immediate benefit.3 2 0
The reduced outflow of capital, which would slow
economic activity and growth abroad, might have a fur-
ther adverse impact on the capital-exporting country
by restraining the demand for its exported goods. 321
In addition to the real economic loss of investment and
trade income, the country that imposes controls on the
export of capital may lose the accounting benefit of
receiving such income in foreign denominated currencies.
Although the IET and the FDIP did not contemplate a
serious drop in gross investment abroad (U.S. investors
were expected to finance foreign investments in foreign
capital markets),3 2 2 there is no way to determine
319. See E. DESPRES, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REFORM 210
(G. Meier ed. 1973). See also Pisar, Capital Restraint Programs,
in 1 U.S. COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT POLICY,
UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY IN AN INTERDEPENDENT
WORLD: COMPENDIUM OF PAPERS 87, 95 (1971).
320. Pisar, supra note 319, at 95. Prior to 1962, direct
investment abroad was the type of foreign investment that was most
significant as a deficit factor. See Note, The Interest Equaliza-
tion Tax, 17 STAN. L. REV. 710, 714 (1965). However, somewhat
surprisingly, direct investment was expressly exempted from the
IET (see I.R.C. § 4915 (1970) (repealed 1976)1 hut was subsequently
included in the Foreign Credit Restraint Program and in the
Foreign Direct Investment Program gee'Pisar, Capital Restraint
Programs, supra note 319, at 93 .
321. Pisar, supra note 319, at 91.
322. See Office of Foreign Direct Investment, Dep't of
Commerce, Regulation of Foreign Direct Investment, in 1 U.S.
COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT POLICY, supra
note 319, at 114.
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to what extent the inconvenience and potentially higher
cost of borrowing abroad actually did reduce the gross
foreign investment of U.S. residents. 3 2 3
From the perspective of other capital markets and
of borrowing countries, the imposition of controls by
capital-exporting countries may have adverse conse-
quences. Prior to the enactment of the IET, Treasury
Secretary Dillon acknowledged that the European capital
market was less efficient than that of the U.S. and
possibly incapable of providing funds in the amounts
which would be required by imposition of the capital
restraint program.3 24 Later observers have suggested
that the IET might have benefited the European capital
market in the long run, both by reducing competition
from the highly developed U.S. market, and by forcing
it to become more efficient. 3 2 5 Other economists, how-
ever, have held the U.S. capital restraint program
largely responsible for the slackening in 1966 of Euro-
pean industrial capital formation and economic growth,
and for the narrowing of profit margins.326 The slack-
ening of economic growth follows where the foreign
demand for capital, comprised of both U.S. investors
forced to borrow abroad and of foreign investors ex-
cluded from the U.S. market, combines with the domestic
demand to exceed supply of the European market. Such
excess demand necessarily results in less domestic
investment, and greater exports, of capital. These
observations lead to the inference that the European
economy could have expanded further had more capital
remained available for its domestic use at lower inter-
323. Even if gross foreign investment were not reduced,
the proportion of foreign income available for repatriation to
the U.S. would be diminished by the return which must accrue to
foreign lenders.
324. Secretary Dillon's Address to the 10th Annual Monetary
Conference of the American Bankers Association, Princeton, New
Jersey, March 7, 1963.
325. T.D. WILLETT, S. KATZ & W. BRANSON, EXCHANGE-RATE SYS-
TEMS, INTEREST RATES, AND CAPITAL FLOWS 29 (Princeton Essays in
International Finance No. 78, 1970).
326. E. DESPRES, supra note 319, at 259-60.
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est rates.32 7 But Europe suffered small discomfort3 2 8
when compared to less-developed countries.
Capital occupies a central position in the theory
of economic development. 3 2 9 Moreover, those developing
327. Id. Despite a "protected" capital market, high inter-
est rates, and prosperous financiers, it is likely that Europe
would have experienced greater real gains in investment, output,
and income, had the U.S. not imposed its capital restraint program.
The countervailing consideration is, of course, that Europe was
enabled to develop a more efficient capital market and to avoid
the burden (if indeed a burden it should be) of an even more
rapidly growing quantum of "Eurodollars." This in turn helped to
strengthen the dollar and to forestall the termination of the
"gold standard"; as the dollar was the major reserve currency, its
strengthening was of indirect benefit to all participants in the
international monetary system. See Note, supra note 320, at 723.
328. In light of the perceived deleterious effects of the
IET and the FDIP on the European economy, it is interesting to
note the persistent doubt among some European economists that the
potential benefit of international integration is as great in the
capital market as it is in the goods market. See M. WHITMAN,
SUSTAINING THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS SYSTEM; ISSUES FOR U.S.
POLICY 36 (1977). This doubt may account in part for the contin-
ued distinction, in the Second Amendment to the Articles, supra
note 3, between payments for current transactions and capital
transfers.
329. The need for foreign capital in developing countries
is clear. See generally W.R. CLINE, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY REFORM
AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 20 (1976); C. DIAZ-ALEJANDRO, LESS-
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES AND THE POST-1971 INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL
SYSTEM (1975); S.H. KI I, FOREIGN CAPITAL FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
(1970), especially Chapters 1 and 2; C.P. KINDLEBERGER, ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT, Chapter 5 (2d ed. 1965); R.F. MIDESELL, PROMOTING
UNITED STATES PRIVATE INVESTMENT ABROAD (1957); Kindleberger,
U.S. Policy toward Direct Investment with Special Reference to the
Less Developed Countries, in 2 U.S. COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL
TRADE AND INVESTMENT POLICY, supra note 319, at 329-51.
However, the net benefit accruing to the capital-importing
(less-developed) country seems to be contingent upon the propriety
of the investment and the sensitivity to local economic conditions
with which it is administered. See C.P. KINDLEBERGER, supra;
WHITMAN, SUSTAINING THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SYSTEM: ISSUES
AND POLICIES, supra note 328, regarding the investment policies
and techniques of multinational corporate investors, As to the
political and social ill-effects that attend improper negotiations,
1979]
YALE STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER
countries that are incapable of generating internally
the capital which a reasonable rate of economic growth
requires need investment capital urgently. The exclu-
sion of less-developed countries from any single capital
market shifts the capital demands of such countries to
markets that remain open to them. Increased demands
upon these markets will raise their interest rates.
Consequently the countries will be forced to forgo or
curtail economic growth to the extent that they do not
obtain needed capital. Any premium paid to foreign
lenders in higher interest rates may reduce the portion
of earnings that is available for reinvestment in the
developing country. 330
Similar consequences, though of lesser magnitude,
result from programs like the IET and the FDIP which,
while not excluding developing countries from a capital
market, do restrict the access of other, developed
countries to a particular market. Such restrictive pro-
grams cause heavy demand in the unrestricted markets,
as described above, and increase the cost of capital
329. (Continued)
bribes, and mismanagement, see G.P. VERBIT, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY
REFORM AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 19-44 (1975). For a discus-
sion of the less-developed countries' needs for foreign capital
for accounting (balance-of-payments) purposes, see generazy id.
at Chapter 2; C. ICHAOPOULOS, FINANCING NEEDS OF DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES (1975).
330. The excess of the market interest rate over the rate
that would have obtained had the exclusion not occurred might
-have been reinvested in the developing country or expatriated-
according to the business plans of the foreign lenders--if the
higher rate were not paid into the foreign capital markets. This,
of course, assumes that the developing country has not engaged in
retaliatory or compensatory controls on capital outflow. Europe
is about 2 per cent of the total issue. Se N. FIELEKE, supra
note 288, at 10. If the investment is in the form of government
or private bonds or loans, then not only the interest but also
the principal must eventually be expatriated to the foreign bond-
holder/lender. If the investment is direct (e.g., in physical
manufacturing facilities), then the principal is permanently, or
nearly permanently, located in the host country, though title may
be held abroad. Earnings, or a portion of them, are likely to be
expatriated to the foreign owner/investor, but the principal is
likely to remain in the host country,
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that developing countries can obtain in those markets.
Additionally, if the restricted participation of
developed countries increases the risk level of the
pool of available investments, then the interest rate
is likely to rise. The developing countries, though
not excluded from the market, would then face a higher
cost of capital or more burdensome terms than thereto-
fore. The exemption from the IET of the securities of
less-developed countries and the very liberal quotas on
direct investments in such countries provided in the
FDIP 331 did not offset fully the costs which these
programs imposed on some developing countries.
The case of Malaysia illustrates the adverse im-
pact of these capital control measures on the very
countries that the exclusions and liberal quotas were
designed to protect. In a 1967 memorandum to the
Malaysian Economic Planning Unit, Mr. Emile Despres,
a prominent international economist, found a serious
shortcoming in the external borrowing of the country.33 2
Mr. Despres felt that the shortcoming would result in a
"marked retardation" of economic growth and per capita
real income, and would possibly worsen Malaysia's
balance of payments irremediably.3 3 3 These circum-
stances are "an instructive case study of the injury
inflicted on innocent bystanders by the measures, many
of them both futile and pernicious, taken by the UniteO
States and Britain for balance-of-payments reasons. "334
In view of the welfare benefits that accrue to all
parties from the optimum distribution of capital, and
the special importance of foreign capital to developing
countries, only the most thorough theoretical and empi-
rical analyses should justify the imposition of con-
trols on capital movements. Such controls should have
331. See Office of Foreign Investment, Deptt of Commerce,
Regulation of Foreign Direct Investment, in 1 U.S. COMMISSION ON
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT POLICY, supra note 319, at 116.
The less-developed countries were subject to the "Schedule A'
quotas, which from 1968 to 1971 limited the allowable annual in-
vestment to 110% of the base period GL965-66) investment.
332. E. DESPRES, supra note 319, at 154.
333. Id. These rather unattractive prospects arose, despite
Malaysia's generally well-developed economic infrastructure and
other strengths, as a consequence of its need for development
capital. See id. at 154-71.
334. Id. at 179.
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to meet the presumption that they are distortive of
the market and harmful to the world welfare. Where
this presumption is overcome and where the suggested
analyses are sanctioned by international scrutiny,
policies of control might be justified as second-best
measures,
D. Capital Mobi'lZty and the Transmssion and Genera-
tion of InfZlation
The problem of inflation pervades the economies of
the world. Due to the direct link between changes in
exchange rates and the international prices of traded
goods, much of the recent discussion of the inflation
problem has focused on the character of exchange-rate
systems. Capital mobility, however, receives only
occasional reference, for its influence on price levels
is less direct. Capital movements respond to interest
rates and wealth, and thus operate first upon the ex-
change rate and national income, and only indirectly
upon price levels. Therefore'an analysis of the role
of capital mobility in the inflation problem relies
upon discussions of the exchange-rate systems.
Many have regarded flexible exchange rates as a
means to "bottle up" inflation in the country where it
is generated and to insulate the rest of the world from
its transmission.3 3 5 Other things remaining unchanged,
the currency of a country which experiences a higher
rate of inflation than the rest of the world depreci-
ates.336  This depreciation offsets the incipient in-
crease in demand for imports and the probable decrease
in demand in foreign countries for exports from the in-
flating country. The relatively higher domestic prices
therefore will not affect the price indices of foreign
335. Crockett and Goldstein, supra note 224, at 510. ,ee
also M. FRIEDMAN, ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS, supra note 217, at
177-78; R.N. Cooper, supra note 259, at 159; A. Swoboda, Monetary
Approaches to the Transmission and Generation of Worldwide Infla"
tion (November 21, 1974) (unpublished paper presented at the Brook-
ings Institution Conference on Worldwide Inflation, Washington,
D.C.).
336. R. Dornbusch, Managed Flating: An Appraisal of the Post
Bretton Woods International Financial System 8 (November 4, 1974;
revised December 1977) Cunpublished paper prepared for the Money
and Banking Workshop of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis).
[VOL. 5
1979] IMF AND CAPITAL M~OBILITY 97
trading partners, and the inflated currency will not
command an inflated purchasing power abroad. 3 7
However, flexible exchange rates may insulate in-
flation imperfectly in the short run. Some countries
may face the transmission of monetary disturbances via
capital ovements resulting from changes in interest
rates.33 Where a country experiencing inflation has
an interest rate that is lower or decreasing relative
to interest rates elsewhere, capital may flow out of
that country and into foreign markets as portfolios
adjust, The foreign country, in turn, may experience
the symptoms of monetary expansion until the portfolio
equilibrium is reached at the new levels of interest
and exchange rates, Both the speed of the exchange"
rate adjustment and the particular conditions that
determine the trade-off between unemployment and infla-
tion in the recipient countries limit the inflationary
potential of the capital inflow. But it is important
to note that neither the mobility of capital nor the
exchange-rate adjustment are the causal factors here.
Rather, they are endogenous variables that respond,
like the price level, to monetary policy.3 39 The ab-
sence of a causal relationship afflicts most studies
that attribute an inflationary bias to a particular ex-
change-rate regime,
337. Some economists have noted a distinction between
"monetary" and "real" disturbances in price levels. They point
out that, where disturbances are primarily monetary phenomena
(which price disturbances frequently are understood to be--see
G. Haberler, Some CurrentZy Suggested Explanations and Cures for
Inflationpin INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AND THE INFLATION PROBLEM
(K. Brunner & A. Meltzer eds. 1976)), changes in relative price
levels can be fully offset by exchangerate movements. However,
where the disturbances are mainly real, such as divergent trends
in productivity or consumption of non-renewable resources, rela-
tive changes in price levels cannot be offset by exchange-rate
changes. See generally Dornbusch, Managed Floating: An Appraisal
of the Post Bretton Woods International Financial System, supra
note 336; B. Balassa, The Purchasing-Power Parity Doctrine:- A
Reappraisal, 72 J. POL. ECON. 584 (1964); P. Samuelson,
TheoreticZ -otes -on.-2rada Problems-, 46-REVT, ECON. & STATISTICS 145
(1964).
338. R. Dornbusch, Payments Disequilibrium--Discussion, 65
AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC. 133, 148 (1975).
339. TI D. WILLETT, FLOATING EXCHANGE RATES AND INTERNA-
TIONAL MONETARY REFORM 58 (1977).
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This limited potential of flexible rates to trans-
mit inflation in the short run contrasts with the tend-
ency of fixed exchange rates to enforce a "sharing" of
the inflation of one country with the rest of the
world. 340 The capacity of fixed rates to transmit in-
flation is similar in operation to, but more extended
and of greater quantitative impact than, the short-term
transmission that flexible rates may effect. Under the
system of fixed rates, there is no adjustment in the
exchange rate to curb imports or to lower the foreign
price of exports. Consequently, inflation spreads to
foreign goods markets through the increased import de-
mand of the inflating country and the higher prices of
its exported goods. If the inflating country does en-
gage in restrictive monetary policy, thereby raising
its interest rates relative to those abroad, an inflow
of foreign capital is likely to frustrate its restric-
tive policy,341 And, if it does not engage in monetary
restraint, the interest rate may decline relative to
those abroad. Foreign governments will seek to avoid
the inflationary impact of the increased import demand
by raising their rates and causing a capital outflow
from the less-restrained economies. This outflow will
aggravate the inflationary demand conditions in the
recipient countries.
Flexible exchange rates not only inhibit the trans-
mission of inflation from one country to another (ex-
cept in the short term), but they also may tend to
generate inflation.342 One means by which flexible
rates may generate inflation is by increasing uncer-
tainty and instability in the exchange market. Such
uncertainty raises the cost to exchange dealers or
international traders of "hedging" in the forward ex-
change market to protect against sudden fluctuations in
the exchange rates. These costs, added to the costs of
production and distribution,343 cause the "prices of
consumer goods to increase. Professor Milton Friedman,
having anticipated this criticism in his classic essay,
The Case For Flexible Exchange Rates, pointed out that
340. See P. Kenen, The Theory of Optimum Currency Areas, in
MONETARY PROBLEMS OF THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY 53 (R. Mundell and
A. Swoboda eds. 1967); and Crockett and Goldstein, supra note 224,
at 510.
341. See generally part V, A, 2 of this article.
342. See Crockett and Goldstein, supra note 224.
343. See id. at 512-13.
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"the substitution of flexible for rigid exchange rates
changes the form in which uncertainty is manifested; it
may not change the extent of uncertaint st all, and,
indeed, may even decrease uncertainty. ''14 t Thus, even
if a system of flexible exchange rates were to increase
uncertainty in the foreign exchange markets, it might
well decrease uncertainty in the use of fiscal, mone-
tary, and income policies. A flexible system would
also discourage the use of large, discrete, and unex-
pected changes in "par" values of currencies. Whether
flexible rates generate inflationary trends therefore
will depend, in part, on the net cha ge in the level of
certainty which the system effects.3
If, as Professor Friedman has suggested, specula-
tive capital movements under flexible excha ge rates
are stabilizing rather than destabilizing,346 then the
high mobility of capital would tend to reduce uncertain-
ty and minimize the inflationary potential of the flexi-
ble exchange-rate system. Stabilizing speculation will
result because speculators who wrongly anticipate the
equilibrium exchange rate will either disappear from
the market, or bear a large portion of the costs of
traders' "hedging" in the forward market.347
Recent data show some movements in exchange rates
which are, by historical standards, large.348 However,
344. M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 217, at 174,
345. Crockett and Goldstein, supra note 224, at 513-15. See
generally EUROCURRENCIES AND THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM
(D. Logue, J. Makin & C. Stem eds. 1976).
Alexandre Kafka notes that frequent small changes in exchange
rates would probably generate expectations of further frequent
changes, and that large infrequent changes in exchange rates would
probably generate expectations of further large and infrequent
changes. A KAFKA, THE IMF: THE SECOND COMING? 12 (Princeton
Essays in International Finance No. 94, 1977). It seems reasonable
to assume that the quantum of uncertainty in the system might actu-
ally be greater under the second posited circumstance than under
the first.
346. M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 217, at 175.
347. Zd,
348. See M, DOOLEY & J. SHAFER, A NAUYSI$ OF SHQRT-RUN
EXCHANGE RATE BEHAVIOR: MARCH, 1973-DECEMBER, 1975 (Fed. Reserve
Board Int'l Finance Discussiont Paper No. 76, 1976); Hirsch and
Higham, Floating Rates - Expectations and Experience, 102 THREE
BANKS REV. 3 (1974). Speculative capital movements and exchange
flexibility may affect certainty in the market and, thereby, the
price level, for "the exchange market mirrors the volatility of
international short-term financial markets." See R. Dornbusch,
supra note 336, at 18.
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longer-term studies of flexible exchange rates reveal
that the major foreign exchange markets have not be n
subject to persistent, poorly-behaved speculation.349
There is no a priori reason to expect the size of ex-
change-rate changes, in net, to be significantly
greater under flexible rates, 3 5 0 nor is there reason
to expect capital movements to be more destabilizing
under flexible rates. The volatility that does exist
in the exchange markets may result from the instability
of the underlying international economic environment
and the intervention of central banks to "manage" ex-
change rates. 
3 5 1
Exchange-rate changes that persist long enough to
be reflected in price indices result from either under-
lying conditions Ce.g., scarcity of resources) or specu-
lative movements of capital that correctly anticipated
such changes.3 5 2 There is no consensus that speculative
movements of capital have been destabilizing,353 and
much of the evidence indicates that they have not been
so. In fact the inflationary consequence of specula-
tive capital movements is likely to be very small rela-
tive to the pressures that are generated by underlying
economic conditions, Nevertheless, to the extent that
speculative capital flows contribute to uncertainty or
are destabilizing under flexible exchange rates, they
contribute to the generation of inflation.
Flexible rates exert their clearest inflationary
impact on the price-level of a depreciating country.
Assuming that -prices and costs of imported goods are
fixed in terms of the supplier's currency, then
349. TD. WILLETT, supra note 339, at 36-37.
350. See Crockett and Goldstein, supra note 224, at 528 &
n. 28 (citing S.I. Katz, Exchange Risk under Fixed and FlexBle
Exchange Rates, 83 N.Y.U. SCH. FINANCE BULL. I 7 (1972)).
351. T.D. WILLETT, supra note 339, at 32-36, 60.
352. 1d. at 62.
353. Whitman, The Payments Adjustment Process and the
Exchange Rate Regime, 65 AM, ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC. 133, 138
(1975). Whitman concludes that speculation has appeared to be
generally stabilizing, See also 'Farber, Roll, gnd Splnick, EmpIriaZ
Study of Risk Under Fixed and Flexible Exchange Rates, in STABILI-
ZATION OF THE DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY 236 (K. Brunner
& A. Meltzer eds. 1977).
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depreciation of the importing country' currency will
raise the domestic price of imports.54 The sale or
use of the imported goods in domestic production will
affect domestic wholesale and consumer prices as
well. 355 Where monetary expansion accouhts for;the
depreciation, no immediate rise in the price of exports
takes place,' despite the import price inflation, for
the supply prices are determined on the basis of pre-
expansion cost 356 and many are set in commercial con-
tracts and understandings. Although inflexible in the
short term, over time the higher supply prices and pro-
duction costs generated by the import price inflation
affect the prices of exports.3 5 7 This lag in the ad-
justment of export prices to exchange-rate changes has
a dual impact on the depreciating country. It effects
an inflationary "squeeze" by raising the price of im-
ports more rapidly than the price of exports and it
gives the country a competitive advantage on foreign
markets fo the duration of the lag in export price in-
flation. 35i
Where currency depreciations are frequent, the
depreciating country may face an upward-ratcheting
price index.3 5 9 Some economists have suggested that
the depreciating country will bear the full burden of
the price adjustment. Their prediction rests on the
assumption that the prices in countries with stable or
appreciating currencies will not decline in response to
the relatively lower prices of imports to those coun-
tries.3 oO However, this assumption conflicts with re-
354. Dornbusch and Krugman, supra note 248, at 558-60.
355. See id. at 568-75; R. Dornbusch, supra note 336, at 24.
356. R. Dornbusch, supra note 336, at 11.
357. Id. at 14-16. Dornbusch notes that the lag time in
price adjustment for currency depreciation may be as much as two
years, though the long-term elasticity of prices with respect to
exchange-rate changes is quite high.
358. See id,
359. See generally id.; Crockett and Goldstein, supra note
224, at 525-30. As to world inflation, however, the size and
frequency of exchange-rate changes, though generating an upward
bias in prices, does not correlate with the magnitude of price
increases. Perhaps a more important element in world inflation is
the size of the economy most affected by a particular change in ex-
change rates, and the random occurrence of shortage and surplus.
360. Crockett and Goldstein, supra note 224, at 523-24.
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cent data which show that appreciation does reduce im-
port price inflation and, indeed, may render it nega-
tive.3 bl Such data would indicate that the lower
prices in the appreciating countries affect the price
of imports to the devaluing countries, and partially
help to offset the inflationary impact of deprecia-
tion. 362 Therefore, although the depreciating country
experiences inflation of domestic prices, downward price
adjustments in other countries will moderate the infla-
tion,
In summary, it appears that the inflationary impact
of increased capital mobility under flexible exchange
rates is small, if it exists at all. There is no
causal relationship between capital mobility and in-
flation, except to the extent that such mobility
generates destabilizing speculation or exchange-rate
volatility and, thus, increases the cost of market un-
certainty, but even this relationship may be doubted.
Flexible rates tend to insulate countries from foreign
inflation, though countries with a depreciating curren-
cy will experience an increase in the price of imports,
to which capital mobility may contribute indirectly.
Nevertheless, most inflationary pressures flow from
underlying economic conditions that are independent of
the mobility of capital.
VI. Conclusion
The Articles of Agreement of the International
Monetary, Fund prohibit members from restricting or un-
duly, delaying payments and transfers for current inter-
national transactions. This provision is meant to
further the purposes of the IMF: to facilitate the ex-
pansion and balanced growth of international trade, to
promote high levels of employment and real income, and
to develop the productive resources of all members.
The Articles give great latitude to members to
restrict and control capital movements for any purpose.
In providing this latitude the original drafters
responded to the desire for domestic monetary autonomy
under fixed exchange rates, the fear of destabilizing
speculative movements of capital, and the need to
361. R. Dornbusch, supra note 336, at 24-25.
362. See Crocket and Goldstein, supra note 224, at 524.
/
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preserve a tool for regulating the external balance of
the capital account.
The concerns of the drafters at Bretton Woods pre-
vail today. As a consequence, although the Second
Amendment to the Articles affirms a system of flexible
exchange rates, it retains the distinction between cur-
rent payments and capital movements. Hortatory terms
remind members of an "essential purpose" of the IT.F: to
facilitate the free exchange of capital. But countries
remain free to use any means to control capital move-
ments that does not unduly restrict current payments or
the settlement of commitments. Private parties have
brought members' restrictions on capital and/or current
payments before the courts of various countries, These
private actions are based on a provision of the Articles
that requires the courts of any member to hold unen-
forceable exchange contracts that are contrary to the
exchange regulations of any other member when those
regulations are consistent with the Articles. Gener-
ally, courts are not to recognize other membersl regu-
lations which either restrict payments for current
transactions or unduly delay the settlement of commit-
ments. However, regulations restricting or controlling
payments for purely capital transactions are to be
recognized and contracts contrary to such regulations
are to be held unenforceable.
Occasionally, where the capital nature of a transac-
tion was evident, the courts have upheld members' con-
trols affecting the transaction and correctly refused
to enforce contracts that contravened the members' con-
trols. These cases involved agreements for the exchange
of currencies or the assignment of equity interests.
However, in numerous cases where a transaction possessed
both current and capital characteristics, the courts
have failed to analyze these economic attributes to
determine the consistency of exchange controls that af-
fect the transaction. Rather, the courts have assumed
incorrectly that the controls were consistent with the
Articles. The finding of a consistent exchange control
would seem to compel the courts to hold unenforceable
those exchange contracts that are contrary to the con-
trols. But, in their desire to avoid unjust results,
the courts have fashioned remedies on other grounds,
such as territorial limitation of the control, quasi-
delictual liability, and a narrow reading of "exchange
contract,"'
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These cases reveal that the courts frequently have
arrived at the "right" result by the "wrong" reasoning.
Judicial reluctance to apply economic analyses has per-
haps prevented diplomatic affront to the countries
whose arguably inconsistent controls were litigated.
However, the noneconomic approach has produced an in-
coherent body of 3 ase law and it has failed, in the
difficult cases, 393 to provide adequate protection to
payments that are in substance current transactions.
Clearly, the courts should find such regulations, which
restrict what are actually current payments, to be in-
consistent with the Articles. Where exchange contracts
contravene such inconsistent regulations, the courts of
members need not hold these contracts unenforceable
under the Articles. In upholding the contracts the
courts then could provide the desired relief more ,
directly, and by disregarding the inconsistent regula-
tions they would call attention to members' failures to
abide by the Articles.
To be sure, the economic consequence of a more
rigorous economic analysis in the cases would be slight
indeed. Many of the significant exchange controls are
indisputably within the present power of members to im-
pose, and parties seldom undertake transactions in-
volving payments that contravene these controls.
A more effective measure would be to afford capital
movements the same degree of protection from which pay-
ments for current international transactions now bene-
fit. This would relieve the courts of a distinction
which they are ill-equipped to make, avoid the possibi-
lity of diplomatic affront, and free the economically
significant payments and capital movements from restric-
tive controls.
This proposition is well.founded in economics. The
recent advent of flexible exchange rates has negated or
diluted the validity of the historical concerns upon
363. E.g., Confederation Life Association v. Ugalde, 151 So.2d
315 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963), rev'd in part, 164 So.2d 1 (Fla.
1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 915 C1964) Csee pp. 33-35, supra);
Perutz v. Bohemian Discount Bank in Liquidation, 279 App. Div. 386,
110 N.Y.S.2d 446 (App. Div. 1952), revd, 304 N.Y. 533, 110 N.E.2d
6 (1953) (see pp. 44--45, supra),
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which the original distinction between current and
capital payments rested. No longer should the mobi-
lity of capital limit the effectiveness of domestic
monetary policy. To the contrary, capital movements
in response to changes in the interest rate enhance
the impact of monetary expansion on domestic income,
output, and employment; the greater and mobility of
capital, the greater the effectiveness of monetary
policy under flexible exchange rates.
Increased mobility of capital, however, and the
consequently greater monetary effectiveness, entails
some costs, The traditional Mundell-Fleming model pre-
dicts that the high mobility of capital under flexible
exchange rates will cause fiscal policy to be less
effective on domestic real variables, where fiscal ex-
pansion is accompanied by monetary restraint. This
phenomenon would tend to shift the locus of economic
control from fiscal policy-makers toward monetary
policy-makers. However, a newly developed "monetary"
model indicates that capital mobility will not greatly
inhibit the effectiveness of fiscal policy, especially
where expectations of future exchange-rate changes are
rational. The improbability that greater capital
mobility would seriously curb fiscal effectiveness, and
the potential benefit of stronger monetary policy, are
considerations that warrant a reduction in national
restrictions on capital movements. Even if fiscal ef-
fectiveness were compromised, a shift in the locus of
economic control toward monetary policy-makers would
not be wholly disadvantageous. For monetary policy is
the more flexible economic tool ands-to the extent that
it is the Governors of the Federal Reserve who formu-
late policy--it is less likely to be affedted by trans-
ient changes in the political temperament than is fiscal
policy developed largely by the Congress and the Execu-
tive Branch.
Another cost of flexible exchange rates and increas-
ed capital mobility lies in their potentially inflation-
ary impact. If flexible rates and speculative movements
of capital tend to destabilize the exchange markets and
to increase market uncertainty, the commercial costs of
such uncertainty would emerge in inflated consumer
prices, However, there is no evidence that speculative
capital movements are destabilizing; nor is there evi-
dence to show that flexible rates and exchange uncer-
tainty result in a net increase in uncertainty. On the
contrary, speculation may have a stab izing effect, and
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flexible rates may reduce the exchange dealers' fear of
large, sudden rate adjustments and disadvantageous na-
tional economic policies designed to remedy payments
imbalances. Flexible rates and capital mobility may
actually decrease the level of uncertainty in interna-
tional commerce, with the remaining uncertainty due in
part to heavy governmental intervention in the exchange
markets and instability in the underlying economic en-
vironment. Therefore, inflation from the costs of in-
creased uncertainty cannot conclusively be attributed
to flexible rates or to capital mobility.
Depreciation of a country's currency generates a
once-and-for-all increase in the price of imports. To
the extent that imports are not reduced, consumer prices
in that country rise. Over time, the price levels in
other countries adjust downward, reflecting the less
expensive exports purchased from the depreciating coun-
try, Because the depreciation operates directly on the
price level, speculative and other movements of capital
have no immediate impact on this sort of inflation.
Yet capital flows are implicated, for under flexible
exchange rates the most effective expansionary monetary
policy is that which causes the largest outflow of
capital and, thereby, the greatest exchange deprecia-
tion. This depreciation stimulates export demand and
domestic income, output, and employment. Hence, the
benefit of more effective monetary policy must be
weighed against the cost of occasional increases in the
domestic price level that accompany exchange deprecia
tion and movements of capital,
Exchange depreciation almost certainly curbs imports
and shifts world demand toward the relatively cheaper
domestic goods. It is unlikely, therefore, that the
impact on the domestic price level of a depreciation
will be so great as to offset completely the gains in
income and output that are obtained through the expan-
sion and attendant depreciation. However, where an
economy depends heavily on imports for which there is no
adequate domestic substitute--e.g, the U.S. demand for
foreign oil--depreciation may have more serious infla-
tionary consequences.
The most compelling argument for increased mobility
of capital is the welfare argument. The encouragement
of world economic growth calls for the most efficient
distribution of the factors of production. Capital, one
such factor, should be applied where the return on its
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application is greatest. Failure to achieve such a
distribution retards economic development in capital-
poor countries, and lowers return on capital invest-
ments by capital-rich countries. Various economic
policies, tax laws, concern for national security, and
other factors on which investment decisions often de-
pend may create distortions in domestic and interna-
tional markets for capital. Such distortions, how-
ever, cannot be so accurately perceived as to permit
much success in compensating policies. The Interest
Equalization Tax and the Foreign Direct Investment
Program were considered by some to be remedial measures
to equalize the costs of borrowing in the U.S. and
abroad, yet these measures might well have had the
effect of further aggravating the inefficient distri-
bution of capital, especially for capital-importing
countries.
The predominant considerations, then, favor greater
capital mobility. To this end, the Articles of Agree -
ment of the International Monetary Fund should be amend-
ed to remove the present distinction between current
payments and capital movements, This would prohibit
members from restricting capital movements, as they are
prohibited from restricting current payments, except
where the Fund approves such restrictions. Such an
amendment would reduce the incidence of restrictions on
capital movements while retaining a means to control
such movements should they genuinely disrupt the inter-
national monetary system. Necessary controls would be
subject to the scrutiny and approval of the IMF, all of
whose members have an interest in assuring the proper
administration of such controls. Additionally, this
limitation on the capacity of members to restrict
capital movements, and the international scrutiny to
which permitted controls would be subject, might pro-
vide an incentive for greater coordination of national
economic policies and the realization of the full bene-
fits of capital mobility.
The proposed amendment thus would relieve the courts
of the necessity to rationalize economic distinctions
between current transactions and capital movements. By
affording the same protections to capital movements as
are currently applied in aid of current transactions,
the amendment would greatly enhance the mobility of
capital among member nations. This would result in a
more efficient world allocation of capital, increasing
capital flow to capital-importing countries and raising
returns on capital to capital-exporting countries,
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thereby, significantly enhancing world economic welfare,
Finally, the increased mobility of capital that would
result from the amendment would make capital flows more
responsive to domestic monetary policy and contribute
to greater economic selfdetermination for member
nations.
